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PREFACE 
Trading of Treasury bills occurs in the weekly auction 
market and the daily secondary market. After the auction 
occurs on Monday, the outcome of the auction is publicized. 
The information in the auction results is examined in this 
study. 
Conclusions from examining information in the auction 
results include the following. First, the secondary market 
is slightly semi-strong form inefficient with respect to the 
percent of competitive auction bids accepted, the percent of 
unaccepted auction bids, the tail spread (high - low 
accepted auction discount rate) and the change in the 
Federal funds rate. 
Next, the auction price was examined and found to be 
downward biased. The bidding adjustment which occurs due to 
the downward biasing is not found, however, to be determined 
by the auction results. The return in Tuesday's secondary 
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market, on the other hand, is determined by the price level 
in the auction. 
Third, the Monday auction rate, which acts as a forward 
rate for a bill to be delivered on Thursday, is found to be 
a biased expectation of Thursday's spot rate. Finally, the 
auction results are not found to be determinants of the 
change in the secondary market bid-ask spread. 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my committee 
members who assisted me in completing this dissertation, 
Ors. Ronald K. Miller, Tim Krehbiel, Janice w. Jadlow, and 
Tim c. Ireland. In particular, I wish to thank my chairman, 
Dr. Ronald K. Miller, for his guidance, knowledge, and 
especially his encouragement to always achieve what I 
thought was impossible. 
Other individuals were highly instrumental in my 
completion of this dissertation. Thanks to my husband, Jim, 
for his love and support and for "enjoying the process" with 
me (or at least trying to). Thanks to Dimmick and Pauline 
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Bymaster and Richard and Ann Kenny for their continued love, 
prayers, and belief that Jim and I could earn these degrees. 
Thanks also to my parents for their many days of help on 
this project. Thanks to Dr. James Tripp, Dr. Carolyn Tripp, 
and Dr. Danny Reeder for their support, encouragement, and 
most of all for their friendship. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the information 
in the Treasury bill auction results. Four methods are used 
to evaluate the information content of the Treasury bill 
auction results. The first method examines the efficiency 
of the Treasury bill secondary market with regard to 
information in the auction results. The next method 
examines whether or not the information in the Treasury bill 
auction explains the downward biased auction results. The 
third method examines whether the auction rate is an 
unbiased expectation of the asked rate on Thursday in the 
secondary market, given the information in the auction 
market on Monday. The last method examines the information 
in the Treasury bill auction market as a determinant of the 
secondary market bid-asked spread. 
Scope of Study 
The first question addressed is whether the Treasury 
bill secondary market is efficient with respect to the 
information carried in the announcement of the Treasury bill 
auction results. This is one aspect of the Treasury bill 
secondary market which has not been examined extensively. 
1 
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The information used for this question relates to the 
strength of demand and the dispersion of information. 
Increased demand may not only show up as an increase in the 
dollar quantity demanded but also may show up in the form of 
more aggressive bids (Lumpkin, 1986). The dispersion of 
information, strength of demand, and aggressiveness of 
bidders can be seen in three pieces of information from the 
announcement of the auction results: the tail spread, the 
competitive bids accepted percentage, and the bids not 
filled percentage. 
The dispersion of auction prices and aggressiveness of 
bidders can be seen through the Treasury bill auction tails 
and the tail spread. Two tails can be calculated using the 
average bid price accepted. The high tail is the difference 
between the highest price accepted (lowest discount rate) of 
the accepted bid and the average price of the accepted bids. 
The low tail is the difference between the lowest price 
accepted (highest discount rate) and the average price of 
the accepted bids. The tail spread is the sum of the low 
tail and the high tail. The tail spread can be calculated 
and used as one variable from the announcement of the 
auction results to examine the efficiency of the Treasury 
bill secondary market. 
Two other pieces of information which can be 
calculated from the announced auction results and used in 
the examination of secondary market efficiency are the 
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percent of competitive bids accepted and the percent 
overbid. The percent of competitive bids accepted can be 
calculated as the dollar volume of competitive bids accepted 
divided by the total dollar volume of bids accepted. The 
percent overbid is the percent of total bids submitted which 
were not filled in the Treasury bill auction. The percent 
of competitive bids accepted and the percent overbid would 
give an idea of the strength of demand for the Treasury 
bills in the weekly auction. These, along with the tail 
spread, may be used in an empirical investigation to 
determine if the variables are significant pieces of 
information in predicting the change in the asked rate on 
Treasury bills in the secondary market in a semi-strong form 
efficiency study. 
The second area addressed is based on auction theory. 
Cammack (1991) notes that the average auction rate tends to 
be less than the rate on similar bills in the secondary 
market near the time of the auction. The auction rate can, 
therefore, be said to be downward biased. Given this 
downward biasing, Cammack suggests a bidding adjustment 
occurs. This bidding adjustment is measured by the 
difference between the auction price and the secondary 
market price. The expected components of the auction 
results variables concerning the dispersion of opinion and 
the number of bidders are considered to be determinants of 
the bidding adjustment. With the announcement of the 
auction results late Monday, the unexpected components of 
these auction results variables are considered to be 
determinants of the Tuesday secondary market return. This 
portion of the study uses the models from Cammack's study 
(1991) to examine downward biasing of auction prices and 
Treasury bill auction information. 
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After market efficiency and the downward biasing of the 
auction rate are examined, the relationship between the 
Treasury bill auction rate and the Treasury bill secondary 
market rate on Thursday is studied. Since the bills from 
Monday's auction are not issued until Thursday, it is 
anticipated that the average auction rate reflects the 
Treasury bill rates expected to prevail when the bills are 
issued. If the two rates are not significantly different, 
then the Treasury bill auction rate is an unbiased 
expectation of Thursday's Treasury bill secondary market 
rate. 
If the announcement of Treasury bill auction results 
resolves uncertainty or adds uncertainty, these auction 
results are also expected to affect the bid-asked spread in 
the secondary markets. The final question addressed by this 
study is whether the auction results variables -- percent 
competitive, percent overbid, and tail spread -- have a 
significant impact on the change in the bid-asked spread. 
If these variables do have a significant impact, then the 
auction results can be considered a determinant of the 
Treasury bill secondary market bid-asked spreads. 
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Four areas have been presented which are examined. In 
order to conduct the research, data concerning the Treasury 
bill auction and secondary markets was gathered for the time 
period August 1985 to August 1990. The data is then used 
with regression methodology to examine the four main areas. 
Justification for the study 
Every Monday and Tuesday new information is released 
concerning the results of the Treasury bill auction which 
may impact or be related to factors in the Treasury bill 
secondary market. This information can be used to examine 
Treasury bill secondary market efficiency, determinants of 
the downward biased auction prices and secondary market 
returns, the auction rate as an unbiased expectation, and 
determinants of the secondary market bid-asked spread. 
An efficient market is one in which current market 
prices reflect all information and fully and instantaneously 
reflect any new, relevant information. The typical 
assumptions given for an efficient market include: 
transactions costs are zero for all participants; 
information is costless for all participants; and 
information is available to all market players at the same 
time. The justification for questioning market efficiency 
comes from an examination of the breakdown of the 
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assumptions of market efficiency. Market inefficiency in 
the Treasury bill secondary market could be due to: not all 
market players being able to interpret information; not all 
market players having access to the same information; and 
information being costly to obtain. 
There will be diverse abilities among traders to access 
and interpret information in the auction and secondary 
markets. Sales of new Treasury bills occur only through the 
Treasury bill auction. One class of bidders in the auction 
submits noncompetitive bids, and these bidders are usually 
investors who are less informed of what the true rates on 
Treasury bills should be. The second class of bidders, 
competitive bidders, submit bids which compete to win new 
Treasury bills based on prices bid. Each competitive bidder 
has information which is different from other competitive 
bidders. This fact is evidenced by the range of prices 
submitted as bids in the auction. 
Most of the competitive bids in the auction each week 
come from dealers. ·These dealers are thought to have 
superior information, because their firms typically have a 
research department which monitors events affecting the 
Treasury bill markets. They also communicate among 
themselves which gives them access to information regarding 
the current conditions in the Treasury bill market. Not all 
dealers, however, will have the same information as 
witnessed by varying bid-asked quotes from different dealers 
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(Garbade, Pomrenze, and Silber; 1979). Non-dealers and some 
noncompetitive bidders do not have such immediate access to 
this information nor the specialized abilities to interpret 
the information. Consequently, the Treasury bill secondary 
market may not be fully efficient since not all participants 
in the market have the same access to the same information 
nor equal abilities to interpret it. 
Another factor which allows for the breakdown of market 
efficiency in the Treasury bill secondary market is the fact 
that information is not free. The competitive bidders 
choose to obtain current market and economic information, 
but in doing so incur costs. Verification of information 
being costly is seen in dealers maintaining a bid-asked 
spread in the secondary market as a way to recoup the costs 
incurred to obtain information. If information was not 
costly and if all market players including non-dealers had 
the same information, the bid-asked spread would not exist. 
Given that information is costly to obtain and 
difficult to interpret, uninformed market players may look 
to the informed players for information rather than incur 
the cost. The uninformed market players can obtain 
information on Treasury bill rates and the strength of 
demand for Treasury bills. The informed players' 
information can be proxied through the current prices in the 
secondary market, the prices realized in the auction (the 
tail spread= high auction discount rate - low auction 
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discount rate), the percent of competitive bids (competitive 
bids accepted/total bids accepted in the auction), and the 
percent overbid (bids not accepted/total bids in the 
auction). If the Treasury bill secondary market is 
efficient, the secondary market rates should fully reflect 
the information of the auction's competitive bidders prior 
to the announcement of the results. 
The information from the auction results -- percent 
competitive bids accepted, percent overbid, and tail 
spread -- can also be examined as determinants of the change 
in the bid-asked spread in the secondary market for Treasury 
bills. The dealers' bid-asked spreads in the·Treasury bill 
secondary market exist for dealers to recover costs they 
incur and to offset losses due to exchanges with traders who 
have better information. The dealers will alter their 
spreads as they receive new information regarding factors 
such as supply and demand conditions, competitors' actions, 
informed trader activity, and Federal Reserve policy. The 
percent competitive bids accepted, percent overbid, and tail 
spread from the auction results will provide information to 
the dealer concerning the strength of demand for auctioned 
Treasury bills and the number of informed traders 
participating or desiring to participate in the auction 
market. This information may then be used by the dealers in 
changing their bid-asked spreads in the secondary market. 
9 
The Treasury bills which are purchased in Monday's 
auction are not issued until Thursday. The new bills issued 
on Thursday can then be traded in the secondary market. 
Bidders realize that the auctioned bills they purchase on 
Monday and receive on Thursday will be similar to the 
Treasury bills already trading in the secondary market on 
Thursday. If the Treasury bill auction is a fair game, a 
bidder in the auction expects to earn no more by bidding in 
the auction than by waiting until Thursday and buying in the 
secondary market (ignoring transactions costs). The auction 
rates can be thought of as forward rates for the expected 
spot rates to prevail on Thursday in the secondary market. 
Summary of Previous Studies 
Information in a market is generally considered as 
disbursed among the informed market participants while some 
participants are considered to be uninformed (Green, 1977; 
Salop and Stiglitz, 1977). Those that do not obtain 
information can use-the prices of securities traded by 
informed traders as proxies for information (Grossman, 1976; 
Green, 1977; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981). In an auction 
market, the auction mechanism serves as an aggregator of 
bidders' private information which is relayed through the 
auction prices attained (Wilson, 1977; Milgrom, 1979; 
Bikhchandani and Huang, 1989). The cited articles justify 
questioning whether the results from the Treasury bill 
auction carry information. 
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The efficiency of Treasury bill markets has been 
examined previously with the results being mixed as to the 
efficiency of the secondary market. Fama (1975) and 
Hamburger and Platt (1975) found the U.S. Treasury bill 
market is weak form efficient with respect to past interest 
rate data. Mills and Stephenson (1985) found the U.K. 
Treasury bill market to be efficient in regard to the use of 
information concerning inflation expectations, however 
inflation was not perfectly expected. Chandy and Cross 
(1984), on the other hand, found there was inefficiency in 
the U.S. Treasury bill market in capturing all of the 
information regarding expected changes in purchasing power 
during high inflationary periods. Wachtel and Young (1987) 
found government security interest rates increased when the 
announced projected federal deficit increased indicating 
semi-strong form efficiency did not exist with respect to 
projected federal deficits. Schirm, Sheehan, and Ferri 
(1989), on the other hand, found interest rates were not 
influenced by the unexpected component of regularly 
scheduled debt announcements indicating a semi-strong 
efficient market. Wachtel and Young (1990) also found the 
Treasury bill secondary market to be semi-strong efficient 
but with respect to the announcement of the upcoming 
Treasury auction. In looking at the auction results 
announcements, however, they found inefficiency in the 
market when there was a "surprise" about demand for the 
bills auctioned. All of the studies cited above lend 
support to questioning the efficiency of the Treasury bill 
secondary market. 
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The question of whether the information in the Treasury 
bill auction explains the downward biased auction results 
was examined by Cammack (1991). The differences between the 
downward biased auction rate and the secondary market rate 
was found to be determined by the expected component of the 
low tail. The return earned in Tuesday's secondary market 
was determined by the unexpected components of the low tail, 
percent competitive, and percent noncompetitive. 
Another relevant category of literature relates to 
unbiased expectations. Several studies examine unbiased 
expectations for futures markets and forward rates using 
regressions of the form Yt+i = a + f3Xi + € 1+1 (Frenkel, 1981; 
Bilson, 1981; Edwards, 1983; Lumpkin, 1986; Chiang, 1988; 
Wong and Henderson, 1990; and Cole, Impson, and 
Reichenstein, 1991). Unbiased expectations are said to 
exist if a is not significantly different than O and~ is 
not significantly different from 1. 
In regard to the bid-asked spread in the Treasury 
securities markets, few studies are found. There are 
several studies, however, concerning bid-asked spreads in 
other markets. The cited studies found the term to 
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maturity, volume outstanding, market volatility, interest 
rate outlook, perceived demand and supply conditions, market 
uncertainty, inventory position, dealer costs, timing of new 
information, new issues, liquidity-motivated investors, and 
information motivated investors will affect the bid-asked 
spreads (Roll, 1970; Bagehot, 1971; Branch and Freed, 1977; 
Garbade and Rosey, 1977; Hamilton, 1978; Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, 1978; Stoll, 1978 and 1989; Garbade, 
Pomrenze, and Silber, 1979; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; 
Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Mann and Seijas, 1991; Mcinish 
and Wood, 1992; Ma, Peterson, and Sears, 1992). 
The following articles provide additional reasons for 
including the selected auction information variables. 
Several authors have found the array of competitive prices 
in the auction results to be an indication of demand 
characteristics (Brimmer, 1962; Bolten, 1973; Boatler, 1975; 
Ryan, 1987). Lumpkin (1986) specifically used the quantity 
weighted average yield on accepted tenders, low tail, and 
tail spread to look at the dispersion of auction prices. 
Wann (1989) tested an auction's success by looking at the 
amount oversubscribed and the spread of accepted tenders. 
The submission of noncompetitive bids and their impact was 
discussed by Brimmer (1962), Smith (1966), Mullineaux 
(1973), and Bolten (1973). All of these articles lend 
support to percent overbid, percent noncompetitive, and tail 
spread as explanatory variables and to the a priori 
expectations of relationships between these variables and 
the dependent variables. 
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The literature supports the rationale for conducting 
this research. Existing Treasury bill secondary market 
studies of semi-strong efficiency have found mixed results. 
There is a paucity of studies in the area of bid-asked 
spread determinants in the Treasury bill secondary market. 
And no literature was found which questions whether the 
auction rate is an unbiased expectation of the Thursday 
secondary market rate. 
Statement of Research Hypotheses 
There are six basic hypotheses this research addresses. 
The first hypothesis considers the Treasury bill secondary 
market efficiency with respect to the information from the 
auction results -- percent competitive, percent overbid, and 
tail spread. The hypotheses for this question concern 
whether the estimated coefficients for the auction 
information variables are significantly different from zero. 
The null hypothesis is stated as: 
Ho1 : Bo· • • .Bj = O • 
The null hypothesis for this question is rejected if the 
group of estimated coefficients for the auction information 
variables are significant in explaining the change in the 
asked rate in the Treasury bill secondary market. The 
secondary market for Treasury bills then is not considered 
fu~ly efficient. 
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Three additional hypotheses are related to the downward 
biasing of the auction prices. Auction theory predicts the 
average auction rate to be downward biased in auctions where 
information is not equally dispersed and the number of 
bidders is finite, such as the Treasury bill auction. The 
first of these hypotheses addresses whether the auction 
results information is a determinant of the bidding 
adjustment which occurs due to downward biasing of the 
auction price. The null hypothesis suggesting the expected 
component of each of the auction results variables is not a 
determinant is: 
H00 : B = O. 
The relationships between the expected components of the 
auction results variables and the bidding adjustment are 
examined individually. If an expected component of an 
auction results variable is statistically significant, the 
null hypothesis is rejected and the expected component of 
the auction results variable is considered a determinant of 
the bidding adjustment. 
The unexpected components of the auction results 
variables may also carry information (Cammack, 1991). The 
second area related to downward biasing addresses the 
relationship of the Tuesday secondary market return with the 
unexpected components of the auction results variables. The 
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null hypothesis suggesting the unexpected component of each 
of the auction results variables is not related to the 
Tuesday secondary market return is: 
Hm: B = o. 
The relationships between the unexpected components of the 
auction results variables and the secondary market return 
are examined individually. If any of the auction results 
variables are significantly related to the Tuesday secondary 
market return, they are considered to be determinants of the 
Tuesday return. 
The auction results variables could be j~st proxies for 
the auction price level {Cammack, 1991). To control for 
this, the third hypothesis related to downward biasing 
includes a price level comparison variable in the model with 
the auction results variables. The null hypothesis for this 
model is the auction results variables and the price level 
comparison variable do not determine Tuesday secondary 
market returns and takes the form: 
H~: B = O. 
If any of the auction results variables are statistically 
significant with the price level variable included in the 
model, it is said the auction results variables do carry 
information other than price level information. 
The fifth area suggests Monday's average auction rate 
is an unbiased expectation of the Thursday secondary market 
asked rate. The joint null hypothesis is the average 
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auction rate is an unbiased expectation and is stated as: 
Hos: Bo = O, /31 = 1. 
The joint null hypothesis is rejected if (i) the estimated 
intercept term is not zero and (ii) the estimated 
coefficient for the average auction rate is not equal to one 
in the model explaining the secondary market asked rate on 
Thursday. 
The last hypothesis deals with the bid-asked spread. 
The null hypothesis is the bid-asked spread in the Treasury 
bill secondary market is not determined by the information 
from the auction results carried in the percent competitive, 
percent overbid, and tail spread. The null hypothesis is: 
H06 : B0 • •• Bj = 0 • 
If the group of estimated coefficients relating to the 
auction information variables is significant in explaining 
the change in the bid-asked spread, the null hypothesis that 
the information variables are not determinants of the bid-
asked spread is rejected. 
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The 
current chapter introduces the scope of study, provides the 
justification for the study, presents a summary of previous 
studies, and proposes the hypotheses to be studied. 
Chapter II reviews the literature relating to Treasury 
bill markets, efficient markets, bid-asked spreads, and 
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forward rates. This literature provides the foundation for 
the development of the hypotheses and the methodology used. 
In Chapter III, the research methodology is explained. 
This includes the data for the research, a discussion of the 
techniques used, and the disadvantages and advantages of 
these techniques. 
Chapter IV presents the results of the study and a 
discussion of the results. Last, Chapter V focuses on the 
conclusions which may be drawn from this research, 
implications which may be useful for the field of finance, 
and future research which may be suggested by the study. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Literature relevant to this study can be classified in 
the following groupings: description and importance of 
Treasury bills, description of Treasury bill markets, 
sources of bids and influence on demand for Treasury bills, 
auction theory and evaluation of the markets, theory of 
efficient markets, informed/uninformed traders in the 
markets, bid-asked spreads in dealer markets, and forward 
rates in markets. The methodological issues related to an 
examination of Treasury bill secondary market efficiency, 
downward biased auction prices, bid-ask spreads, and forward 
rates are illustrated through the review of this literature. 
Description and Importance 
of Treasury Bills 
Treasury bills, notes, and bonds are the three types of 
securities issued by the U.S. government. Treasury bills 
were first introduced to the auction market in December 
1929 in 30, 60 and 90 day maturities (Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond, 1964). They were initially introduced to 
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lessen the impact on the money market from the operations of 
the Treasury (Federal Reserve Bank of st. Louis, 1960). The 
government also believed the use of Treasury bills would 
help to reduce errors in the pricing of bonds, and the 
shorter maturities of Treasury bills would allow closer 
matching with the length of time for which funds were needed 
(Henning, Pigott, and Scott; 1984). In the early 1930's, 
bill maturities of 182 to 273 days were also sold. In 1937, 
the Treasury began issuing only 91-day bills at the weekly 
auctions. In 1958 the Treasury added 182 day bills at the 
weekly auctions (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1964). 
The Treasury bill market is an important component of 
the U.S. money market. As of April 30, 1993, $642 billion 
of Treasury bills were held by the public (compared to $482 
held in December of 1990) (Bureau of the Public Debt, 1990 
and 1993). Treasury security markets are the arena in which 
the Federal Reserve conducts open market operations for the 
purpose of achieving monetary policy goals. The Treasury 
bill rate is often used as a barometer of credit market 
conditions, because the Treasury bill is a major money 
market instrument; and it indicates the return which can be 
earned on liquid investments by large lenders who often use 
Treasury bills to meet requirements of keeping certain funds 
in liquid form (Henning, Pigott, and Scott; 1978). At this 
particular point in time, the study of Treasury securities 
garners additional interest because investors are trading 
Treasury securities as they become more concerned with 
safety in investments (Sullivan, 1990). Due to these 
factors, it is pertinent to know that the Treasury bill 
markets are efficient. 
Description of the Treasury Bill Markets 
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To illustrate the potential for information from 
Treasury bill auctions to affect secondary market outcomes, 
each market will be described. This includes a description 
of the auction market including the types of bids for 
Treasury bills in the auction market and the process of 
issuance for newly auctioned Treasury bills followed by a 
description of the secondary market for Treasury bills. 
The Auction Market 
The primary market for Treasury bills is a weekly 
auction carried out by the Federal Reserve. Currently, 
Treasury bills can be bought in these auctions in 
denominations starting at $10,000 and increasing in units of 
$5,000 thereafter (Rahmani, et. al., 1987). These bills are 
available to subscribers in book-entry form only. 
The issuance of new 91-day and 182-day Treasury bills 
follows a standard procedure~ During the week prior to 
issuance, the Treasury publishes the volume of Treasury 
bills to be sold and invites bids for these bills. It then 
accepts bids for both the 91-day and 182-day Treasury bills 
on the following Monday. Except for dealers, commercial 
banks, and large regular bidders, payment for the bills is 
required at the time of bidding (Cammack, 1991). 1 This 
requirement favors the regular, more informed competitive 
bidders by not requiring payment in advance and allowing 
them to use their money for the extra three days. 
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The Federal Reserve accepts both competitive and non-
competitive bids for the weekly Treasury bill auction. 
Competitive bids state the discount rate the bidder is 
tendering for a specified quantity of bills. The 
competitive bidder tenders the highest discount the bidder 
believes will be accepted and still provide the desired 
quantity of bills (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1960). 
The bidder may tender several bids having different 
quantities and/or discounts. Currently, the competitive 
portion of the Treasury bill auction is conducted through 
bids quoted on a bank discount basis to two decimal places. 2 
Generally, the source of competitive bids will be from 
subscribers who are in continual contact with the money 
market. There are approximately 40 regular, competitive 
1Payment made at the time of bidding is for the full face value of 
the bids submitted. After the price is determined from the auction 
results, the Treasury refunds the amount overpaid to the winning bidders 
and a full refund to the losing bidders. 
2Radcliffe (1987) defines the bank discount method. Let P=price, 
F=$100 face, D=dollar discount on $100 face value, t=time to maturity, and 
d=quoted yearly discount rate. Dis calculated as D = Fd(t/360]. The 
price is then P = F - D. 
The example given by Radcliffe is for a three month bill with a 
quoted discount of 8.55%. 
D = $100 X 0.0855 X (91/360) = $2.16125. 
Then P = $100 - 2.16125 = $97.83875. 
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bidders in a Treasury bill auction "who are mainly primary 
dealers and large financial institutions" (Bikhchandani and 
Huang, 1989) . 
There are primarily two types of competitive bids for 
Treasury bills. First, there are the "sure bids" which are 
generally tendered by government securities dealers. These 
bids are at a price high enough that the probability of the 
bids not being accepted is very low. The second type of 
bid, the "scale-out bid", is a bid at a low price, tendered 
in hopes of receiving bargain prices and earning a higher 
profit (Bolten, 1973). Dealers often submit "scale-out" 
bids in order to pick up extra bills for their inventories 
at low prices. Bolten {1973) suggests this part of the 
dealers' demand will increase in a market with rising yields 
and decrease in a market with falling yields. The demand 
curve for Treasury bills may be elastic for the sure-bid 
portion but inelastic for the scale-out portion (Boatler, 
1975). 
The second type of bid in the auction is the 
noncompetitive bid. Noncompetitive bids are submitted by 
stating only the quantity of bills desired. They are 
noncompetitive in the sense they do not compete on the basis 
of price. These bids are filled at a weighted average price 
and acceptance is restricted to amounts between $10,000 and 
$1 million. Noncompetitive bids by volume (number) make up 
the majority of Treasury bill bids tendered each week 
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(Federal Reserve Bank of st. Louis, 1960). By dollar 
amount, however, the majority of bills are sold on a 
competitive basis. Historical data has not been collected 
by the Treasury concerning the composition of noncompetitive 
bidders, but the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1978) 
found that 11 85 percent of the total number of noncompetitive 
tenders came from individuals" which represented 11 70 percent 
of the total dollar volume of such tenders" (Sivesind, 1978, 
p. 35). Because of the size restrictions on non-competitive 
bids, it is likely these bids represent demand for bills 
from market participants who are not major players in the 
Treasury bill markets. 
There are standard times for submitting both types of 
bids and issuing the bills. Noncompetitive bids must be 
submitted to the u. s. Treasury or the Federal Reserve banks 
by noon Eastern time on Monday, and competitive bids must be 
submitted by 1:00 p.m. Eastern time on Monday (Wall Street 
Journal, March 27, 1991). Typically by 5:00 p.m. Eastern 
Time on Monday, the Treasury updates an 800 phone line 
announcing the highest bid, lowest bid, and average bid from 
the auction which allows bidders to know what quantity of 
bills they have been awarded (Chicago Board of Trade, 1991). 
The bills are then issued on Thursday of the auction week. 
Given that the bills are purchased in the auction on Monday 
but not received until Thursday, a question raised is 
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whether the average auction rate is an unbiased expectation 
of Thursday's secondary market rate. 
The Treasury bill auction process described is 
considered a discriminatory auction. The auction 
discriminates by selling the identical security to different 
competitive bidders at different prices (Garbade, 1982). 
The discriminatory auction process follows a standard 
procedure. Each weekly auction starts with the 
noncompetitive bids being filled from the supply of bills 
available. The remaining bills, total bills available -
bills sought by noncompetitive bid - Fed purchases of bills 
(Cammack, 1991), are used to fill the orders of the 
competitive bids by ranking the tenders starting with the 
lowest discount first. The competitive bids are accepted at 
increasing discount rates until all bills are sold. The 
highest discount bid accepted in the weekly auction is the 
stop-out rate. The bids submitted at the stop-out rate are 
filled on a prorated basis of the total amount accepted at 
the stop-out rate (Scott, 1965). 
After the competitive bids are filled, the rate for the 
noncompetitive bids is determined. The noncompetitive bids 
will be allotted at an average rate of the accepted 
competitive bids weighted by the amount of bills sold at 
each competitive rate (Brimmer, 1962). By reducing the 
supply of bills to competitive bidders, the existence of 
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noncompetitive bids has an indirect impact on prices in the 
Treasury bill market (Smith, 1966). 
The week's demand schedule for each type of Treasury 
bill can also be noted after the competitive bids have been 
ranked (Bolten, 1973; Boatler, 1975). When the demand at an 
auction for a Treasury bill issue is not great enough, there 
is a "price concession" in the form of the Treasury 
accepting more low price bids (Ryan, 1987). This means the 
tail spread (high - low accepted auction discount rate) 
gives an indication of demand for Treasury bills since it is 
correlated with the Treasury accepting lower price bids. 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) note that after completion of 
an auction additional information is conveyed than the 
information available to the winning bidders. That is, 
after the auction the maximum and minimum value of the 
auctioned goods are also known which provides the upper and 
lower boundaries on all the bids. They state that the price 
derived from this auction is a good aggregator of the 
bidders' private information. If this idea is applied to 
the Treasury bill markets, the announcement of the auction 
results will release more than any individual bidder's 
private information. 
The Secondary Market 
The secondary market for Treasury bills is an over-the-
counter dealer market. Dealers may be dealer departments of 
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commercial banks or nonbank dealers (Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, Winter 1977-78). There are approximately 40 
primary dealers and 300-500 secondary dealers (Chicago Board 
of Trade, 1991). 
One function of the primary dealers is to aid the 
Federal Reserve in implementing monetary policy through the 
Federal Reserve's open market operations. Primary dealers 
provide by, 11:00 a.m. each business day, the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank with insights into the daily state of 
the Treasury bill market by supplying information concerning 
trading activity, financial positions, and inventory 
(Chicago Board of Trade, 1991). In exchange for providing 
this information, primary dealers have direct access to the 
New York Federal Reserve trading desk, through which the 
dealers continue to gain information, and are awarded all 
Federal Reserve repos and reverse repos through a bidding 
process (Chicago Board of Trade, 1991). This indicates 
primary dealers have information which others do not and, 
hence, the assumption for an efficient market that all 
participants have access to the same information is 
violated. 
Within the secondary market for Treasury bills, there 
are two components: the interdealer market and the customer 
market (Campbell and Kracaw, 1993). The interdealer market 
is composed of trades between dealers either directly or 
through brokers. The customer market is all nondealer 
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trades. There is an automated quotation system in the 
interdealer market which provides automated execution of 
trades and gives all of the primary dealers' bid and ask 
quotes. In contrast, in the customer market there is a 
billboard system giving only the average bid and asked 
quotes. Again, a divergence of information availability can 
be noted between dealers and other investors since they do 
not have access to the same information. Since there exists 
this asymmetric information, the efficiency of the secondary 
market comes into question as the requirements for an 
efficient market break down. 
Sources of Bids and Influences on Demand 
for Treasury Bills 
The majority of bids come from dealers and commercial 
banks (money centers). Other demand for Treasury bills 
comes from money market mutual funds, foreign investors, 
insurance companies, state and local governments, trust 
accounts, pension funds, individual investors, and 
corporations. The demand for Treasury bills will vary from 
week to week for different reasons. The strength of this 
demand impacts the percent overbid, percent competitive, and 
tail spread. Is the secondary market for Treasury bills 
semi-strong form efficient with respect to these auction 
results? Do the auction results have a material impact on 
dealer bid-ask spread in the post-auction period? 
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Dealers are interested in holding Treasury bills for 
inyentory needs. They are faced with two types of 
uncertainty in submitting bids in the auction (Smith, 1966). 
They are uncertain of the range of bids which will be 
accepted and, hence, how low a discount rate (high price) 
they must bid to win the bills they need for their 
inventories. Second, they are uncertain of the price at 
which they will be able to resell the Treasury bills in the 
secondary market. Both of these uncertainties affect the 
dealers' demand and bids for bills. Auction results 
summarize the responses of auction participants to their 
information set(s) at the time of bidding. The release of 
the auction results would be anticipated to affect secondary 
market prices in a less than perfectly efficient market in 
which all participants do not share the same information set 
or in which information is costly to produce. 
During periods in which the Federal Reserve is 
exhibiting a lenient monetary policy, the dealers are able 
to obtain funds at favorable rates from the New York money 
market banks through call-loan privileges in order to 
participate in the Treasury bill market (Scott, 1965). When 
the Federal Reserve has a tight monetary policy and call-
loan rates are no longer favorable, dealers may not be able 
to maintain a positive carry. 3 "Thus precisely at the time 
3A positive carry occurs when dealers obtain rates of return on 
Treasury bill transactions which are higher than the interest rate the 
dealer pays on borrowed funds to finance the bill inventory (Scott, 1965). 
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when markets are thin anyway because of rising interest 
rates, the cost and availability of local accommodations 
further discourage the dealer from holding government 
securities" (Scott, 1965, p.167). This provides one basis 
for the expectation of a smaller percent overbid (due to 
fewer dealers submitting many bids) to actually cause an 
increase in the dealer's secondary market bid-ask spread in 
order to recover higher costs. 
The demand for noncompetitive bids is derived mainly 
from small savers seeking liquidity. Often, corporations 
and individuals are placed into this category (Bolten, 
1973). The Fed purchases bills at the noncompetitive rate 
as well. 
The small savers as noncompetitive bidders are 
attracted to the Treasury bill market because they are 
somewhat disadvantaged in making other similarly low-risk 
security investments which require large cash investments 
(e.g. commercial paper typically issued in multiples of 
$100,000) (Mullineaux, 1973). Some additional investors may 
be attracted to the Treasury bill primary market during 
periods of increasing bill rates. These investors may 
submit noncompetitive bids, instead of buying the bills in 
the secondary market and incurring the dealer's charge 
during these periods of increasing bill rates (Brimmer, 
1962; Mullineaux, 1973). 
Auction Theory and Evaluation 
of the Markets 
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The demand for Treasury bills is met in part through 
the discriminatory auction process used to auction Treasury 
bills in the primary market and in part through the 
secondary market. A review of auction theory is useful as a 
preliminary guide for examining market efficiency. 
According to Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) and Rasmusen 
(1989), the number of players, the utility functions of the 
players, and the number of objects being sold in an auction 
are important descriptive factors. The number of players in 
an auction is an indication of the strength of demand for 
the good(s). According to their definitions, the Treasury 
bill auction is best described as an auction with a random 
number of bidders having random utility functions bidding on 
a finite number of identical, indivisible objects having a 
known maturity value. Once the Treasury bill auction is 
over, however, the percent competitive and the percent 
overbid serve as proxies for the number of bidders and, 
hence, the strength of demand. 
These auction theories also suggest the number of 
bidders will impact an auction's outcome. As the number of 
bidders increase and the bidders realize with how many other 
bidders they are competing, auction prices will be driven 
up. In an auction in which the bidders do not know the 
number of other bidders, one alternative for estimating this 
information is to look at previous similar auctions. In a 
similar situation, the Treasury bill secondary market 
dealers can look at the number of bidders in the auction 
market (proxied by the percent competitive and percent 
overbid) to help determine the number of players that will 
be participating in the post-auction secondary market. 
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Baron (1976) notes three types of information which 
bidders may possess. First, undisclosed information 
describes information which only an individual bidder knows. 
Second, confidential information refers to information which 
only the bidder knows but of which other bidders are aware 
of that bidder knowing. Last, there is common information, 
such as the rate of inflation, which is available to all 
bidders. In terms of the Treasury bill markets, dealers 
most likely possess most of the undisclosed and confidential 
information. The non-competitive bidders and secondary 
market participants have available to them the common 
information. Although this information is available, the 
costs (e.g. time, financial) which may be involved in 
obtaining it may mean not all bidders possess the common 
information. The existence of asymmetric, costly 
information violates the assumptions of an efficient market. 
Harsanyi defined an auction as a game with incomplete 
information (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980). With multiple 
bidders competing in the Treasury bill auction, it is also a 
game with asymmetric information. Each player has 
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information different from the other players and bids 
without knowing the other players' bids and information. A 
bidding strategy is chosen by each player in an auction to 
place bids using the information which the bidder observes. 
Bidders with undisclosed information may have an advantage 
and bidders with "uniformly worse" information should stay 
out of the Treasury bill auction or submit noncompetitive 
bids (Rasmusen, 1989). 
In this type of theoretical setting, one inefficient 
outcome faced by bidders is the possibility of suffering the 
"winner's curse." This occurs when the "winner's" payoff 
is negative, because the winner has overbid. If players 
scale down their bids, the chances of falling into the 
winner's curse are reduced (Rasmusen, 1989). If bidders do 
suffer the winner's curse because they have overbid, 
however, it can be questioned whether the auction 
information is reflective of the value of the bills 
auctioned. For Treasury bill dealers, another inefficient 
outcome faced in this setting of asymmetric information is 
not winning enough bills through the auction. 
Some argue there may be problems associated with the 
use of a discriminatory auction such as second-best outcomes 
and dealer collusion which can provide other reasons for 
Treasury bill secondary market inefficiency. Smith (1966) 
found the submitted bids in discriminatory sealed-bid 
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auctions will be lower than the bids in competitive auctions 
while others found collusion in the auctions. 
Milton Friedman (1959), Boatler (1975), and Scott and 
Wolf (1979) suggest the Treasury's discriminatory auction 
practices leads to collusion among bidders. Friedman's 
evidence of collusion was the fact in many periods there was 
no overlap between the highest and lowest bid accepted in 
one week versus the following week. Boatler (1975) also 
finds significant evidence of collusion during 1952-1972. 
Scott and Wolf (1979) believe the dealer collusion comes in 
the form of dealers exchanging views on the likely stop-out 
price in an effort to determine potential demand for the 
bills and to narrow their own assessments of the stop-out 
price shortly before the cut-off time for bidding. 
Wilson (1977) and Milgrom (1979) each examine the 
winning bids of a sealed bid auction. In this type of 
auction, it is assumed one object was being auctioned with 
an unknown true value (V) under a non-cooperative game with 
incomplete information. There are n bidders each possessing 
a bidding strategy (p~) developed on information received 
through a private signal (sk) to that bidder (k). Each 
bidders' bid, p~(sk), is then based on expectations about V 
and sk. Milgrom denotes the winning bid as Wn = max p~ ( sd 
with k less than or equal ton. Both Milgrom and Wilson 
show the same result, Wn should converge to Vas the number 
of bidders gets large. The auction mechanism under this 
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scenario serves as an aggregator of all the bidder's private 
information which is relayed through the price. Applying 
this to the current study, Treasury bill auctions, having a 
large number of bidders, should have auction prices which 
aggregate the competitive bidders' private information. 
This information can in turn be evaluated by secondary 
market participants when the results of the auction are 
announced. 
Wilson's and Milgrom's suggestion that prices tend 
toward the true value as the number of bidders increases 
implies that prices would be downward biased when the number 
of bidders is low. In the current study, the percent 
overbid is a direct indication of the dollar volume of 
competitive bids. If there is a positive relationship 
between dollar bidding volume and the number of bidders, one 
would expect that, as the percent overbid gets larger, the 
auction price will tend toward the true value. 
French and McCormick (1984) examine auction markets 
which incorporate pr-econtract sunk costs and sealed bids. 
They suggest sunk costs determine the number of bidders, and 
expected profits are inversely related to the number of 
bidders. The sunk costs "on average," however, are 
recovered. With application to this study, an increase in 
the percent overbid in an auction means the dealers' 
expected profit from the auction will be less. The dealers, 
in turn, may adjust the secondary market bid-ask spread in 
an effort to recover the costs. 
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Along with sunk costs, French and McCormick (1984) 
discuss the potential for duplicate information to be 
produced when there are several bidders revealing 
information in the sealed-bid auction. With this potential, 
the asset owner may be better off producing information to 
increase efficiency. Prior to the Treasury bill auction, 
the U.S. government announces the volume of bills to be sold 
and the amount of new money to be raised. The more 
information the bidders must produce, the lower will be the 
price paid to the owner. 
French and McCormick note that the Treasury reduces the 
production of duplicate information in the Treasury bill 
auction by allowing non-competitive bids since these bidders 
do not have to produce any information. These 
noncompetitive bidders, in effect, receive a free ride from 
the information gathered by the competitive bidders. Both 
the noncompetitive and competitive bidders have reduced 
incentives to obtain information in the Treasury bill 
auction due to the fact the noncompetitive bidders are 
guaranteed to pay an average price without any information 
search. In this scenario, information is asymmetrically 
distributed between the noncompetitive and competitive 
bidders. Is the information possessed by the competitive 
bidders then passed along through the release of the auction 
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results? If it is, does the fact that more competitive 
bidders desired bills in the auction, as measured by percent 
overbid, mean the competitive bidders had information making 
the bills more desirable which may then affect the secondary 
market bid and asked prices? 
Cammack (1991) evaluates the existence of downward 
biasing of auction prices and the presence of imperfect 
information in the U.S. Treasury bill markets. Cammack 
suggests traders in the different Treasury bill markets 
(auction, secondary, and forward) have different information 
and hypothesizes that these markets do not incorporate the 
information in the same manner. 
If the secondary and auction markets incorporate the 
information from the auction in the same manner, then the 
mean price from the auction of 91 day bills (PA) and the 
price from the secondary market for 91 day bills would 
differ only by a risk premium. The risk premium would exist 
because the market participants purchase the bills through 
different market mechanisms, the auction market or the 
secondary market. The announcement of auction results 
should not affect secondary market prices under this 
scenario. 
Cammack states that according to auction theory and the 
imperfect information assumption, the average auction price 
would be a "downward biased" estimate of the value of a 91 
day Treasury bill if it matters in which market the bills 
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are purchased. The potential for downward biasing occurs 
when the number of bidders is finite and bidders' 
information is diverse. To examine the concept of downward 
biased auction prices, Cammack defines her variables of 
interest as: 
1) PA= quantity-weighted average auction price (Mon. 6:00 
p.m.) 
2) 91 PM = secondary market price from Monday for 92 day bill 
adjusted to a 91 day maturity calculated as 91 PM = 
F X (PM/F) SIT 
3) PT= mean of the bid-ask prices from the Tuesday 
secondary market for a 91-day bill (Tues. 3:00) 
4) Tail= log(P8 - low auction price) 
5) N =($amount of competitive bids placed)/($ amount of 
competitive bids accepted) 
6) NC=($ amount of noncompetitive bids)/($ amount of 91-
day bills sold in the auction) 
7) Monday Bidding Adjustment [Mon. BAJ= 100 x ln( 91PM/PA) 
8) Tuesday Bidding· Adjustment [Tues. BAJ= 100 x ln(PT/PA) 
9) Tuesday Return [Tues. Ret.J = 100 x ln(PT/PM) 
10) Monday Return= 100 x ln(PM/Pp) 
11) Pp= Friday's secondary market mean of bid-ask price 
Variables 1, 2, and 3 indicate the prices on 91 day 
bills in the auction and secondary markets. Variables 4, 5, 
and 6 are used to indicate bidders' dispersion of opinions 
and number of bidders in the auction. Variables 7 and 8 are 
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used in examining the downward biasing of auction prices. 
If the bidding adjustment variables are greater than zero, 
the average auction price is less than the secondary market 
price. Finally, variables 9, 10 and 11 are used to measure 
the percentage change in prices caused by a reaction to the 
auction results in the secondary market from Friday to 
Monday and Monday to Tuesday. 
In Cammack's analysis, Cammack groups the data into 
subperiods based upon announced Federal Reserve policy 
changes (from targeting interest rates to targeting monetary 
aggregates) and the start of Treasury bill futures trading. 
Cammack then calculates the unexpected and expected 
components for the variables using the full sample and 
subsamples. 
Once the expected and unexpected components are 
determined, Cammack's first set of regressions are estimated 
with the expected components of the variables. The 
equations estimated were: 
Mon. BAi = a + BETailt + Et 
Mon. BAi = a + BENt + Et 
Mon. BAi = a + BENCt + Et. 
These are used to examine the expected gain from the auction 
in relation to the expected number of bidders and the 
expected dispersion of opinions. Cammack finds a positive, 
significant relationship between the expected tail and the 
Monday bidding adjustment in these regressions and no 
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relationship between the number of bidders and the Monday 
bidding adjustment. This indicates the greater the 
dispersion of opinions in the auction (as measured by the 
expected tail), the greater the downward bias of the auction 
rate. 
Cammack's second series of regressions examines the 
secondary market's reaction to the unexpected component of 
the announced auction results. The regressions, 
Tues. Ret. 1 = o: + .BUTail1 + € 1 
Tues. Ret. 1 = o: + .BUN1 + € 1 
Tues. Ret. 1 = o: + .BUNC1 + € 1 
show the unexpected dispersion of opinion variable generates 
the strongest reaction of the Tuesday return. The 
unexpected number of competitive bidders, as measured by N, 
also causes a reaction in Tuesday's return but not as 
statistically significant. For both cases, the majority of 
explanatory power is found in the first sample period, 
January 1973 to January 1976. 
The last regression Cammack runs is to examine the 
possibility that price levels from the auction are proxied 
by the unexpected components of the auction variables. 
According to Cammack, the Tuesday secondary market price 
drops may be caused by a higher than expected tail. This 
drop in secondary market prices would have to occur if all 
the bills sold in the auction were at lower prices. 
Cammack, therefore, includes a price level comparison 
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variable, A%A, calculated as 100 x ln(low auction price/PM). 
The following regression is then run: 
Tues. Ret.t = a + BUTailt + oUNt + 9UNCt + ¢A%A + €1• 
The unexpected component of the tail is not as significant 
as in the previous regressions, and the unexpected component 
of N is no longer significant. The A%A variable is 
statistically significant and affects the Tuesday return due 
to the price level news from the auction. 
Overall Cammack's results show: (1) unanticipated 
dispersion of opinion in the auction market causes the 
prices in the secondary market to decrease; (2) greater 
unanticipated participation in the auction yields an 
increase in secondary market prices; and (3) auction rates 
are downward biased rates of the Tuesday secondary market 
rates. Based on these results, Cammack concludes the 
auction and secondary markets do incorporate information 
differently from traders, and the secondary market contains 
less than perfect information. 
Theory of Efficient Markets 
Another major area of literature examined deals with 
market efficiency. First a general development of market 
efficiency is presented (Fama, 1970; Garbade, 1982). Next 
studies relating to market efficiency in the Treasury bill 
secondary market are discussed. Fama (1975) finds weak form 
efficiency in the Treasury bill secondary market did exist 
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while Hamburger and Platt (1975), Schirm, Sheehan, and Ferri 
(1989), and Wachtel and Young (1990) find evidence of semi-
strong form efficiency. Mills and Stephenson (1985) find 
semi-strong form efficiency in a market similar to the US 
Treasury bill secondary market, the UK Treasury bill 
secondary market. Chandy and Cross (1984) confirm Fama's 
weak form efficiency results but find semi-strong 
inefficiency in the Treasury bill secondary market with 
respect to changes in the purchasing power. Other studies 
indicate Treasury bill secondary market semi-strong form 
inefficiency also: Wachtel and. Young (1987) with respect to 
announced future expected government deficits; Schirm, 
Sheehan, and Ferri (1989) with respect to the announcement 
of cash management bills; and Wachtel and Young (1990) with 
respect to the post-auction announcement. 
General Market Efficiency 
Fama (1970) provides a definition and a classification 
scheme for the concept of market efficiency. There are 
three main classifications of market efficiency which were 
developed originally by Fama with the stock market: weak 
form efficiency, semi-strong form efficiency, and strong 
form efficiency. Weak form efficiency suggests all past 
price information is reflected in current prices. Semi-
strong market efficiency suggests all publicly available 
information is reflected in the security prices. Strong 
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form efficiency suggests all public and private information 
is reflected in security prices. The inclusiveness of the 
information sets is what distinguishes among the three 
classifications. Fama (1976, p.186) states, "the value of a 
market is in providing accurate signals for resource 
allocation, which means setting prices that more or less 
fully reflect available information. If the market ignores 
the information from so obvious a source (such as past 
inflation rates), its effectiveness is seriously 
questioned." 
The semi-strong form market efficiency is the most 
relevant form for the major portion of the current study. 
In looking at semi-strong market efficiency, this study is 
considering the following type of scenario Garbade (1982) 
describes. 
Let: I= some information set 
¢=an observation from I 
P'= price in next auction 
P = price in current auction 
U = another information set over all 
publicly available information 
u = an observation from U. 
If (1) Exp [P' lu,¢) = Exp [P' l¢J, the market is said to 
be efficient with respect to U as the added information 
from u does not change the expected price. 
If R is the return on a security between auctions, 
then: R = p • - p 
p 
Then the expected return given¢ is 
µ(¢) = Exp[P'l¢J- P, 
p 
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and the price in the current auction can be written as 
the discounted expected future value: 
P = Exp [ P ' l ¢] . 
1 + µ(¢) 
If market efficiency holds as in (1), we can then write 
P = Exp [ P ' l u , ¢] 
1 + µ(¢) 
and 
µ ( u ' <I>) = Exp [ p I : u r ¢ ] - p . 
p 
Therefore, µ(u,¢) = µ(¢) and information from U 
does not alter expected returns, and the market is 
efficient with respect to U. 
Putting the semi-strong efficiency portion of the current 
study in similar terms, U would be the complete set of 
information from the auction. The specific observations 
from U would be the tail spread, percent of competitive bids 
accepted, and the percent overbid. 
Treasury Bill Market Efficiency 
The concept of semi-strong market efficiency has been 
widely studied in the stock markets. Semi-strong form 
market efficiency in the U.S. Treasury bill secondary market 
has been studied less. Most studies of U.S. Treasury bill 
secondary market efficiency have been weak form studies. 
Fama (1975) Fama explores the weak form efficiency of 
the Treasury bill market by asking if interest rates of one 
to six month Treasury bills from 1953 to 1971 incorporated 
accurate information on future inflation rates. Fama 
examines this by determining if all past information on 
inflation, which embodies expected future inflation, was 
used by the market in valuing the real return on Treasury 
bills. 
In setting up the inquiry, Fama approximates the real 
return on a Treasury bill (r1) as the nominal return (Ri) 
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plus the rate of change in purchasing power (~1) during the 
period: 
The hypotheses given are: 
H0 : Ri summarizes all information available about the 
expected rate of change in purchasing power. 
H8 : Ri does not summarize all information available 
about the expected rate of change in purchasing power. 
By recognizing the best predictor of the rate of change 
in purchasing power will be the nominal Treasury bill 
interest rate, Fama set up two regressions to examine 
efficiency given the above relationship: 
The data obtained to calculate the purchasing power rate of 
change is the consumer price index. 
The first equation is used to test whether the expected 
real return is constant (the null hypothesis). This would 
mean 0:0 = E (r) and a: 1 = -1. o. Also since Ri summarizes all 
information about the expected rate of change in purchasing 
power, there should not be any way to use the past series of 
disturbance terms to predict a future disturbance term 
[E(~1 l€w, €~, ••• ) = 0.0). Therefore, the autocorrelations 
of the disturbances from the above regression should be 
zero. 
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To test the alternative hypothesis, a second 
independent variable (L!.t-i> is added to equation 1 to reflect 
the market's use of information from the previous period's 
rate of change in purchasing power to set~- If the market 
is efficient, a 2 = O and E(€t:€t-1' €t_21 ••• ) = 0.0. If the 
expected real return is constant, a 0 = E ( r) and a 1 = -1 . O . 
Through e.xamination of the results of the regressions, 
Fama determines the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The 
Treasury bill secondary market real rates do incorporate all 
information concerning rates of change in purchasing power. 
Therefore, the secondary market is efficient with respect to 
the information concerning the rates of change in purchasing 
power. 
Hamburger and Platt (1975) Hamburger and Platt look at 
the efficiency of the U.S. Treasury bill market in 
combination with the expectations hypothesis for the period 
1961 to 1971. They state that forward rates follow a 
martingale sequence under the expectations hypothesis and 
the efficient market model. They suggest information 
regarding the validity of both concepts may be gained by 
comparing forecast errors with actual rate changes over 
three month spans. 
The authors posit the difference between the forward 
rate and the future spot rate could be explained by using 
the expectations hypothesis and the efficient market 
hypothesis together. This concept is developed from the 
expectations hypothesis stated as: t+jFk,t = Et Ct+jRk) and the 
efficient market model (assuming perfect information 
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rate is t+iFk,t· Et Ct+iRd is the market's expectation at time t 
of the rate on k to prevail at time t + j. 
future spot rate. µtj is information regarding the future 
spot rate represented by a random number. Putting the two 
hypotheses together yielded the following equation: t+jRk -
t+jFk,t = µtj· The difference between the future spot rate and 
the forward rate, therefore, is simply a random number 
representing the arrival of new information. 
A weak form market efficiency test is first performed 
for the period 1961 to 1971. The authors find past interest 
rate data was reflected in current rates, and therefore the 
secondary Treasury bill market is weak form efficient. 
Under the efficient market hypothesis and the 
expectations hypothesis, the following equation is formed: 
where: t+jRk 
t+iF k,t 
µt,j 
= 
= 
= 
spot rate yield at time t+j on an 
instrument of maturity k 
forward rate on a k period security 
expected in period t+j which is implied 
by the yield curve at time t 
random number representing information 
available at time t+j that was not 
available at time t regarding t+jRk. 
47 
Next a semi-strong form test is performed. They propose 
expectations of future rates are formed based on information 
from estimates of personal income and liquidity variables 
(including Ml money supply, the monetary base, and 
nonborrowed monetary base). From the initial results, it is 
determined the nonborrowed monetary base was the best 
measure of liquidity. This, combined with personal income 
on a lagged basis, is used in the regression to look for 
semi-strong form efficiency. The result is the Treasury 
bill secondary market was highly semi-strong efficient. 
In attempting to detect any systematic nature in the 
forecasting errors, they find a constant was added to the 
actual change in rates. However, no significant forecasting 
ability using three month Treasury bill forward rates is 
evidenced. They conclude the three month Treasury bill rate 
which prevailed when the forecast of the three month 
Treasury bill forward rate was made is almost equal to the 
three month Treasury bill forward rate, and the three month 
Treasury bill forward rate is a poor predictor of the future 
spot rate. Based on the semi-strong tests, better 
predictions can be made with information from the personal 
income and money supply variables. 
Chandy and Cross (1984) In their study, Chandy and 
Cross advance the work with interest rates and inflation in 
examining the efficiency of the U.S. Treasury bill market. 
Two of Fama's results (from 1975, 1976, and 1977 studies) 
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are confirmed in this study: past purchasing power rates of 
change did carry information about future rates, and one 
month Treasury bill expected real returns were constant. 
In the one-month Treasury bill secondary market, 
however, they found inefficiency in the market in capturing 
all of the information regarding expected changes in 
purchasing power during high inflationary periods. The 
authors offered that Fama's results of market efficiency may 
be dependent upon a period of low inflation, as was the case 
during the time of Fama's studies. They also noted 
measurement bias could have occurred due to individual 
investor differences and the use of only one proxy for 
inflation and interest rates. 
Mills and Stephenson (1985) Mills and Stephenson 
investigate the semi-strong form efficiency of the U.K. 
Treasury bill market. In their study, market efficiency 
deals with the use of information concerning inflation 
expectations to determine the nominal rate of return on a 
Treasury bill. 
In conducting the test of the U.K. Treasury bill 
market, they use a quarterly interest rate series with the 
rate used being the average rate from the auction. The 
bills examine were 91 day maturity bills during the time 
frame 1952 to 1982. The inflation rate for each quarter is 
estimated using the retail price index. Based on their 
initial work, they decided any seasonal component should be 
removed from the inflation rate in the development of a 
model of interest rates and examination of market 
efficiency. 
The authors then use two models to test for market 
efficiency. With the following definitions, 
n = rate of inflation over period t 
Pt= expected real rate of return 
~=nominal interest rate on a bill 
The Fama model used is: 
The Mundell-Tobin model used is: 
They combine these models to form: 
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The combined model is the only one which did not exhibit 
serial correlation and therefore indicates secondary market 
efficiency. Given the above results, Mills and Stephenson 
proceed to develop a model·of the U.K. Treasury bill market. 
The model for the U.K. Treasury bill market is formed by 
adding an integrated MA(l) process for expected inflation. 
The empirical results from the completed model yield the 
conclusion the U.K. market is semi-strong form efficient. 
Wachtel and Young (1987) The announcement effect of 
future expected government deficits on government security 
interest rates are examined by Wachtel and Young. They 
hypothesize a larger than expected increase in the deficit 
should lead to higher interest rates. They use regression 
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methodology to measure the effect of the anticipated and 
unanticipated elements of the deficit and the unanticipated 
elements of the money supply announcements. The results of 
their study indicate statistically significant increases in 
interest rates occurred for government securities with 
longer maturities (greater than 90 days) when the projected 
deficit increased. This indicates market inefficiency in 
the sector of the market for longer maturity Treasury bills. 
Schirm. Sheehan. and Ferri (1989) In a similar study, 
Schirm, Sheehan, and Ferri examine the effects of Treasury 
debt announcements. They state that the Treasury attempts 
to minimize the effect of a deficit announcement (debt 
funding announcements) by making weekly announcements and 
consulting with primary dealers concerning the timing and 
maturity of new issues. However, the Treasury believes 
there is still some effect on the markets from such 
announcements. The authors hypothesize the unexpected 
component of debt announcements affects financial markets. 
Using the period January 1977 to December 1985, regression 
results indicate only the announcement of cash management 
bills and not the unexpected component of regular scheduled 
debt announcements influence the interest rates. This means 
semi-strong form market inefficiency with respect to the 
announcement of cash management bills. 
Wachtel and Young (1990) A second study by Wachtel and 
Young examines the Treasury auction announcements. In this 
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study, the authors look at effects on interest rates both 
before and after the Treasury auction. First, they examine 
the effects from the Treasury's announcement concerning the 
upcoming auction. The announcement concerning an upcoming 
auction tells the maturities, volume of new bills to be 
auctioned, and the new cash expected to be raised. They 
initially hypothesize the auction announcement might carry 
surprises about the "debt management policy" or "deficit 
financing requirements" of the Treasury. Their results 
indicate there was no significant information in this 
announcement which affected the interest rates. 
Consequently, they do not reject market efficiency. 
Their nexthypothesis is a post-auction announcement 
indicating a weak demand leads to higher interest rates. 
They use three measures of demand for Treasury issues to 
examine this: 
1) the high tail from the auction, 
2) the cover (total tenders received/total tenders 
accepted); and 
3) percent noncompetitive (noncompetitive 
tender/total tenders received). 
Two equations are developed to look at the effects from 
an auction announcement. The first is an attempt to explain 
the daily change in yields with a. measure of money surprise 
and either the tail, cover, or percent noncompetitive. The 
regression equation formulated is: 
where ~=daily change in yield on the illi maturity 
Mu = portion of money stock announcement 
which was unanticipated, and 
Iu = tail, cover, and percent noncompetitive. 
The second equation incorporates the effect of auction 
announcements on the term structure. This is handled by 
adding the change in yields on a three month bill as an 
explanatory variable to the regression. 
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Their examination of the effects from the announcement 
of the auction results shows a slight but positive, 
significant impact on interest rates. This occurs when the 
announcement conveys a "surprise" about demand for the 
securities auctioned. This leads to the conclusion the 
Treasury bill secondary market is not fully efficient. 
Prices as Information 
The following section reviews the existing research on 
markets which incorporate the existence of both informed and 
uninformed market participants and the pricing systems in 
these markets. The Treasury auction process sorts bids into 
two categories, competitive bids from "informed" traders and 
non-competitive bids from "uninformed" traders. Salop and 
Stiglitz (1977) suggest that most people do not even 
understand simple probabilities, as a result it is unlikely 
all market participants would ever be considered informed. 
The informed participants are generally said to have private 
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information which they obtain through an information 
gathering process which is costly (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). 
Do the auction results then pass on information from the 
informed bidders to the secondary market participants? The 
discussion of the use of information, informational 
efficiency, and informed/uninformed traders is presented by 
Hayek (1945), Grossman (1976), Green (1977), Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), and Bikhchandani and Huang (1989). 
Hayek (1945) was one of the first to discuss the use of 
information. Hayek states "in a system where the knowledge 
of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices 
can act to coordinate the separate actions of different 
people ... " Hayek describes the pricing system in a market 
as a means of passing along information and hence indicating 
change. Auction results release a summary of the informed 
bidders information. One factor found as a result of the 
auction which indicates the level of prices in the auction 
is the tail spread. The Treasury bill secondary market 
participants may examine the tail spread as a means of 
gaining information concerning auction prices and informed 
bidders' information. 
Green (1977) furthers Hayek's suggestions by stating 
that the information to be obtained is costly, and some 
market players choose to obtain the costly information, 
while others do not. Similar to Hayek's suggestion of 
prices aggregating information, Green says that those who do 
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not obtain the information can use the prices of the 
securities traded by informed players as proxies for the 
information. Green argues these systems, however, are 
usually inefficient because of this process of information 
transfer. This indicates the Treasury bill secondary market 
may be inefficient if the secondary market traders are using 
auction prices as proxies for information. 
Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) also 
proffer the informed participants have obtained information 
which is used to make trades, and this information is then 
partially reflected in the prices of the securities. The 
uninformed see only the prices of the securities and use 
those in decision-making. Not all informed traders will be 
able to earn returns by obtaining information if the pricing 
in the market is "over-informationally" efficient, but the 
fact the prices contain only partial information permits the 
informed traders to earn a return to offset the cost of 
obtaining information. 
Under this scenario, Grossman (1976) and Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) develop models of these markets. Grossman 
(1976) concludes an equilibrium will exist in a market when 
there is some noise in the system so that it is profitable 
for the informed trader to continue to obtain the 
information. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) find the price 
system becomes more informative as the cost of information 
decreases; the proportion of informed traders increases as 
noise increases; and the percentage of informed traders 
decreases as costs increase. In the Treasury bill market, 
bidders must not all choose to incur the costs of becoming 
informed since not all bidders submit competitive bids. 
Since the same traders submitting bids participate in the 
secondary market, there are both informed and uninformed 
bidders in the secondary market as well. With information 
being costly and unequally distributed, the assumptions of 
market efficiency are violated. Is the Treasury bill 
secondary market then inefficient? 
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The scenario modeled by Grossman (1976) and Grossman 
and stiglitz (1980) may hold true in the Treasury bill 
markets for dealers with noise existing in both markets. 
Combining this with Diamond and Verrecchia's (1981) 
suggestion that prices cannot be fully revealing with noise 
in a system, the question can be posed whether the auction 
prices are fully revealing. If the auction prices are not 
fully revealing, then they may not be unbiased expectations 
of Thursday's spot rate. 
In an examination of auctions with resale markets, 
Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) develop an exploratory model 
of the U.S. Treasury bill market. Their model assumes 
competitive bidders have information which is better than 
the information possessed by investors in the secondary 
market. The bids in the auction then convey this 
information to the secondary market. They speculate 
secondary market prices will respond to the private 
information held by competitive bidders in the primary 
market. 
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A game-theoretic model linking the resale price and 
actions of competitive bidders is developed which has n 
risk-neutral bidders who are dealers and k identical, 
indivisible objects (n > k). The objects all have the same, 
true, but unknown value at bid time. The model assumes 
information on the highest losing bid and additional 
information can be passed to the secondary market between 
the bidding cutoff time and the opening of the secondary 
market. The price at which the winning dealers resell their 
objects is the "expected value of the object conditional on 
all publicly available information" in a discriminatory 
auction with a resale market such as the Treasury bill 
market. 
The model developed by Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) 
suggesting that secondary market prices will respond to the 
private information held by competitive bidders gives rise 
to a semi-strong form efficient Treasury bill market study. 
Do asked rates in the Treasury bill secondary market react 
to the announcement of auction results using the percent 
overbid as a proxy for private information held by 
competitive bidders? 
The current study questions the semi-strong efficiency 
of the Treasury bill secondary market. The majority of the 
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results described in the existing literature support a weak 
form efficient Treasury bill secondary market (Fama, 1975; 
Hamburger and Platt, 1975; Phillips and Pippenger, 1976; 
Mills and Stephenson, 1985). Chandy and Cross (1984), 
however, found weak form inefficiency during high 
inflationary periods. Most studies also failed to reject 
the semi-strong efficiency of the Treasury bill market. 
Table I summarizes the results of the market information and 
semi-strong form efficiency studies of the Treasury bill 
secondary market. The results of these studies, in 
particular Wachtel and Young (1990} and Cammack (1991), lend 
relevance to the present study's question of announced 
auction results having an impact in the Treasury bill 
secondary market. 
Forward Rates and Unbiased 
Expectations in Markets 
Bids placed on Monday are for bills to be received on 
Thursday. As a result, purchasing a Treasury bill in the 
auction market could be viewed as purchasing a forward 
contract for a 91-day Treasury bill to be delivered in three 
days (Lumpkin, 1986). Monday's auction bid rates can be 
considered as unbiased expectations of the spot rate to 
prevail in the secondary market on Thursday. This type of 
relationship has been examined in studies dealing with the 
Treasury bill futures market and the foreign exchange 
Authors: 
Hamburger and Platt (1975) 
Chandy and Cross (1984) 
Mills and Stephenson (1985) 
Wachtel and Young (1987) 
Schirm, Sheehan, and Ferri 
(1989) 
Wachtel and Young (1990) 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF SEMI-STRONG 
TREASURY BILL SECONDARY MARKET 
EFFICIENCY STUDIES 
Market Efficiency with Respect to: Results: 
Estimates of personal income and Semi-strong efficient 
liquidity (nonborrowed monetary 
base) 
Expected changes in purchasing Market inefficiency during 
power high inflationary periods 
Expected inflation in the U.K. Semi-strong efficiency in 
Treasury bill market U.K. Treasury bill market 
Expected government deficits semi-strong inefficient for 
announcements the longer-term maturity 
segment of the market 
Unexpected components of the Semi-strong efficient except 
Treasury debt announcements and with respect to cash 
cash management bills management bills 
announcements announcement 
Announced auction results - demand semi-strong inefficiency 
surprise 
u, 
00 
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market. To develop the appropriate methodology for the 
current study, literature relating to (1) the foreign 
exchange market and forward rates is reviewed (Frenkel, 
1981; Bilson, 1981; Edwards, 1983; and Chiang, 1988) and (2) 
Treasury bill futures and unbiased expectations (Wong and 
Henderson, 1990; Cole, Impson, and Reichenstein, 1991). 
The concept of unbiased expectations has been studied 
with forward rates in the foreign exchange market. The 
model developed and used in many of these studies provides 
the model to examine the auction rate as an unbiased 
expectation of Thursday's secondary market rate in the 
current study. 
Trades of foreign currencies in the foreign exchange 
market occur both at rates established in the spot market 
and at rates established by forward contracts. One concept 
which has been questioned due to the existence of these two 
outlets for foreign currency trades is whether the forward 
rate is an unbiased expectation of the future spot rate. 
Current spot foreign exchange rates will reflect all 
relevant information at the time the spot rate is set in an 
efficient foreign exchange market, and forward rates should 
reflect expectations about future spot rates (Frenkel, 1981; 
Edwards, 1983). In examining forward exchange rates as 
unbiased expectations of future spot rates, the basic model 
used takes the form (Frenkel, 1981; Bilson, 1981; Edwards, 
1983; Chiang, 1988): 
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st+1 = a + BFi + €1+1 
where st+1 = spot rate at time tl+l or ln of spot rate 
F1 = forward rate at time tor ln of forward rate 
€t+1 = white noise. 
Testing the unbiased expectations hypothesis is a joint 
hypothesis test: 
H0 : a= 0 and B = 1 
H1 : a ;c o and B ;c 1 . 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the forward 
rate is considered an unbiased expectation of the future 
spot rate. 
Both studies from the Treasury bill futures market 
included in the literature review use models similar to the 
foreign exchange market models to examine unbiased 
expectations. Wong and Henderson (1990) examine the 
efficiency of the Treasury bill futures market. One part of 
their study also involves determining if futures prices are 
unbiased forecasts of Treasury bill spot prices during the 
time period March 1976 to December 1986. In order to 
conduct their study, the following regression model is 
developed: 
where 
Sn = a + bFTm,n + Um 
Sn = spot price at time n 
Um= forecast error [ Sn - Em(Sn)J; and 
FTm,n = futures price at time m, to be delivered at 
time n. 
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If the futures price is an unbiased forecast of the spot 
price, then the two should not be significantly different 
and Um should be approximately zero. The hypothesis tested 
is: H0 : b = 1 
HA: b ;c 1 
In testing this hypothesis, Wednesday bid prices are 
used for the Sn variable and the 3, 6, and 9 month futures 
were used for FTm,n• The results of the regression lead to a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis in most cases since b 
was not significantly different from one at the 95 percent 
confidence level. The only cases in which the null 
hypothesis is rejected are the futures having terms to 
delivery of 1, 4, 25 and 27 weeks. 
Cole, Impson, and Reichenstein (1991) look at the 
possibility of Treasury bill futures rates being rational 
expectations of the spot rates to prevail on the contract 
delivery date. They test futures prices for the 
characteristics of rational expectations. 
In studying this question, Cole, Impson, and 
Reichenstein suggest one of the following would hold. (1) A 
combination of factors, such as term premia; differences in 
transactions costs and margin regulations; and location, 
timing and delivery options contained in futures contracts, 
could lead to rational expectations not being able to 
describe the futures rate. In this case, there would be a 
significant difference between the futures rate and expected 
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spot rate. (2) Rational expectations can be used to 
describe the futures rate when these combined factor~ are 
not significantly reflected in the expectation. In this 
case, the futures rate is a rational expectation of the spot 
rate. 
In determining whether the futures rates are consistent 
with rational expectations, their study includes a test of 
unbiasedness. In doing the study, futures rates are 
compared with a "no-change" scenario in which actual bill 
rates are used from the same day the futures rate is 
obtained. The test for unbiasedness is performed using the 
following regression. 
where 
rt = a + .Brt-s + est 
rt= actual bill rate at time t 
rt-s = forecast at time t-s of the bill rate 
expected to prevail at time t 
The results of the tests indicate Treasury bill futures 
rates are consistent with unbiased rational expectations. 
With Monday's auctioned Treasury bills not being issued 
until the following Thursday, the auction rate is similar to 
a forward or futures rate. Is the auction rate from Monday 
an unbiased expectation of the rate to prevail in Thursday's 
secondary market? To examine this question, the same model 
and hypotheses used in the foreign exchange market studies 
and Treasury bill futures market studies are used in the 
current study. 
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Bid-Ask Spreads in Dealer Markets 
The last area of the current study examines the 
determinants of the Treasury bill secondary market bid-ask 
spread around the time of the auction results announcement. 
Bid-ask spreads exist to compensate dealers for inventory 
costs, transactions costs, asymmetric information costs, and 
risk (Bagehot, 1971; Branch and Freed, 1977; Hamilton, 1978; 
Stoll, 1978 and 1989; ; Mann and Seijas, 1991; and Mcinish 
and Wood, 1992). Security dealers continually monitor new 
information and evaluate their risks and costs to set bid 
and ask quotes (Hamilton, 1978). The information set 
monitored will include inventory positions, competitors' 
supply and demand schedules, purchase and sale orders, 
volatility and arrival of new market information (Hamilton, 
1978; Garbade, Pomrenze, and Silber, 1979). 
In the over-the-counter stock market, Stoll (1989) 
examines three of the determinants of the bid-ask spread. 
Stoll argues the true value of a stock will be bracketed by 
the bid-ask spread if the spread is compensation only for 
order processing. If the spread is instead compensation for 
inventory holding costs, dealers will alter their bid-ask 
spread in order to attract or discourage trades depending on 
how near the dealers are to their perceived optimal 
inventory positions. Last if dealers are being compensated 
for adverse information costs, dealers will alter their bid-
ask spreads after transactions with other dealers under the 
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assumption the other dealers have superior information. The 
adverse information cost is a result of the dealer being put 
in the position of trading with individuals who have more 
information than the dealer. 
Using data from NASDAQ/NMS from 1984, Stoll found 43 
percent of the realized spread was compensation for adverse 
information costs, 10 percent for holding costs, and 47 
percent for order costs. Since compensation for adverse 
information costs is a significant portion of the spread in 
the over-the-counter stock market, this compensation is 
likely a significant portion of the spread in the Treasury 
bill market as well. 
Treasury bill dealers cannot discern between 
transaction orders generated by traders with liquidity needs 
and orders generated by traders with superior information. 
Liquidity-motivated investors are interested in being able 
to make timely exchanges of securities for cash, and 
information-motivated investors make exchanges based on the 
possession of "special" information which the market maker 
may not have (Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983; and 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). The market maker gains from 
transactions with the liquidity-motivated investor and 
attempts to minimize losses to information-motivated 
investors by altering the bid-ask spread. The larger the 
spread is, the smaller will be the market maker's loss due 
to adverse selection from these information-motivated 
investors. The spread, however, cannot be too large as it 
would discourage trades by the information-motivated 
investors (Bagehot, 1971). Bagehot also notes the more 
liquid the market, the smaller the spread. 
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Based on the theory there are expected losses to 
informational traders and expected gains from liquidity 
traders, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Copeland and Galai 
(1983) develop models of bid-ask spreads. Glosten and 
Milgrom extract the following propositions from their model. 
1) If all traders, along with the market maker, had 
equivalent information, there would be one price between the 
bid and ask prices. 2) A martingale is formed by the 
prices at which the transactions occur. 3) The variance of 
underlying uncertainty partially determines the bound on the 
size of the spread. 4) Insiders' information is reflected 
in market prices. 5) Bid prices decrease and ask prices 
increase when (a) insiders get better information; (b) there 
becomes many more informational traders as opposed to 
liquidity traders; (c) for the liquidity trader, there is an 
increase in elasticity of expected supply and demand. 
The fourth and fifth propositions are the most useful 
for this study. If insider information is reflected in 
market prices, the tail spread will convey "insider" 
information from the Treasury bill auction to the secondary 
market. Dealers will alter their bid-ask spreads to reflect 
the arrival of this "insider" information in the post-
auction period. 
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The bid-ask spread should be wider, according to the 
fifth proposition of Glosten and Milgrom, when there are 
more informational traders. The question is does the 
announcement of the auction results including the percent 
competitive and percent overbid reduce some uncertainty 
concerning the number of informational traders and result in 
changes to the bid-ask spread. 
Previous studies model determinants of the bid-ask 
spread of the over-the-counter stock market dealers and NYSE 
specialists. Linear regression models are developed in a 
format similar to: 
si = B0 + B1X1i + B2X2i + B3X3i + B4X4i + ei 
where si represents the bid-ask spread as an average or as a 
percentage relative to the stock price or average bid-ask 
spread and the X's represent the hypothesized determinants 
of the bid-ask spread (Branch and Freed, 1977; Hamilton, 
1978; and Mcinish and Wood, 1992). Stoll (1978) uses a 
similar model, but in log linear form, to explore bid-ask 
spread determinants. The dependent variables included as 
determinants in these models are able to significantly 
explain the bid-ask spread of OTC dealers and NYSE 
specialists (R2s from .3 to .82.). 
Branch and Freed (1977) find dealers' risk (as measured 
by the percentage change in closing price of stock from 
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previous day), competition, and volume are significant 
determinants of the bid-ask spread. In the Treasury bill 
market, dealers' risk may change as a result of the auction 
outcome and, therefore, the bid-ask spread in the secondary 
market is affected according to Branch and Freed's results. 
The level of competition and volume may also change in the 
secondary market as a result of the auction outcomes. If 
dealers are able to buy more bills in the auction, 
competition to sell the bills in the secondary market will 
increase. 
Hamilton (1978) finds the difference between highest 
and lowest bid price for a stock, the number of OTC dealers 
quoting prices for a stock, the number of shareholders, and 
the average share price were determinants of the bid-ask 
spread. The difference between highest and lowest bid price 
for stock is similar to the tail spread information from the 
auction. The tail spread is then expected to be related to 
the change in the secondary market bid-ask spread. 
Stoll's (1978) log linear model finds dealer risk 
aversion, stock return variance, volume, adverse information 
costs (proxied by turnover), stock price, and the degree of 
competition were all determinants of the over-the-counter 
stock market bid-ask spread. The volume, degree of 
competition, and price are negatively related to the bid-ask 
spread while the variance and adverse information costs are 
positively related to the spread. The relationship of 
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volume, degree of competition and adverse information costs 
to the bid-ask spread are expected to be the same in the 
Treasury bill secondary market. 
The intraday bid-ask spread. in the futures markets is 
shown to be related to both the "timing of information 
arrival and the uncertainty of the information flow" (Ma, 
Peterson, and Sears, 1992). Ma, Peterson, and Sears suggest 
that bid-ask spread changes signal the arrival of new 
information. If Treasury bill dealers change their bid-ask 
spread in the post-auction period due to the announcement of 
the auction results, it would be said the auction results 
announcement is an arrival of new information. If the 
coefficients on the auction results variables are 
statistically significant, then they would be considered 
determinants of the change in the spread. 
Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) specifically examine the 
arrival of new information and information events. In a 
study of the over-the-counter stock market, they note the 
dealer should widen the spread in anticipation of an 
information event which will give informed traders an 
advantage. The information events studied are dividend and 
earnings announcements. The results of their study show, 
judging by the dealer's increase in spread, there is an 
increased amount of information asymmetry (more than "normal 
asymmetry") between the uninformed dealers and the informed 
traders at the time of a second announcement of dividends or 
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earnings. Applying this idea to the Treasury bill secondary 
market, dealers may reduce their spreads after the auction 
if they believe there is reduced information asymmetry due 
to the announced auction results. 
One study of bid-ask spreads specifically dealing with 
Treasury issues is Garbade and Rosey's (1977). Two models 
are used by Garbade and Rosey to examine bid/asked spreads 
for U.S. Treasury coupon issues. The time frame for the 
study was 1961 to 1974 which is subdivided into pre- and 
post-1966. The spreads during these years are collected in 
mid-February, mid-May, mid-August, and mid-November. 
Garbade and Rosey's first model compares bid/asked 
spreads to characteristics of the U.S. Treasury coupon 
issues. The model is formulated as: 
ln(S) = ao + boln(TRM) + coln(VOL) + doFlwr + eoNew 
where: s 
TRM 
VOL 
Flwr 
New 
= bid/ask spread in percent of par value 
= term to maturity 
= volume outstanding 
= a dummy variable equal to one if the 
security could be used to pay estate taxes 
and zero otherwise, and 
= dummy variable equal to one if the security 
had been issued within three months before 
the observation date and zero otherwise. 
The results of the first regression indicate all of the 
coefficients are significant. The term to maturity and the 
flower variable have a positive relationship with the 
bid/ask spread. The outstanding volume variable and the new 
variable have a negative relationship with the spread. 
The second model examines the bid/ask spread as 
co~pared to yield volatility. The change in the Federal 
funds rate is used as a proxy for yield volatility. The 
model is: 
ln(S) = ao + aljAFFj + boln('l'RM) + bljAFFjln(TRM) 
+ coln(VOL) + cljAFFjln(VOL) + doFlwr + eoNew. 
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With the second regression, they find that in the post-1966 
time frame, dealers' spreads on U.S. Treasury coupon issues 
varied directly with volatility in the market. A model 
similar to this will be used in the current study and the 
change in the Federal funds rates will be included as an 
explanatory variable. 
Roll (1970) examines bid-asked spreads on 13 week 
maturity Treasury bills. Roll discusses the sharp changes 
in the spreads on the 13 week bills which occur at the time 
of a new issue. 
Roll provides three explanations for these changes. 
First, the Treasury bill secondary market may have trouble 
absorbing the new issue. If the market is able to absorb 
the new issue without any problems, the decrease in spreads 
should be smoother. An alternative explanation for the 
sharp decrease in spreads is that dealer collusion may be 
occurring in the secondary market in an attempt to provide 
low priced newly issued bills for government purchases in 
the secondary market. The sharp drop in spreads from 12 to 
13 weeks and from 25 to 26 weeks supports this alternative 
explanation. Roll's final explanation is in the 1 to 13 
week Treasury bill market, the dealer costs are less and 
this is reflected in the smaller yield spreads. This 
explains the upward shifts in spreads from 14 to 26 weeks 
but not the drops in spreads. Roll also notes the market 
for new issues of 13 and 26 week bills is very active. 
Costs are lower in more active markets. 
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With the exceptions of Roll's (1970) article and 
Garbade and Rosey 1 s (1977) article, this paper differs from 
other studies presented here in that it examines the 
Treasury bill secondary market bid-ask spreads. It uses 
more current data and questions whether auction results are 
determinants of the post-auction secondary market bid-ask 
spreads. Although the spreads should be smaller on the 91 
day bills used in this study, Roll (1970) provides an 
argument for examining the determinants of bid-ask spreads 
in the secondary market. It would appear the secondary 
market is reacting to something associated with the 
auctioning of new bills given the sharp change in spreads at 
the time of new issues. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(Winter 1977-78, p. 40), "Spreads ... widen--sometimes 
dramatically--when new developments generate caution or 
uncertainty in the market." Do the announced auction 
results lessen uncertainty and cause a reduction in 
secondary market bid-ask spreads in the post-auction period? 
Are the secondary market bid-ask spreads on Treasury bills 
determined by the information from the auction results: 
tail spread, percent competitive, and percent overbid? 
Summary of Study as Related 
to the Literature 
The literature review supports the development of the 
hypotheses and selection of methodology to test the 
hypotheses. The first group of literature discusses the 
auction and the secondary markets. This sets up the 
justification for the examination of information flow 
between the two markets through the announced auction 
results and the examination of the auction rate as a 
downward biased estimate of the true value of a Treasury 
bill. 
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The next area of the literature review concerns market 
efficiency. This literature states that if markets are 
semi-strong form efficient, then the announcement of new 
information will not affect the market prices. Studies are 
presented which use regression methodology to test 
relationships similar to the semi-strong form Treasury bill 
secondary market efficiency being tested in this paper. The 
studies specifically examining Treasury bill secondary 
market efficiency are mixed in their results. Semi-strong 
form market efficiency is found in the United States and 
United Kingdom Treasury bill secondary markets with respect 
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to estimates of personal income and liquidity, expected 
in~lation, and unexpected components of Treasury debt 
announcements (Hamburger and Platt, 1975; Mills and 
Stephenson, 1985; Schirm, Sheehan, and Ferri, 1989). This 
study examines the semi-strong market efficient of the 
Treasury bill secondary market with respect to components of 
the announced auction results not previously studied. 
The Cammack (1991) study provides the justification and 
models for hypotheses two through four. These hypotheses 
look at models of a bidding adjustment and secondary market 
returns which occur as a result of the downward biasing of 
the auction price. 
The studies presented support the methodology for 
testing the fifth hypothesis concerning unbiased 
expectations. These studies examine unbiased expectations 
in forward and futures markets all using similar regression 
models and hypotheses. The model and hypotheses are used in 
the current study to test the Treasury bill auction rate as 
an unbiased expectation of Thursday's secondary market rate. 
Bid-ask spreads are discussed in the last area of the 
literature review. In other markets, studies find 
determinants of the bid-ask spread to include asymmetric 
information costs, transactions costs, volatility, supply 
and demand schedules, risks, volume, and competitors. This 
study examines components of the Treasury bill auction 
results as determinants of the secondary market bid-ask 
spread. These components encompass information regarding 
asymmetric information, demand, risk, volume, and 
competitors. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODELS AND HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY, 
AND DATA SOURCES 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the models, hypotheses, 
methodology, and data sources for this study. The chapter 
is divided into three sections. In the first section, six 
models are presented along with the hypotheses examining the 
models. In the second section, the methodology is discussed 
for testing the hypotheses. The required data and data 
sources employed to conduct the hypotheses testing are 
introduced in the last section. 
Models and Hypotheses 
Market Efficiency 
The first hypothesis concerns whether the Treasury bill 
secondary market is semi-strong efficient with respect to a 
given information set. If the changes in Treasury bill 
secondary market asked rates follow a fair game, the 
Treasury bill secondary market can be said to be semi-strong 
efficient with respect to the given information set. A 
75 
stochastic process, xt1 is a martingale with respect to a 
sequence of information sets, ¢t1 if Xi has the property 
Et (xt+1 I ¢t) = xt and is said to be a fair game if xt+1 has the 
property Et(xt+1 l¢t) = o. It follows that the change in a 
martingale process (xt+l - xt) is a fair game and is not 
predictable given the sequence of information sets, ¢t• 
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Applying this theory to the Treasury bill secondary 
market, the change in the Treasury bill discount rate from 
time period t-1 to time period tis not predictable if the 
Treasury bill rate follow a martingale process. An analysis 
of the following model is appropriate in questioning whether 
changes in the discount rates follow this fair game, 
systematic, linear relationship: 
where 
Re - Rc-1 = Bo + B1X1 + B2X2 + • • • + BjXj + €t. 
Re= the discount rate on a Treasury bill at 
time t, 
JS= component j of the information set, 
€t = random error terms which are identically, 
independently distributed. 
If changes in Treasury bill rates are a fair game, then 
coefficients B0 •••• ~, which are linked to the information 
set, will not be significantly different from zero. The 
Treasury bill secondary market would then be considered 
semi-strong efficient with respect to the information set. 
The information set of interest in this study, ¢t1 
includes the Treasury bill auction announcement variables 
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(percent competitive, percent overbid, and tail spread) and 
the change in the Federal funds rate. The percent overbid, 
the percent competitive, and the tail spread are proxies for 
the strength of demand and the degree of participation in 
the auction market by informed and uninformed traders. 
The first auction results variable discussed is the 
percent overbid. The percent overbid (POVER) is calculated 
as the ratio of the dollar volume of competitive bids not 
accepted to the total dollar volume of bids in the auction. 
When the volume of competitive bids exceeds the supply of 
bills available to competitive bidders, demand has exceeded 
supply. This excess demand can be measured by the percent 
overbid. When the competitive bidders demand is not met in 
the auction market, the demand is expected to move to the 
secondary market. Because the competitive bidders have 
better information than other traders in the secondary 
market, transactions with competitive bidders increases the 
dealers' risk in the secondary market (Bikhchandani and 
Huang, 1989). It is anticipated that dealers reduce asked 
rates (increase prices) in response to the increased risk 
and the greater demand. 
The percent competitive, the second auction results 
variable, reflects the number of informed traders winning 
bills in the auction market. The percent competitive 
(PCOMP) is the ratio of the dollar volume of competitive 
bids accepted to the dollar volume of total bids accepted. 
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The largest group of informed traders is dealers. A larger 
percent of competitive bids filled in an auction suggests 
dealers will have a larger inventory of 91 day bills once 
the bills are issued. The dealers may increase their asked 
rates (lower prices) in .order to bring their inventory of 91 
day bills to an optimal level. 
The bids filled in an auction are either competitive or 
noncompetitive bids, by definition. The percent of total 
bids filled through competitive bids (PCOMP), therefore, 
indirectly indicates the demand for bills from 
noncompetitive bidders in the auction market. Since 
noncompetitive bids reduce the supply of bills· available to 
competitive bidders, a lower percent competitive variable 
may indicate there could be more competitive bidders seeking 
bills in the secondary market. More competitive bidders 
seeking bills in the secondary market would be associated 
with a reduction in asked rates (higher bill prices). 
The study's last auction information variable is the 
tail spread. The tail spread (TAILSPR) is the difference 
between the high and low accepted bid rates. Boatler (1975) 
states that an approximate demand schedule for Treasury 
bills is produced by the ranking of bid prices and 
quantities. This demand schedule can be represented by the 
spread between the high and low prices. The more aggressive 
the demand, the smaller the tail spread. 
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Market prices aggregate the private information of 
market participants (Hayek, 1945; Grossman, 1976; Green, 
1977; Milgrom, 1979; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981; and 
Lumpkin, 1986) .. The tail spread (TAILSPR) reflects the 
prices achieved in an auction. This implies the tail spread 
is not only a reflection of the dispersion of prices but is 
a means of passing along bidders' private information. 
Reduced demand from competitive bidders, a wider disparity 
of information among competitive bidders, or less aggressive 
competitive bidders are all factors which could result in a 
larger tail spread. As the tail spread gets larger, an 
increase in the secondary market asked rate (lower bill 
prices) is expected. 
The fourth variable in the information set is the 
change in the Federal funds rate (CHFF). The Federal funds 
rate is included to account for activities of the Federal 
Reserve which affect Treasury bill rates. The purchase or 
sale of Treasury bills by the open market desk of the 
Federal Reserve Bank·of New York is used to adjust reserves 
in the banking system. While a measure of open market 
transactions to account for Federal Reserve activities which 
could influence interest rates might be more appropriate for 
the estimated model, the. data was not available. The 
Federal funds rate was selected as an explanatory variable 
to act as a proxy for the influence of the Federal Reserve 
on Treasury bill rates. 
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The first reason the Federal funds rate acts as a proxy 
is the Federal funds rate provides a measure of the Federal 
Reserve's pressure on the money supply and the pressure on 
the money market. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
(1961) states that a restrained monetary policy, which leads 
to increasing Federal funds rates, will be seen in an 
economic boom. In this situation, commercial banks may have 
to reduce their holdings of Treasury bills in order to fill 
their customers' loan demand and meet reserve requirements. 
Also as the Federal funds rate increases, there is a 
reduction in the money supply available for bank purchases 
of Treasury bills to hold as secondary reserves. This 
results in a reduced demand for Treasury bills. 
A second reason for selecting the Federal funds rate as 
a proxy is the Federal funds rate can be used for predicting 
future rates on other money market instruments, since it is 
most quickly influenced when the Fed changes its policy 
(Jones, 1986; Bernanke and Blinder, 1989; Simon, 1989). 
Cook and Hahn (1988) find the change in the Federal funds 
rate is a statistically significant explanatory variable for 
the change in the three month Treasury bill rate. Given the 
two reasons for using the Federal funds rate as a proxy, a 
Federal funds rate increase is anticipated to result in an 
increase in the Treasury bill secondary market asked rate 
(lower bill price). 
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Using the information set consisting of the auction 
results variables and the change in the Federal funds rate, 
the first relationship modeled is: 
Model I 
CHASKt = B0 + B1POVE:Rc + B2PCOMPt + B3TAILSP:Rc 
+ B4CHFFt + €.t• 
The variables used are defined as follows: 
CHASK: the change in the discount rate 
POVER: 
(Re - Rc-t) on a Treasury bill with 
approximately 91 days to maturity; 
the ratio of the bids not accepted to the 
total bids in the auction; 
PCOMP: the ratio of competitive bids accepted to the 
total bids accepted in the auction; 
TAILSPR: the low auction tail plus the high auction 
tail (difference between the highest and 
lowest auction discount rates accepted); and 
CHFF: the change in the Federal funds rate. 
Model I examines whether the Treasury bill secondary 
market is semi-strong form efficient with respect to the 
auction results variables and the change in the Federal 
funds rate. The null and alternative hypotheses to test 
this are: 
Ho1 : Bo· • • Bj = 0 
HAI : Bo • •• Bj :;t O • 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, the Treasury bill 
secondary market is not considered ~ully efficient with 
respect to the auction results information and the changes 
in the Federal funds rate. 
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Initially, Model I uses the change in the Treasury bill 
asked discount rate (CHASK) from Friday to Monday, because 
information concerning Monday's auction may be used by 
Monday's secondary market participants. There is only a 
short time, however, between the 1:00 p.m. cutoff of 
Monday's auction and the collection at approximately 3:00 
p.m. Monday of secondary market trading information. The 
high, low and average rates accepted in the auction are not 
announced until 5:00 p.m. Monday. The timing, therefore, 
allows secondary market trades on Monday to be based only on 
the bidders' perceived auction results and on information 
transmitted between auction bidders during the two hour time 
span from 1:00 to 3:00 p.m .. 
With the Treasury release of the auction information 
not occurring until near 5:00 p.m., there is no time Monday 
for the secondary market to react to the announced auction 
results. It is more likely that a change in the asked rate 
due to information contained in the announced auction 
results would occur from Monday to Tuesday. The next 
regression, consequently, will use the change in the 
Treasury bill asked discount rate from Monday to Tuesday. 
Additional Model I regressions use Tuesday to Wednesday 
data, Wednesday to Thursday data, and Thursday to Friday 
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data. These regressions attempt to see if the market waits 
until the bills are issued to incorporate the auction 
results information. 
Downward Biased Estimates 
Auction theory suggests auction rates are downward 
biased estimates of the true value of the Treasury bills 
(Reece, 1978; Milgrom and Weber, 1982; French and McCormick, 
1984; and Cammack, 1991). As a result, Monday's secondary 
market price will differ from the auction price and an 
excess return could be earned due to a bidding adjustment. 
Components of the auction results can be considered as 
determinants of the bidding adjustment and secondary market 
returns. To examine this, the models developed by Cammack 
(1991) are replicated using the current data from the time 
period August 1~85 to August 1990. 
According to auction theory, this downward biasing of 
the auction prices is a function of the number of auction 
bidders and the dispersion of opinion among auction 
participants (Reece, 1978; Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Cammack, 
1991). Downward biased auction rates occur when bidders 
realize there are fewer bidders in the auction and their 
chance of winning a bid is greater. The bidder can lower 
his bid and realize a greater return. A simple comparison 
of the auction rates and the secondary market rates is 
conducted to verify that the relationship predicted by 
auction theory is correct. 
Once the comparison confirms downward biasing exists, 
the hypothesis that the downward biased auction rate is 
determined by the number of bidders and dispersion of 
opinion is examined. The degree of downward biasing is 
measured using a variable termed the Monday bidding 
adjustment (MONBA) which is 100 x ln( 91PM/PA) (Cammack, 
1991). 91PM is the 92-day Treasury bill price traded in 
Monday's secondary market adjusted to 91 days to maturity. 
The formula to make this adjustment is 91PM = 100 x 
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(PM/ 100) 91192 • PA is the quantity-weighted average price from 
Monday's auction. 4 
Three auction variables are used to measure the 
dispersion of opinion and the number of bidders. The low 
tail (LOTAIL) is a proxy for the dispersion of opinion. 5 
The number of competitive bidders in an auction (C) is 
examined by looking at the fraction of unsuccessful 
competitive bids. 6 The number of noncompetitive bidders 
(NC) is measured with the fraction of the dollar volume of 
4The prices are calculated from the discount rates given in the 
auction and secondary markets using the following formula: P = 100 -
(days to maturity x discount rate)/360. 
5LOTAIL = ln(PA - low auction price). 
6c = dollar volume of competitive bids submitted/dollar volume of 
competitive bids accepted. 
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noncompetitive bids in the auction. 7 
These three auction variables are decomposed into 
expected and unexpected components using a first-order 
autoregressive proces·s. Each auction variable of interest 
is estimated using an iterative process with ten data points 
for each iteration. The model used to determine the 
expected component for each variable takes the form: 
Variablet = B0 + B1Variablet-t + €t. 
B0 and B1 are estimated for the model first using data points 
fort= 2 through 11. The estimated equation is used to 
forecast the variable at t = 12 which is then considered the 
expected component for the variable at t = 12. The 
unexpected component fort= 12 is then calculated by 
subtracting the forecasted component from the actual value 
at t = 12. This estimation process is repeated through the 
study period by dropping the iili observation and adding the 
iili plus ten observation each time until the end (n) of the 
data set is reached (t = 3 through 12, 4 through 13, .... , 
n - 10 through n - 1). This estimation process produces 
unexpected and expected components for the auction results 
variables for n - 11 time periods. 
The process outlined for finding the unexpected and 
expected components differs from Cammack's process in that 
Cammack used a data set including the entire time frame 
7Nc = dollar volume of noncompetitive bids/dollar volume of accepted 
bids. 
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rather than an iterative process with ten data points in 
each estimation period. The process used for this study was 
chosen because it should provide better estimates for the 
unexpected and expected components of the auction variables. 
This improvement should occur because the time period used 
in estimating the expected components is closer in proximity 
to the time period being estimated. 
The model used to examine the relationship of the 
expected components of the auction independent variables 
with the bidding adjustment due to the downward biasing is 
(Cammack, 1991): 
Model II 
MONB~ = a + BXt + €t 
where: MONBA = Monday's bidding adjustment 
X = ELOTAIL (expected component of the ·1ow tail); 
EC (expected component of the number of 
competitive bidders); or ENC (expected 
component of the number of noncompetitive 
.bidders) 
The hypotheses tested in conjunction with this model are: 
H02 : J3 = 0. 
HA2: J3 ;c O. 
The expected components are used in this model, because the 
Monday secondary market price cannot react to the unexpected 
components of the auction results. This is true because the 
calculation of the unexpected components cannot occur until 
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after the secondary market prices are recorded at 3:00 p.m. 
Mo~day and the auction results are announced at 5:00 p.m. 
If there is a relationship, the bidding adjustment should be 
related to the expected portion of the auction results. 
The null hypothesis for this question is rejected if an 
individual expected component of an auction results variable 
is statistically significant in explaining the bidding 
adjustment. ELOTAIL is expected to have a positive sign 
since the dispersion of prices is related to expected profit 
(Cammack, 1991). The number of bidders, as proxied by EC 
and ENC, should be also positively related to the bidding 
adjustment (Cammack, 1991). 
The next model, as presented by Cammack (1991), 
examines whether the unexpected components of the auction 
results variables are determinants of the return which can 
be earned in Tuesday's Treasury bill secondary market. Any 
adjustment of the secondary market prices due to unexpected 
information and the bidding adjustment will likely occur on 
Tuesday. This is due to the announcement of the auction 
results occurring on Monday after the secondary market 
prices are recorded for the day. The model which uses each 
of the auction results variables individually to examine 
this relationship is stated as: 
Model III 
TUESRET1 = a + BX1 +€ 1 
where: TUESRET = the percentage change in price on a 
Treasury bill from Monday (PM) to Tuesday 
(PT) in the secondary market; 
100 X ln (PT/PM) 
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X = ULOTA.IL (unexpected component of the low 
tail); UC (unexpected component of the 
number of competitive bidders); or UNC 
(unexpected component of the number of 
noncompetitive bidders). 
The hypotheses tested in conjunction with this model are: 
H03: B = o. 
HA3: B ¢ o. 
If any of the auction 
significant, they are 
Tuesday return. 
results variables are statistically 
considered to be determinants of the 
The auction results variables in the third model may 
simply be proxies for the price level in the auction 
(Cammack, 1991). The fourth model, therefore, includes a 
price level comparison variable (denoted A%D) to determine 
whether the auction results variables only convey 
information about the price level in the auction. This 
model is presented as (Cammack, 1991): 
Model IV 
TUESRETt = a + B1ULOTAILc + B2UCt + B3UNCt + B4A%Dt +ft 
where A%D = 100 x ln(low auction price/PM). 
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The set of hypotheses for the examination of each individual 
variable is: 
H04 : B=O. 
HA4: B ;¢ 0. 
If any of the individual auction res.ults variables are 
statistically significant in this model, then they are not 
just proxies for the auction price level and are 
determinants of Tuesday's secondary market return. 
Unbiased Expectations 
Buyers of Treasury bills in Monday's auction market do 
not receive the bills until Thursday. For Treasury bill 
auction markets to be truly efficient, the auction must 
produce an unbiased estimate of the secondary market rate 
prevailing when the new bills are delivered. Lumpkin (1986) 
notes the purchase of a Treasury bill in the auction market 
could be viewed as a purchase of a forward contract for a 
91-day Treasury bill to be delivered in three days. Forward 
rates can be examined as unbiased expectations of future 
spot rates. 
Unbiased expectations in the auction rate are in 
contrast to the auction rate being downward biased. The 
examination of whether the auction rate is a downward biased 
estimate of the true rate requir·es a comparison of almost 
identical bills selling in two different markets on the same 
day. The law of one price argues the rates in the two 
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markets should be the same for similar products. The 
argument for downward biased auction rates, however, stems 
from auction theory and the fact that when there is less 
competition and greater disparity of information bidders can 
place lower price bids. 
This is in contrast to an examination of whether the 
auction rate is an unbiased expectation of Thursday's 
secondary market rate. The unbiased expectations 
examination looks at a comparison of similar instruments 
selling in two different markets on two different days. The 
argument for unbiased expectations stems from market 
efficiency and forward rate theories. If the auction rate 
is a downward biased estimate of the Treasury bills true 
value in the secondary market on Monday and Tuesday, then 
the auction rate may not be an unbiased expectation. 
The average auction rate (being similar to a forward 
rate) should be an unbiased expectation of Thursday's 
secondary market asked rate. This relationship is stated 
as: 
AM Th = EM (RTh) 
where AM,To is the auction rate on Monday (M) for a bill to 
be issued on the following Thursday; and EM(RTo) is the 
Monday auction market's expectation of Thursday's spot rate 
(RTo) . 
To address the question of whether the auction's 
average discount rate (AM,To) is an unbiased expectation of 
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Thursday's spot rate (RTu), the following regression model 
suggesting the two rates are equal (except for white noise, 
€t) is used: 
Model V 
RTh = Bo + B1AM,Th + €t. 
The model is consistent with that used by Hamburger and 
Platt (1975); Frenkel (1981); Bilson (1981); Edwards (1983); 
Chiang (1988); Wong and Henderson (1990); and Cole, Impson, 
and Reichenstein (1991) in testing for unbiased 
expectations. 
The joint hypotheses associated with this model 
question whether the average auction discount rate (AM,Th) is 
an unbiased expectation of Thursday's secondary market rate 
(RTh) are: 
H0s : B0 = 0 and B1 - 1 . 
HAs: B0 ;c O and B1 ;c 1 . 
If the estimates of the coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero and one, respectively, then the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. It would then be said AM,Th 
is an unbiased expectation of RTh. Failure to reject the 
joint null hypothesis implies that all relevant information 
for predicting Thursday's secondary market rate is contained 
in the auction rate (Chiang, 1988). 
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Bid-Asked Spreads 
The last set of hypotheses for the study involves the 
determinants of the change in the bid-asked spread in the 
Treasury bill secondary market. In general, market spreads 
will change as new information arrives and increases or 
lessens uncertainty (Garbade, Pomrenze, and Silber, 1979; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; and Ma, Peterson, and Sears, 
1992). Spreads in the Treasury bill secondary market have 
been found to be explained by dealer costs, volume, term to 
maturity, and new issue status (Roll, 1970; and Garbade and 
Rosey, 1977). It is expected the Treasury bill auction 
results contain information which the dealers in the 
secondary market incorporate into their bid-asked spreads. 
The explanatory variables considered as determinants of the 
secondary market change in bid-asked spreads include three 
auction results variables (percent overbid, percent 
competitive, and tail spread) and the change in the Federal 
funds rate. 
The first auction result variable considered as a 
determinant of the change in the bid-asked spread is the 
percent overbid (POVER). One argument for including the 
percent overbid as an explanatory variable stems from the 
theory dealers increase bid-asked spreads when their risks 
and costs are increased. The percent overbid acts as a 
signal of the level of excess demand from information 
motivated traders in the auction. These more informed 
traders may demand bills in the secondary market, because 
they were unable to purchase bills in the auction market 
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Bagehot, 1971; and Mann and 
Seijas, 1991). Recognizing that trades may be occurring 
with information motivated traders, the dealers increase 
their bid-asked spreads to reflect the potential risk and 
recoup the cost of transacting with informed bidders. The 
change in the spread should be positive when the percent 
overbid increases. 
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Another argument supporting the inclusion of the 
percent overbid (POVER) as a determinant of the bid-asked 
spread is based on the cost of obtaining information. As 
this cost increases, fewer market traders will choose to 
incur the cost of obtaining information needed to 
participate in the auction as a competitive bidder. The 
result is a smaller percent overbid. With fewer information 
motivated traders having unmet demand in the auction, the 
chance of suffering a loss in an exchange with these traders 
in the secondary market is reduced. Dealers can therefore 
reduce their bid-asked spreads when the percent overbid is 
smaller. 
The second determinant of the bid-asked spread included 
in the model is the percent competitive (PCOMP). Mullineaux 
(1973) notes that looking at the ratio of noncompetitive 
bids to total bills sold is a good measure of small saver 
activity in the primary Treasury bill market. Accord~ngly, 
94 
if the small saver activity was increasing, there would be a 
lower amount of competitive bids being accepted in the 
auction market. Consequently, the current study's use of 
the percent competitive (which is one minus the ratio of 
noncompetitive bids to total bills sold} should give a 
measure of the informed traders success in purchasing bills 
in the auction market. This, in turn, indicates the number 
of informed bidders which will enter the secondary market. 
Another reason for suggesting the percent competitive 
(PCOMP} is a determinant of the bid-asked spread stems from 
the possibility competitive bidders may have specialized 
information. A lower percent competitive may indicate 
traders have specialized information and are willing to 
trade in the secondary market and incur the transactions 
costs rather than submit competitive bids in the auction. 
Dealers would realize this and in turn increase their bid-
asked spread to protect themselves against trades with 
information motivated traders. 
The last component of the auction results which is 
considered as a determinant of the secondary market bid-
asked spread is the tail spread (TAILSPR}. The support for 
inclusion of this variable is based on the tail spread being 
a measure of the dispersion of information and a measure of 
the range of auction market prices. Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985} propose that market prices convey inside information. 
If the tail spread reduces uncertainty for the dealers 
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concerning "inside" information of the auction market 
participants, the dealers will alter their bid-asked 
spreads. Also, Mcinish and Wood (1992) note the difference 
between the highest and lowest bid prices explain over-the-
counter stock market bid-asked spreads. Although in a 
different market, the tail spread is the difference between 
the highest and lowest auction bid rates and, as such, is 
similar to Mcinish and Wood's stock market bid-asked spread 
variable. 
Support for including this variable in the model of 
determinants of the bid-asked spread is also derived from 
Boatler (1975, 1985). The tail spread was larger as less 
experienced bidders, tendering less informed bids, were 
drawn into the market during periods of low bill prices and 
high interest rates. If there are more uninformed 
participants in the market, which can be judged by a larger 
tail spread, the dealers have the opportunity to narrow 
their bid-asked spreads without as much concern for losing 
profits to informational traders. 
Last, justification for.including the tail spread 
(TAILSPR) in Model VI is found in Bolten {1973). Bolten 
notes higher prices in this week's Treasury bill auction 
would give some expectations of a lower price in next week's 
auction. Trading volume in the post-auction secondary 
market would be reduced if market participants have 
expectations of prices being lower in next week's auction. 
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Reduced trading volume would lead dealers to increase their 
secondary market bid-asked spreads (Mcinish and Wood, 1992; 
Copeland and Galai, 1983; Branch and Freed, 1977; Stoll, 
1978). If this occurs in the Treasury bill markets, then a 
smaller tail spread would lead dealers to increase their 
bid-asked spreads. 
The change in the Federal funds rate (CHFF} is the last 
explanatory variable included as a determinant of the 
secondary market bid-asked spread. The justification for 
including this variable is the same as presented in the 
development of Model I. The Federal funds rate was said to 
be a predictor of money market rates and a proxy for Federal 
Reserve activities which affect the Treasury bill rates. 
Garbade and Rosey (1977) also find in a study of Treasury 
coupon issues that the Federal funds rate acts as a proxy 
for yield volatility in determining bid-asked spreads. As 
such, it had a positive relationship to the change in the 
bid-asked spread. 
Using the variables calculated from the auction results 
(the percent overbid, percent competitive bids accepted, and 
the tail spread) and the change in the Federal funds rate, 
the last question addressed concerns whether these variables 
explain the Treasury bill secondary market bid-asked spread. 
This question is examined using the following model: 
Model VI 
CHSPl\ = B0 + .B1POVE1\ + B2PCOMP1 + .B3TAILSP1\ + 
B4CHFF1 + € 1 
where CHSPR = the change in the secondary market bid-
asked spread. 
The set of hypotheses for this examination are: 
Ho6: Bo. • • .Bj = 0 • 
HA6: Bo.·· .Bj ;t: 0 • 
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If the group of estimated coefficients relating to the 
auction information variables and the change in the Federal 
funds rate is statistically significant in explaining the 
change in the bid-asked spread, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Rejecting the null hypothesis would mean the 
auction results variables and the change in the Federal 
funds rate are determinants of the secondary market bid-
asked spreads. 
Methodology 
The hypotheses are examined using linear regression 
models. Regression is a common means of examining and 
explaining the relationship between variables. With 
regression, a dependent variable is related to one or more 
independent variables. The independent variables are tested 
to determine whether they have explanatory power of the 
dependent variable using F-tests and t-tests. The 
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regression methodology used is consistent with that used by 
Fa~a (1975); Hamburger and Platt (1975); Chandy and Cross 
(1976); Mills and Stephenson (1985); Wachtel and Young 
(1987, 1990); Schirm, Sheehan and Ferri (1989); and Cammack 
(1991). In setting up the regression models, some basic 
assumptions are made. 8 
Regression Methodology Considerations 
When working with linear regression models, there are 
potential problems with the use of time series data and the 
use of the standard regression model for which tests must be 
conducted. First, the functional form of the equation can 
be difficult to define. The test for market efficiency is 
also a test of the equation used to examine market 
efficiency. Second autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, 
multicollinearity, &nd nonstationarity are problems with the 
use of time series data in a study. 
The error terms must be independent and identically 
distributed if the assumptions of the linear model are not 
to be violated. For each of the regressions, the residuals 
are used to conduct a Durbin-Watson test for 
8Basic Assumptions of the Linear Model 
1) The dependent variable may be expressed as a linear 
combination of the independent variables plus a disturbance 
term. 
2) On average the disturbance terms will be zero. 
3) The disturbance terms have equal variances 
(homoskedastic) and are pairwise uncorrelated. 
4) The independent variables are not linearly related. 
5) The disturbance terms have Normal distribution. 
6) The independent variables form a nonstochastic matrix. 
autocorrelation. The d-statistics are reported in the 
results' tables for each regression. 
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The linear model assumes the error terms are 
homoskedastic. There is the possibility, however, that the 
error terms are heteroskedastic. In this study two tests 
are conducted to check for heteroskedasticity. The first is 
a visual inspection of a graph of the residuals. The second 
is the White test. 
Both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity lead to 
nonspherical disturbances which cause ''unbiased but 
inefficient estimation" (Johnston, 1984) and invalid t-
tests. If autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity are found 
to be present, the regression can be altered to help 
counteract these problems. It is possible an autoregressive 
process, a moving average process, or a combination of both 
may provide a better model. 
Multicollinearity is also a possible problem with 
regression analysis. The variable correlation and the 
regression coefficients' standard errors are examined in 
this study to check for the possibility of 
multicollinearity. 
Finally, nonstationarity of the time series of the 
variables may be a problem. A visual inspection of time 
series graphs for the variables and the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test are used to check for stationarity. If any 
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variables are found to be nonstationary, the assumptions of 
the standard least squares model are not met. 
If the variables are nonstationary and cointegrated, 
the standard least squares model is again inappropriate, but 
a technique for testing the parameters exists. The Engle-
Granger cointegration test is used to check for 
cointegration. If the variables are found to be 
cointegrated, the Johansen technique will be used to 
estimate the parameters and perform hypotheses tests. 
Data Sources 
For this study, data is obtained concerning the 
Treasury bill discount rates, the results of the auction, 
and the Federal funds rate. The data used covers the time 
period from August 1985 through August 1990. The Treasury 
bill discount rates are obtained from back issues of the 
Wall Street Journal from the "Treasury Bonds, Notes, and 
Bills" column. The rates for bills with approximately 91 
days to maturity are used in order to include bills which 
are similar to those from the auction. The discount rate 
used for this study is the asked rate, since that is the 
rate at which market players can purchase bills in the 
secondary market. A comparison, therefore, is being made 
between the rate at which bills are purchased in the auction 
market and the rate at which bills are purchased in the 
se~ondary market. 9 
Results of the weekly auctions are also obtained. 
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These come from the Treasury Bulletin. In the "Offerings of 
Bills" table from the "Public Debt Operations" section of 
this report, the partial results of each weekly auction 
which occurred during the quarter are listed. Data 
concerning the following are included: issue date, maturity 
date, number of days to maturity, amount of bids tendered, 
total amount of bids accepted, total amount of bids accepted 
on a competitive basis, total amount of bids accepted on a 
noncompetitive basis, amount maturing on issue date of new 
offering, total unmatured issues outstanding after new 
issues, the average price per hundred on total bids 
accepted, the average discount rate on total bids accepted, 
the average investment rate on total bids accepted, the high 
and low discount rate on competitive bids accepted, and the 
high and low price per hundred on competitive bids accepted. 
Last, the Federal funds rate is obtained. This 
variable is found in the Wall Street Journal in the "Money 
Rates" column. 
Due to changes in factors affecting variables, it may 
be necessary to divide the data into subperiods. Cammack 
divided the 1973 - 1984 data into groups according to the 
9The asked rate given in the Wall Street Journal is the lowest rate 
for which a dealer was willing to sell the bill of interest during the 
day. 
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Federal Reserve changes in targets for implementing monetary 
policy and the introduction of Treasury bill futures 
trading. During the time frame of the current study, there 
are no such changes which would necessitate partitioning the 
data. 
The models presented in this chapter are estimated 
using the data obtained. The results of these estimations 
and the description of the data set used are presented in 
Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a description of the auction and 
bid-asked data used in this study, and the results of the 
tests .of hypotheses. Figures showing the time series plots 
for the variables are included in this section. Also 
included in this section is a test to check for time period 
differences in the data. 
Description of the Data 
Auction Rates 
Auction rate data consists of the high, low and average 
discount rates. The high and low discount rates accepted in 
each auction are obtained for the 260 weeks covered in the 
time period August, 1985 to August, 1990. For the low 
discount rate accepted, the range is from 5.00 percent 
(occurring 10/26/87) to 9.05 percent (occurring 3/27/89). 
For the high discount rate accepted, the range is 5.08 
percent (occurring on 10/6/86) to 9.11 percent (occurring on 
3/27 /89). 
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Friedman {1959), Boatler {1975), and Scott and Wolf 
{1979) argue that dealer collusion occurs in the auction. 
Friedman's conclusion is drawn, because there was no overlap 
evidenced between the highest and lowest bids accepted one 
week and the highest and lowest bids accepted the next week 
(e.g. week one: highest rate= 8.0 percent and lowest 
rate= 7.0 percent; week two: highest rate= 9.0 percent 
and lowest rate= 8.2 percent). In comparing the highest 
and lowest bids for the current study from one week to the 
next, there is some degree of overlap but only in 22 percent 
of the weeks (58 out of 260 auctions). More recent studies 
argue the lack of overlap is simply due to market factors 
during the week. 
The Treasury calculates the average auction rate based 
on a weighted average of the accepted competitive auction 
bid rates. The average auction rates differ very little 
from week to week. There are, however, only seven 
occurrences where the average auction rates are exactly the 
same from week to week. During the five year time frame, 
the average auction rate ranged from a low of 5.08 percent 
on 10/9/86 to a high of 9.10 percent on 3/27/89. 
The low tail, high tail, and tail spread are calculated 
using the low discount rate accepted, high discount rate 
accepted, and the average discount rate. The low tail 
ranged from o to .12 percent, and the high tail ranged from 
o to .89 percent. The calculated tail spread ranged from o 
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(on 10/30/89, 7/17/89, 7/20/89, and 3/30/86} to .95 percent 
(on 8/21/89} (see Appendix A}. Figure 1 presents a time 
series plot of the tail spread data (see Appendix E} . 10 
Bid and Asked Rates 
Information concerning the Treasury bill secondary 
market is obtained from the Wall Street Journal. The bid 
and asked rates reported in the Wall Street Journal are as 
of the official close of trading in the Treasury bill 
secondary market, which occurs at 3:00 p.m. every weekday. 
The bid-asked spread, the change in the asked rate, and the 
change in the spreads are calculated from the bid and asked 
rates {See Appendix B}. Some rates are not available due to 
holidays and those dates are not included. 11 The time 
series plots of the independent variables {the change in the 
asked rate and the change in the spread} are shown in 
Figures 2 and 3 respectively (see Appendix E}. 
An examination of the bid-asked spreads reveals the 
bid-asked spread ranges from Oto .25 percent. Table II 
shows the proportion of increases and the proportion of 
decreases in bid-asked spreads from one trading day to the 
next. The bid-asked spread did not change from one trading 
10outliers were noted for some of the data points in the figures, but 
the numbers were verified from the data sources. It is possible the data 
sources contained typographical errors. The regression models were 
estimated with and without the outliers. The results were not 
significantly different. 
11cammack ( 1991) notes the occurrence of holidays did not have a 
significant impact on results. 
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day to the next for 60 percent of the data points during the 
five year study period. For the Friday to Monday time 
frame, the bid-asked spread changes in 39.04 percent of the 
weeks. For the weekly Monday to Tuesday data points, there 
is a change in 64.68 percent of the weeks. During the 
Tuesday to Wednesday time frame, the bid-asked spread 
changes in 29.80 percent of the weeks. For the Wednesday to 
Thursday data points, there is a change in 30.65 percent of 
the weeks; and for Thursday to Friday data points, there is 
a change in 36.93 percent of the weeks. For the Monday to 
Tuesday group, the number of changes in the bid-asked spread 
TABLE II 
CHANGE IN THE BID-ASKED SPREAD 
Proportion Proportion of 
of Increases Decreases 
Friday to Monday 17.11% 21.93% 
(n = 228) 
Monday to Tuesday 8.94% 55.74% 
(n = 235) 
Tuesday to Wednesday 14.90% 14.90% 
(n = 255) 
Wednesday to Thursday 15.32% 15.32% 
(n = 248) 
Thursday to Friday 16.18% 20.75% 
(n = 241) 
Note: There is no change in the bid-asked spread for the remainder 
of the data points. 
n = number of weeks in the sample 
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is much greater than for any of the other days, and the 
majority of changes are decreases. These decreases in the 
bid-asked spread occur much more frequently than for any of 
the other days. (86 percent of the total changes are 
decreases.) 
Tests for differences in the proportion of increases 
versus the proportion of decreases are conducted with this 
data. The set of hypotheses for these tests are: 
Ho: Pt - P2 = 0 
HA: Pt - P2 ¢ 0 • 
The results of these tests for a difference in proportion 
suggest for the Monday to Tuesday data there is a 
statistically significant difference between the proportion 
of decreases and the proportion of increases at a 99 percent 
confidence level CZ-calculated= 12.5247, z.005 = 2.575). 
The Monday to Tuesday proportion of decreases in bid-
asked spreads to total observations is also significantly 
different from all the other proportions of decreases at a 
99 percent confidence level (see Table III). Looking at 
Table III, only one other proportion is significantly 
different from one of the other proportions but not at a 99 
percent confidence level. 
Based on this information, there appears to be some 
significant event occurring during the Monday to Tuesday 
time frame driving the reduction in secondary market bid-
asked spreads. This lends justification to examining 
whether auction results variables from Monday are 
determinants of the bid-asked spread using Model VI. 
TABLE III 
CALCULATED Z-VALUES FOR COMPARISON OF 
PROPORTIONS OF THE NEGATIVE CHANGES 
TO TOTAL OBSERVATIONS 
MON-TUE TUE-WED WED-THU THU-FRI 
TUE-WED 10.38* 
WED-THU 10.19* .13 
THU-FRI 8.41* 1. 70 1. 56 
FRI-MON 7.97* 1.99** 1.85 .31 
*=significantly different in proportions at 99 percent 
confidence level 
**=significantly different in proportions at 95 percent 
confidence level 
Percent Competitive and Percent Overbid 
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The percentage of total bids accepted in the form of 
competitive bids (PCOMP) and the percent oversubscribed 
(POVER) are also calculated from the auction results (See 
Appendix C). The percent of competitive bids accepted 
during the 260 week period ranged from 72.63 percent (on 
9/11/89) to 99.04 percent (on 7/7/86) (see Figure 4 in 
Appendix E). Noncompetitive bids accounted for between 1 
percent and 28 percent of the bills purchased in auctions 
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from August 1980 to August 1985. This is near the historic 
range of 10 percent to 25 percent (Chicago Board of Trade, 
1991). The percent oversubscribed ranged from 59.15 percent 
(on 12/2/85) to 93.03 percent (on 8/15/88) (see Figure 5 in 
Appendix E). 
Federal Funds Rate 
The Federal funds rates are obtained for each day and 
the change in the rates (CHFF) calculated (see Appendix D). 
The largest change occurred on 3/6/89 and is an increase of 
5.38 percent. 
Stationarity Test and Cointegration 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and a visual 
examination of the time series plots of the variables is 
used to check for stationarity. The ADF test values and the 
associated critical values are shown in Table IV. As the 
ADF test values indicate, all of the variables are 
stationary with the exception of Thursday's asked rate and 
the average auction rate. 
Since both the Thursday asked rate and the average 
auction rate are included in Model V, cointegration is 
considered. Using the Engle-Granger cointegration test, it 
is determined the average auction rate and Thursday's asked 
rate have one cointegrating vector. Based on these results, 
TABLE IV 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results 
t-,.statistic 
CHASK -9.8576 
CHSPR -11.2001 
POVER -6.7538 
PCOMP -7.9911 
TAILSPR -10.5501 
CHFF -9.6298 
A(M,Th) -1.2526* 
R(Th) -1.0894* 
C -6.7178 
NC -6.8204 
LOTAIL -9.2239 
TUESBA -9.6860 
' 
TUESRET -10.0194 
MONBA -8.2953 
MONRET -6.4278 
A%D -9.1578 
Note: Critical t-value is -2.87. 
* = Nonstationary. 
110 
111 
the Ordinary Least Squares method for evaluating Model Vis 
deemed inappropriate and the Johansen Method used in its 
place. 
Data Subperiods Test 
The standard least squares model assumes the estimated 
parameters are constant over the time period examined. If 
the parameters do not remain constant during the period for 
which the data was collected, the estimated parameters will 
be inefficient and the t-tests unreliable. One solution to 
time-varying parameters is to group the data into subperiods 
during which the parameters do not vary. Federal Reserve 
policy changes represent an exogenous variable for this 
study that would affect Treasury bill rates and auction 
results. During this study's time frame, there are no major 
Federal Reserve policy changes. To verify there are no 
other changes that would necessitate the data being placed 
in subsets, the total sample is divided in two halves. The 
means and standard deviations for all variables are computed 
on both subsets (see Table V), and the results compared. 
The hypotheses for examining the data subsets for each 
variable are: 
H0 : µ for first half of data=µ second half of data 
HA: µ for first half of data~µ second half of data. 
Two-tailed tests for a difference between means are 
PA-low rate 
High-low (tail spread) 
LOTAIL 
C 
NC 
PCOMP 
POVER 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF DATA SUBSETS 
FOR POTENTIAL GROUPING 
First half of data Second half of data 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
.03 .018 .036 .023 
.046 .083 .046 .031 
-3.722 .865 -3.548 .733 
4.137 .682 4.123 .832 
16.864 2.825 15.532 2.376 
83.218 2.927 84.464 2.371 
71. 64 7 4.262 71. 545 5.145 
Full data set 
Mean Std. Dev. 
.033 .021 
.046 .063 
-3.635 .805 
4.130 .759 
16.198 2.689 
83.841 2.731 
71.596 4.715 
N 
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conducted at a 1 percent alpha level. As Table VI shows, 
there are no statistically significant differences between 
the means for six of the seven variables. This leads to the 
failure to reject the null hypothesis. Consequently the 
data is not divided into subperiods, and the analyses are 
done using the sample as a whole. 
TABLE VI 
CALCULATED T-VALUES FOR THE COMPARISON 
OF SUBSET MEANS 
PA-low 
High-low (tail spread} 
LOTAIL 
C 
NC 
PCOMP 
POVER 
with a= 1 percent, t - stat= 2.576 
2.342 
o.oo 
1.7498 
.1484 
1.5763 
3.7716* 
.1741 
* significant difference between means at a= 1 percent. 
Regression Results 
Hypothesis One 
The hypothesis tested by Model I examines whether the 
Treasury bill secondary market is efficient with respect to 
the information carried in the announced auction results 
(percent overbid, percent competitive, tail spread} and the 
change in the Federal funds rate. Table VII presents the 
estimation results for Model I. 
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The F-statistics used to test the null hypotheses 
indicate the set of independent variables is significant in 
explaining the change in the asked rate for the Wednesday to 
Thursday data and the Thursday to Friday data at a 95 
percent confidence level .. The percent competitive {PCOMP), 
tail spread {TAILSPR), and change in the Federal funds rate 
{CHFF) were each statistically significant for the Wednesday 
to Thursday data. For the Thursday to Friday data, the 
percent overbid (POVER) is statistically significant. Given 
these results, the Treasury bill secondary market cannot be 
said to be efficient with respect to the percent overbid, 
percent competitive, tail spread, and change in the Federal 
funds rate. The overall explanatory power of the model, 
however, is very weak with R-squareds of 7.7 percent and 5.9 
percent. 
The Durbin-Watson test is conducted on each regression 
to check for autocorrelation. This test is run to determine 
if the autocorrelation parameter, p, is zero. As long as 
the d-statistic calculated from the regression residuals is 
within the bounds for the Durbin-Watson test, the test is 
inconclusive. Only if the d-statistic falls outside the 
bounds can a conclusive statement about autocorrelation be 
made. When the d-statistic is greater than the upper bound, 
one can conclude the parameter, p, is equal to zero. In 
Change in Asked 
Rate From: INTERCEPT 
Friday- -.194 
Monday (-.477) 
Monday- 0.034 
Tuesday (.149) 
Tuesday- -.185 
Wednesday (-1.171) 
Wednesday- .270 
Thursday (1.7) 
Thursday- -.066 
Friday (-.333) 
TABLE VII 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR SEMI-STRONG 
MARKET EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS: 
MODEL I 
POYER PCOMP TAILSPR CHFF 
-.004 .006 .063 .011 
(-1.429) (1.271) (.353) (.555) 
-.001 0 .088 0.009 
(-.318) (.049) (.818) (.836) 
0.0 0.003 -.147 0.002 
(-.454) (1.493) (-1.939) (.857) 
0 -.003 -.158 -.008 
(.227) (-2.003)* (-2.197)* (-2.479)* 
.004 -.002 .139 .027 
(2.757)* (-1.005) (1.529) (1.748) 
* significant at 95 percent level 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are t-values 
R2 F-stat 
.024 1.254 
.007 0.329 
.026 1.644 
.077 4.60* 
.059 3.64* 
POVER = number of competitive bids not accepted/total number of bid submitted 
PCOMP = number of competitive bids accepted/total number of accepted bids 
TAILSPR = difference between the high and low auction discount rates 
CHFF = the change in the Federal funds rate. 
d-stat 
2.083 
1.961 
1.798 
2.255 
1.75 
11.n 
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three of the regressions, the d-statistic is above the upper 
boundary of 1.799 and two fall between the lower and upper 
boundary. There is no evidence of autocorrelation from 
these results. 
A White heteroskedasticity test is also conducted with 
each regression. None of the resulting F-statistics from 
the White tests called for rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no heteroskedasticity. 
Last, the collinearity of the independent variables is 
considered. Correlations are calculated for the explanatory, 
variables, and the standard errors of the estimated 
parameters are examined to check for multicollinearity. The 
correlations, presented in Table VIII, are not large, and 
the standard errors of the estimated parameters are very 
small. Multicollinearity, therefore, is not expected to be 
a problem. 
TABLE VIII 
PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX 
PCOMP POVER TAILSPR 
PCOMP 1.000 
POVER 0.020 1.000 
TAILSPR 0.008 -.253 1.000 
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Hypotheses Two. Three and Four: 
The next regressions simulate Cammack's study (1991), 
but differ in two respects. One exception, noted earlier, 
is the data 1s not subsetted in the current study. Cammack 
presents results for the full sample 1/1973 to 12/1984 plus 
four subsets of the sample which corresponded to changes in 
Federal Reserve policies of targeting interest rates versus 
targeting monetary aggregates and the introduction of 
Treasury bill futures. 
The other exception is the method used to compute the 
expected and unexpected components. Cammack determines the 
expected and unexpected components of the auction variables 
using univariate models. An ARMA(l,1) process is employed 
for the low tail (LOTAIL) and for the participation of 
competitive bidders variable (C). An AR(l) process is used 
for the participation of noncompetitive bidders variable 
(NC). The current study uses information from the previous 
10 time periods for each variable in order to predict the 
following time period's expected and unexpected components. 
Table IX and X give general statistical descriptions of 
the explanatory and dependent variables used in this portion 
of the study. The descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables are presented in Table IX. Compared to Cammack's 
study (1991), this study's dependent variables have fewer 
autocorrelation coefficients which are greater than two 
standard errors. 
MEAN 
MONBA 0.005230 
TUESBA 0.004178 
TUESRET 0.017945 
MONRET 0.015901 
TABLE IX 
DATA DESCRIPTION FOR MEANS, STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS, AND AUTOCORRELATIONS 
OF THE BIDDING ADJUSTMENTS 
STD DEV SE Pi P2 p3 
0.013967 0.069 0.068 0.184* 0.088 
0.023037 0.069 -0.056 0.071 -0.059 
0.021308 0.069 -.045 0.067 -.064 
0.033173 0.069 .121 -.036 -.056 
* greater than two standard errors. 
p4 Ps 
0.158* 0.14* 
0.141* 0.019 
.026 .076 
.017 .014 
-()':) 
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Table IX allows a comparison 0£ the bidding adjustment 
and return data which occur as a result of the downward 
biased auction prices. For the current data, the mean 
Monday bidding adjustment and the mean Tuesday bidding 
adjustment are .005 and .004 percent, respectively. For 
Cammack's full sample data, both bidding adjustments are .01 
percent. For this study, the mean auction price is only 
slightly less (1.6 to 2 basis points less) than the mean 
secondary market prices from Monday and Tuesday and not the 
four basis points Cammack finds. 
A slight downward bias in the auction rate, however, is 
still evidenced. To determine if the Monday bidding 
adjustment is different from zero the t-statistic was 
calculated as 5.79. The statistical significance of the 
Monday bidding adjustment suggests it is different from 
zero. 
In the 8/85 through 8/90 time period, the Monday and 
Tuesday average bidding adjustments are .008 and .007 
respectively. The only portion of Cammack's bidding 
adjustment data similar to this study is in the 1/76 to 1/79 
subperiod (Fed targeting interest rates) during which time 
both the Monday bidding adjustment and Tuesday bidding 
adjustment had averages of .004. The next closest bidding 
adjustment averages from Cammack's data are in the 10/82 to 
12/84 subperiod when the Fed again was targeting interest 
rates. 
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The standard deviations of the bidding adjustments for 
this study are also compared to those from Cammack's data. 
The standard deviation of the Monday bidding adjustment is 
significantly less than the standard deviation of the 
Tuesday bidding adjustment. The difference in Cammack's 
data is even greater with the standard deviation for 
Monday's bidding adjustment being half as much as Tuesday's. 
Cammack suggests this is because Monday's secondary market 
price is observed at 3:00 p.m. which is approximately the 
same time as the Monday auction bid price is observed at 
1:00 p.m. The Tuesday secondary market, as a result, has 
much more time to incorporate additional information. The 
difference in the current data and Cammack's data is the 
variables have about half as much variance during 8/85 to 
8/90. 
Table X shows the des,cripti ve statistics for the 
auction variables for Models II, III and IV. The average 
low tail (PA - low) during the time from August 1985 to 
August 1990 is .003 compared to .009 during Cammack's time 
frame (1/73 to 12/84). The average total tail spread (High-
Low) is .012 for the 8/85 to 8/90 data, which is less than 
half the average tail spread during Cammack's time frame. 
The means of the other variables are similar. The standard 
deviations for the variables measuring the number of bidders 
(C and NC) are much less than Cammack's, while the standard 
deviation for low tail is slightly more. 
TABLE X 
DATA DESCRIPTION FOR MEANS, STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS, AND AUTOCORRELATIONS 
OF THE AUCTION VARIABLES 
MEAN 
' 
Std DEV Pi 
PA-Low 0.00343 .01517 .007 
Hi-Lo .01175 .01691 .032 
WTAIL -5.36483 4.68136 .015 
C 4.15703 0.74507 .339• 
NC 16.16224 2.74965 .396• 
Notes: Q (I 0) is the Box-Pierce Statistic for 10 Lags. 
• greater than two standard errors 
•• greater than X2(10) 95 = 18 .3 
PA-Low = average auction price - low auction price 
Hi-Lo = highest auction price accepted - lowest auction price accepted 
LOTAIL = ln(PA-Low) 
C = fraction of competitive bids submitted to competitive bids accepted 
NC = fraction of noncompetitive bids to total bids accepted 
"2 
.015 
.049 
.116 
.283• 
. 273• 
Ps P, Ps P, P, 
-.011 -.002 -.012 .008 .01 
-.018 .019 -.043 .020 .09 
-.022 .001 .085 -.111 -.046 
. 195• .220• .096 .137• .116 
.304• .251• .219• .242• .176• 
P, 
.01 
.019 
-.006 
.123 
.129 
Po Pw SEp,o Q(lO) 
-.024 -.006 .067 .314 
-.061 -.011 .067 4.112 
.128 .140• .066 16.65 
.120 .131 .066 85.75 .. 
.129 .189• .066 137.6 .. 
N 
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Table XI shows the correlations of the bidding 
adjustment variables (MONBA and TUESBA) and the auction 
variables. The first section of the table shows 
correlations using the actual auction variables. For this 
study's data, all of the correlations of the actual auction 
variables with the bidding adjustment variables had the same 
sign for both Monday and Tuesday. For most of the variables 
in each subperiod of Cammack's data, the signs of the 
correlations of the Monday bidding adjustment with the 
actual auction variables were opposite the signs of the 
correlations of the Tuesday bidding adjustment with the 
actual auction variables. Cammack notes the expected 
scenario would be correlations with the same sign since both 
bidding adjustments are examining similar relationships. 
This expected relationship was found with the current data. 
The second section of Table XI presents the 
correlations of the bidding adjustment variables (MONBA and 
TUESBA) with the expected components of the auction results 
(ELOTAIL, EC, ENC). The expected component correlations 
have opposite signs for the Monday bidding adjustments 
versus the Tuesday bidding adjustments whereas with 
cammack's data the signs are more similar. Since both 
Monday and Tuesday bidding adjustments are measuring similar 
relationships, the correlations should carry similar signs. 
Cammack states that the similar signs found with the 
expected components indicate "the time-series models are 
MONBA 
TUESBA 
LOTAIL 
C 
NC 
ELOTAIL 
EC 
ENC 
ULOTAIL 
UC 
UNC 
TABLE XI 
CORRELATIONS OF BIDDING ADJUSTMENTS 
AND ACTUAL AUCTION VARIABLES 
MONBA TUESBA LOTAIL C 
1 
0.416499 1 
-0.00141 -0.01694 1 
0.000764 0.106302 -0.37070 1 
0.001153 0.030722 -0.04781 0.137459 
CORRELATIONS OF BIDDING ADJUSTMENTS AND 
EXPECTED COMPONENTS OF 
AUCTION VARIABLES 
MONBA TUESBA ELOTAIL EC 
0.017630 -0.04884 1 
i-0.05174 0.057103 -0.14320 1 
0.020996 -0.01859 .o.035984 0.045932 
CORRELATIONS OF BIDDING ADJUSTMENTS AND 
UNEXPECTED COMPONENTS OF 
AUCTION VARIABLES 
MONBA TUESBA ULOTAIL UC 
-0.02803 0.021734 1 
0.102144 0.061387 -0.21758 1 
0.014654 0.046235 -0.05325 0.181366 
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NC 
1 
ENC 
1 
UNC 
1 
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successful in extracting the expected portion of the actual 
value" (p. 118). Since the current data has opposite signs 
on the correlations, the time series models in this study 
may not be as successful as Cammack's in extracting the 
expected portion of the auction variables or the 
relationship has changed. 
The correlations for the bidding adjustment variables 
{MONBA and TUESBA) with the auction variables' unexpected 
components {ULOTAIL, UC, UNC) are presented in the last 
section of Table XI. The correlations for the Monday 
bidding adjustment versus the Tuesday bidding adjustment are 
the same sign except, for the tail component. This is in 
contrast to Cammack who found opposite signs for the bidding 
adjustment correlations with the unexpected portions of the 
auction variables for Monday versus Tuesday. The 
noncompetitive measure has the same sign for the 
correlations of both the expected and unexpected components 
with the Monday bidding adjustment. Cammack reasoned this 
relationship would indicate there must be some information 
about the auction which is not included in the expected 
component of the noncompetitive measure. For the 
correlations of the low tail unexpected component with 
Monday's and Tuesday's bidding adjustments, the opposite 
signs indicate there is some unexpected information from the 
auction concerning the tail which is being disbursed to the 
secondary market. 
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For the estimation of Model II examining the expected 
components of the auction variables (ELOTAIL, EC, ENC) as 
determinants of Monday's bidding adjustment (MONBA), the 
results are presented in Table XI.I. There are no 
statistically significant parameters in the estimation of 
Model II. Cammack had found the expected component of the 
low tail produced statistically significant results for the 
Model II regressions. Using the current data, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for any of the auction 
variables. This suggests that none of the auction variables 
are significant in explaining the Monday bidding adjustment. 
Table XIII presents the regression results for Model 
III, which tests whether the unexpected components of the 
auction results (ULOTAIL, UC, UNC) are determinants of 
Tuesday's secondary market return (TUESRET). The results 
indicate the unexpected portion of the number of 
noncompetitive bidders (UNC) is statistically significant. 
This leads to rejection of the null hypothesis suggesting 
that the unexpected number of noncompetitive bidders (UNC) 
does not explain the Tuesday secondary market returns. The 
unexpected portion of the low tail (ULOTAIL) and competitive 
bidders (UC) variables are not significant. In contrast to 
Cammack's results, Cammack finds all three·· independent 
variables are statistically significant pieces of 
information which determine Tuesday secondary market 
TABLE XII 
REGRESSIONS OF MONDAY BIDDING ADJUSTMENT 
ON ELOTAIL, ENC, AND EC: 
Model II 
fl 
MONB.Ai = a + BELOTAII.i + Et 
Coefficient .00544 0.000049 
t-statistic 3.4519 0.229173 
SE (.001576) (. 0002158) 
R2 
.000252 
Durbin-Watson 1. 86 
SE Regression .014008 
MONB.Ai = o: + BECt + Et 
Coefficient .010984 -.0013894 
t-statistic 1. 4001 -.74876 
SE (. 0078451) (.0018557) 
R2 
.002688 
Durbin-Watson 1.8565 
SE Regression .013991 
MONB.Ai = a + BENCt + Et 
Coefficient .0038209 8.222E-05 
t-statistic .503056 .1770598 
SE (.0075953) (.0004643) 
R2 
.000151 
Durbin-Watson 1. 865423 
SE regression .014009 
n = 210 
MONBA: Monday's bidding adjustment 
ELOTAIL: expected portion of the low tail 
EC: expected portion of the fraction of 
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competitive bids placed to competitive bids accepted 
ENC: expected portion of the fraction of 
noncompetitive bids placed to total bids accepted 
TABLE XIII 
REGRESSIONS OF TUESDAY RETURN ON 
ULOTAIL, UC, AND UNC: 
Model I.II 
TUESRETt = a + B ULOTAI~ + Et 
a 
Coefficient .015866 
t-statistic 6.952379 
SE (. 0022821) 
R2 
.001315 
Durbin-Watson 1. 808644 
a 
Coefficient .01588 
t-statistic 7.009 
SE (.00227) 
R2 
.011541 
Durbin-Watson 1. 817144 
a 
Coefficient .0159535 
t-statistic 7.117548 
SE (.0022414) 
R2 
.033492 
SE regression .033385 
Durbin-Watson 1. 8217 
*=significant at 1 percent level 
n = 222 
B 
-.0001902 
-.5381232 
(.0003535) 
B 
.0045875 
1. 6267 
(.002862) 
B 
.0022306 
2.7610941* 
(.0008079) 
TUESRET: Tuesday secondary market return 
ULOTAIL: unexpected portion of the low tail 
UC: unexpected portion of the fraction of 
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competitive bids placed to competitive bids accepted 
UNC: unexpected portion of the fraction of 
noncompetitive bids placed to total bids accepted 
returns. The coefficient on the unexpected portion of 
noncompetitive demand carries a positive sign which is 
consistent, however, with Cammack's results. 
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The regression results of Model IV, which included all 
the unexpected components of the auction variables and the 
price level .comparison variable, are shown in Table XIV. 
The results of this regression are similar to Cammack's in 
that the price level comparison variable, A%D, is 
statistically significant. However, Cammack also found the 
unexpected tail to be statistically significant. The 
statistical significance of the price level comparison 
variable leads to rejection of the associated null 
hypothesis suggesting the variable is not a determinant of 
the Tuesday secondary market return (TUESRET). 
In summary, the lack of statistically significant 
parameter estimates for Model II leads to a failure to 
reject the null hypothesis for the expected components of 
all three auction variables. This indicates the expected 
components of the auction results variables (ELOTAIL, EC, 
ENC) cannot explain the Monday bidding adjustment (MONBA) 
which occurs due to the downward biasing of the auction 
rate. For Model Ill, the null hypothesis is not rejected 
for the unexpected components of the low tail (ULOTAIL) and 
the number of competitive bidders (UC). For the unexpected 
portion of the fraction of noncompetitive bidders to total 
TABLE XIV 
REGRESSION OF TUESDAY RETURN ON A%D, 
ULOTAIL, UC, AND UNC: 
Model IV 
TUESRETt = a + B1ULOTAILi + B2UCt + B3UNCt + B4A%Dt + Et 
a 
Coefficient .015846 
t-stat 9.76248 
OLS Std. Error (.00162) 
R2 
.04181 
Durbin-Watson 2.098 
SE of regression .02119 
MA(l) Std. Errors .015844 
*=significant at alpha= 1 percent 
B's estimated using OLS 
n = 209 
B1 
.00018 
.77477 
(.0002) 
.00023 
TUESRET: Tuesday secondary market return 
ULOTAIL: unexpected portion of the low tail 
UC: unexpected portion of the fraction of 
B2 
5.63E-05 
.02959 
(. 0019) 
.001907 
competitive bids placed to competitive bids accepted 
UNC: unexpected portion of the fraction of 
noncompetitive bids placed to total bids accepted 
B3 
.00037 
.65954 
(.0006) 
.00057 
B4 
.19466 
2.8675* 
(.0679) 
.06798 
A%D = the difference between the low auction price and Monday's secondary market price. 
N 
'° 
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bids accepted (UNC), however, the null hypothesis is 
rejected which suggests the unexpected portion of this 
variable is significant in explaining Tuesday's secondary 
market return (TUESRET). Last, the null hypothesis for 
Model IV is rejected for the price level comparison variable 
indicating the price level variable does explain the Tuesday 
secondary market return but the unexpected components of the 
auction variables do not. 
Hypothesis Five 
The fifth hypothesis examines the question of whether 
the weekly average Treasury bill auction rate (AMTo) is an 
unbiased expectation of Thursday's Treasury bill spot rate 
(RTo). The method of examining Model Vis altered due to 
the nonstationarity and cointegration of Thursday's asked 
rate and the average auction rate. Ordinary least squares 
cannot be used to obtain accurate results with data 6f this 
nature. The Johansen method, however, accounts for these 
problems in its estimation of the parameters. 
Use of the Schwarz Criterion determines one is the 
appropriate number of lags to use with the Johansen method. 
The estimated parameters from the Johansen estimation method 
using one lag are presented in Table XV. 
Tests on the parameter estimates are conducted for the 
joint null hypothesis, B0 = o and B1 = 1. The results of 
this test yielded a chi-square value with two degrees of 
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freedom equal to 44.8515. The critical value at a 95% 
confidence level for the chi-square(2) statistic is 5.991. 
Therefore, the joint null hypothesis is rejected. This 
indicates the auction rate (AMTo) is a biased expectation of 
the Thursday secondary market rate (RTo). 
The significance of the slope and intercept term for 
Model Vis also examined individually. Using the Johansen 
method and the individual null hypotheses B0 = o, the test 
TABLE XV 
UNRESTRICTED PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE 
JOHANSEN METHOD COINTEGRATION VECTOR 
Model V 
THURSDAY 
ASKED 
RATE 
INTERCEPT 
-.154 
AVERAGE 
AUCTION 
RATE 
1. 01 
statistic chi-square(l) = 8.4922 was obtained. This 
indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at a 95% 
confidence level. The statistical significance of the 
intercept term, therefore, suggests it is different from 
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zero. With the null hypothesis being B1 = 1, the resulting 
test statistic under the Johansen method is chi-square(l) = 
3.5331. This indicates the slope term is not significantly 
different from one. Based on these results, the average 
auction rate (AMTh) is a biased estimate of Thursday's 
secondary market asked rate (RTh) even though the slope term 
is not significantly different from one. 
Hypothesis Six 
The last null hypothesis suggests the auction results 
variables and the change in the Federal funds rate are not 
significant in explaining the change in the secondary market 
bid-asked spread. The results of the Model VI regressions 
to examine this hypothesis are presented in Table XVI. The 
Durbin-Watson test is also conducted for each of these 
regressions and no significant autocorrelation is found. 
Although individually the parameter estimate for the 
percent competitive (PCOMP) is statistically significant for 
the Monday to Tuesday data and the Tuesday to Wednesday 
data, none of the F-tests call for rejection of the null 
hypothesis which jointly tests all of the independent 
variables. The auction results variables and the change in 
the Federal funds rate, therefore, are not significant in 
explaining the change in the secondary market bid-asked 
spread ( CHSPR) . 
Bid-Asked Spread 
Change from: CONSTANT 
Friday-Monday .005 
(.026) 
Monday-Tuesday -.942 
(-1.957) 
Tuesday-Wednesday 1.015 
(2.374)* 
Wednesday-Thursday -.047 
(-.733) 
Thursday-Friday -.002 
(-.035) 
• = Significant 95 percent confidence level. 
TABLE XVI 
REGRESSION RESULTS EXAMINING 
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHANGE 
IN THE SECONDARY MARKET 
BID-ASKED SPREAD: 
Model VI 
POVER PCOMP TAILSPR CHFF 
.002 -.002 .046 ,006 
(1.734) (-.895) (.582) (.645) 
-.002 .013 -.043 0 
(-.477) (2.528)* (-.194) (.015) 
-.001 -.011 .028 .001 
(-.432) (-2.462)* (.135) (.183) 
0 0 .005 0 
(.275) (.658) (.184) (.08) 
0 0 -.005 .003 
(.359) (-.659) (-.184) (.719) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are t-values 
POVER = number of competitive bids not accepted/total number of bid submitted 
PCOMP = number of competitive bids accepted/total number of accepted bids 
TAILS PR = difference between the high and low auction discount rates 
CHFF = the change in the Federal funds rate 
R2 F-stat 
.018 .948 
.03 1.659 
.025 1.610 
.003 0.546 
.004 .216 
d-stat 
1.791 
1.992 
2.001 
2.012 
2.019 
w 
w 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
Chapter V provides a summary of the results. Using 
The first econometric techniques, six models are examined. 
model was used to question semi-strong form market 
efficiency in the Treasury bill secondary market with 
respect to auction results and the change in the Federal 
funds rate. Models II through IV are included to examine 
the determinants of the bidding adjustment and secondary 
market return caused by the downward biasing of auction 
prices. Next, Model V assumes auction rates are not 
downward biased and are instead unbiased expectations of 
Thursday's secondary market spot rate when the new bills are 
issued. Last, auction results and the change in the Federal 
funds rate are examined as determinants of the secondary 
market bid-asked spread using Model VI. 
The chapter is presented in the following manner. The 
discussion of the results from the tests of hypotheses for 
models one through six is presented first. The analysis is 
broken down into four groups: Hypothesis One, Hypotheses 
Two through Four (Cammack Simulation}, Hypothesis Five, and 
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Hypothesis Six. The remainder of the chapter discusses the 
implications of this work for the field of finance and the 
future potential studies related to this work. 
Discussion of the Results 
Hypothesis One 
Three of the Model I regression results, support the 
null hypothesis of secondary market efficiency. The 
regressions which support secondary market efficiency are 
the Friday to Monday, Monday to Tuesday and Tuesday to 
Wednesday regressions. The F-statistic for each of these 
regressions suggests the set of independent variables does 
not explain the change in the asked rates (CHASK). This is 
consistent with the null hypothesis of the asked rate having 
no relationship with percent overbid (POVER), percent of 
competitive bids accepted (PCOMP), tail spread (TAILSPR), 
and change in Federal funds rate (CHFF). This indicates 
participation in the Treasury bill secondary market is 
participation in a fair game. 
The release of the information regarding the auction 
results does not occur until near 5:00 p.m. Eastern time 
through a recording on an 800 number at the U.S. Treasury 
Department. It is up to individuals to call the 800 number 
to receive the auction information on Monday, and the major 
Treasury bill secondary market trading has ended for Monday 
by the time the auction information is available. This does 
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not give Monday's secondary market the opportunity to react 
to information prior to the secondary market results being 
reported. Due to this, it is feasible there would not be a 
statistically significant relationship between the auction 
results variables and the change in the asked rate for the 
Friday to Monday data. 
The complete auction results are published on Tuesday 
morning, so any reaction by the Treasury bill secondary 
market to the auction results would likely occur on Tuesday. 
The F-statistic, however, did not call for rejecting the 
null hypothesis for the Monday to Tuesday data. This again 
is consistent with a semi-strong efficient secondary market 
with respect to the auction results variables and the change 
in Federal funds rate. From the Model I regression using 
the Tuesday to Wednesday data, the F-statistic also did not 
lead to rejection of semi-strong efficiency. 
The Wednesday to Thursday data has a significant F-test 
statistic. The coefficients for percent competitive 
(PCOMP), tail spread (TAILSPR), and change in Federal funds 
rate (CHFF) all were statistically significant from the 
Model I regression. At the 95 percent confidence level the 
F-statistic called for rejection of the null hypothesis 
which jointly tested that all the estimated parameters are 
zero. This suggests the Treasury bill secondary market is 
inefficient in anticipating all the information in the 
auction results variables and change in Federal funds rate. 
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One possible explanation for this is the secondary market is 
reacting to auction results on Thursday when the auctioned 
bills are actually distributed and possibly begin trading in 
the secondary market. 
All the statistically significant auction results 
variables for the Wednesday to Thursday time period carry 
negative signs. This indicates the asked rate will decrease 
(price increase} from Wednesday to Thursday as the percent 
competitive (PCOMP}, tail spread (TAILSPR}, and change in 
the Federal funds rate (CHFF} increase. The signs on these 
variables are all opposite of a priori expectations, and the 
significant results are also further from the time of the 
auction than was expected. 
The negative sign for the percent competitive (PCOMP) 
may be a result of a reversal effect. A larger percent 
competitive in the auction may allow dealers to increase the 
asked rate (decrease prices} near the time of the auction 
since more of the informed bidders won bills in the auction. 
Near the auction's close, dealers may not see demand in the 
secondary market from these bidders. This reduces dealer's 
demand and risk of trading with informed traders which 
allows dealers to increase their asked rates. By Thursday, 
dealers may reduce their asked rates to reverse the asked 
rate changes they made near the time of the auction. 
The negative sign on tail spread (TAILSPR) may be 
explained by considering what the tail spread indicates. A 
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larger tail spread would mean lower prices were accepted in 
the auction in order to sell all available bills. Since the 
Treasury auction accepted lower prices in the auction, 
dealers may have to accept lower prices in the secondary 
market during the days near the auction. From Wednesday to 
Thursday, the dealers may believe prices in the secondary 
market are similar enough to auction prices that the dealers 
can increase their prices again. 
The change in the Federal funds rate (CHFF} also has a 
negative sign for the Wednesday to Thursday period. The 
variable's significance can be explained by the Thursday 
announcement of changes in Fed policy. If policy changes 
result in the Fed funds rate increasing from Wednesday to 
Thursday, Treasury bill dealers may find it necessary to 
increase prices in the secondary market to keep aligned with 
the Fed funds rate. 
The F-test is statistically significant in the Thursday 
to Friday regression. The null hypothesis suggesting the 
auction results variables and the change in the Federal 
funds rate jointly affect the change in the asked rate, 
therefore, is rejected. On Thursday the auctioned bills are 
available to be traded in the secondary market, so the 
individuals who did not place winning bids in the auction 
can now purchase those same Treasury bills in the secondary 
market. These results also indicate the Treasury bill 
secondary market is not semi-strong efficient with respect 
to the information carried in the auction results and the 
change in the Federal funds rate. 
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The estimated parameter for the percent overbid (POVER) 
is statistically significant and positive in the Thursday to 
Friday regression. This indicates as more competitive 
bidders are unsuccessful in winning bills in the auction, 
the asked discount rate is increased from Thursday to Friday 
(prices decreased). The competitive bidders who do not 
fulfill their demand for bills in the auction may seek to 
buy similar bills in the post-auction secondary market. 
With this increased demand in the secondary market, dealers 
keep their asked discount rates lower. When secondary 
market dealers take possession of the auctioned bills on 
Thursday, their supply of 91 day bills is increased. The 
dealers can then increase their asked rates in the secondary 
market. A higher percent overbid, therefore, results in an 
increase in the secondary market asked rate from Thursday to 
Friday. 
The F-statistics led to the rejection of the joint null 
hypothesis for the Wednesday to Thursday data and the 
Thursday to Friday data. This means the Treasury bill 
secondary market cannot be considered efficient with respect 
to the independent variable set. For these relationships, a 
fair game is not evidenced in the results. It had been 
anticipated the null hypothesis for the Friday to Monday 
data, Monday to Tuesday data, or Tuesday to Wednesday data 
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would be more likely to be rejected, than for the Wednesday 
to Thursday data or the Thursday to Friday data. The 
secondary market, however, seems to react to the auction 
results around Thursday when the bills are actually issued. 
Although the F-tests call for rejection of the null and 
suggest the Treasury bill secondary market is not semi-
strong efficient, all of the regressions had low R-squareds 
(2.4 percent to 7.7 percent). This means the model has low 
explanatory power for the variations in the change in the 
asked rate, and the regression line is considered a poor fit 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). This is not unusual, since 
Model I was developed based on a martingale process. A 
martingale is expected to exist in an efficient Treasury 
bill secondary market (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), and 
therefore the auction variables in Model I have difficulty 
explaining the change in the asked rates. Due to a lack of 
fit, the model would not be economically valid as a 
predictive model for use in trading Treasury bills. 
Although this study uses different forms of the auction 
information variables and different models, the results 
obtained were consistent with those of Wachtel and Young 
(1990) in that a slight degree of semi-strong secondary 
market inefficiency was found with regard to the auction 
results information set. Wachtel and Young, however, had 
much larger R2 's indicating economical significance of their 
results. 
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One explanation for the decreased explanatory power of 
the auction information variables in the current study as 
compared to the Wachtel and Young (1990) study is found in 
Boatler (1985). In a study ten years after an initial 
study, Boatler concludes the cause of the change in 
explanatory power a variable related to the tail spread is 
due to market participants gaining experience in coping with 
price instability. This may be the case for the lack of 
explanatory power of the auction variables in the current 
study compared to Wachtel and Young's results. It may be 
over time the secondary market has learned to cope with the 
weekly price changes from the auction market. The market, 
consequently, has reduced the reaction to unexpected 
information carried in the auction results and further 
increased the efficiency of the secondary market. 
Another relevant cause of the differences in results 
may be the different ·time·periods studied. The supply and 
demand for Treasury bills has continued to increase over 
time. Market efficiency in incorporating all information 
into prices usually increases as trading volume increases. 
Using more recent data than Wachtel and Young, which 
involves increased supply and demand conditions, may show 
increased market efficiency. Also Wachtel and Young 
examined a more volatile time period. 
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Hypotheses Two. Three. and Four 
The conclusions from the simulation of Cammack's (1991) 
study in some cases are contrary to Cammack's results. 
Cammack notes downward biasing of the auction rate is 
evident by an examination of the data. During the time 
frame August 1985 through August 199b, the data for this 
study finds downward biasing occurs but by only 1.6 to 2 
basis points. The auction rate was approximately four basis 
points less than rates on similar bills in the secondary 
market during 1973 through 1984. The downward biasing which 
causes the bidding adjustment during August 1985 through 
August 1990 is statistically significant. Model II is used 
to further examine this relationship. 
Using Model II to examine whether the secondary market 
bidding adjustment (MONBA) caused by the downward biased 
auction rates is explained by the expected portion of the 
auction results (ELOTAIL, EC, ENC), there are no 
statistically significant results. With no statistically 
significant results, the slight bidding adjustment which 
occurs due to downward biasing is not determined by the 
expected components of the auction results during August 
1985 to August 1990; and no excess expected gain would be 
realized by traders using the auction information. 
These results are consistent with Cammack's in two 
respects. Cammack finds the expected portion of the number 
of noncompetitive bidders (ENC) is not related to the 
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bidding adjustment (MONBA). Also, the expected portion of 
th~ ratio of competitive bids submitted to competitive bids 
accepted (EC) is not significant for the data sample as a 
whole. EC was only significant in two of Cammack's four 
subperiods. Cammack expected EC to have a positive 
relationship with the bidding adjustment, but EC carries a 
negative coefficient as it does. in this study. 
Cammack finds a strong significant positive 
relationship between the expected component of the tail 
(ELOTAIL) and Monday's bidding adjustment (MONBA) for the 
full sample (1973 to 1984) and three of the four subperiods. 
This means the greater the dispersion of opinion, the 
greater the expected gain due to more downward biasing. The 
expected component of the tail is not statistically 
significant in this study. 
In Cammack's last subperiod (10/82 to 12/84) none of 
the auction variables are statistically significant. This 
subperiod ends only seven months prior to the beginning of 
this study's time frame. The results using this study's 
data, therefore, are all consistent with the results during 
Cammack's last subperiod. 
For Model III questioning whether Tuesday's secondary 
market return (TUESRET) is explained by the unexpected 
components of the auction results, there was slight evidence 
of explanatory power. The relationship of the unexpected 
portion of the number of noncompetitive bidders (UNC) with 
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Tuesday returns had statistical significance. The 
unexpected component of the number of noncompetitive bidders 
(UNC) carried a positive relationship to the Tuesday return 
which is consistent with Cammack. This indicates unexpected 
demand from the less informed bidders in the auction market 
leads to higher prices in the secondary market. 
The results differ from Cammack's in that Cammack also 
finds unexpected information concerning the dispersion of 
opinion (ULOTAIL) and the number of rejected bids (UC) to be 
statistically significant explanatory variables. Although 
not statistically significant in this study, the 
coefficients of these auction variables do have signs 
consistent with Cammack's. 
From Model IV's regression examining whether the 
auction results simply convey information about the price 
level in the auction, the price level comparison variable 
(A%D) is the only statistically significant variable. Since 
the unexpected portion of the number of noncompetitive 
bidders (UNC) is no longer statistically significant as in 
the previous model, UNC is simply acting as a proxy for the 
price level in the auction. 
There was a positive relationship of A%D with the 
Tuesday return (TUESRET) indicating information about the 
price level in the auction does ~ffect Tuesday's secondary 
market returns. This is logical as the bills purchased in 
the auction market are similar to the bills being sold in 
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the secondary market. As a result, the prices in the two 
markets should be related. The overall equation, however, 
does not have much predictive value with an R2 less than 
Cammack's. 
This result is consistent with Cammack except the 
unexpected component of the low tail (ULOTAIL) is also 
significant in Cammack's results. This would indicate the 
low tail is conveying information to the secondary market 
other than simply serving as a proxy for the auction price 
level during Cammack's time frame. 
The dissimilarities between Cammack's results and this 
study's results are most likely due to the time frame 
differences. The current study examines the August 1985 
through August 1990 period, and Cammack is examining the 
January 1973 to December 1984 time frame. 
The biggest difference in the market environment during 
these two time frames is the period of the late 70's through 
early 80's was a period of instability. Markets were much 
more volatile then than during the 1985 through 1990 time 
frame. This was evident in the comparison of the dependent 
and independent variable standard deviations which were much 
less during August 1985 through August 1990. 
Another factor may be the changes in Fed targets. 
During Cammack's study period, the Fed changed from 
targeting interest rates to targeting the money supply then 
back to targeting interest rates. The Fed targeted interest 
rates continuously during the August 1985 to August 1990 
pe~iod. 
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Finally, two other factors may play a role in causing 
the discrepancies in results. First, Treasury bill futures 
trading was introduced during Cammack's time frame which may 
have had an initial unsettling impact on the Treasury bill 
secondary market. Second, the supply and demand for 
Treasury bills has continued to increase over time. This 
increased trading volume may have an impact on results. 
The results from the last subperiod of cammack's study 
provide justification for the time period differences being 
responsible for the discrepancies between the two studies. 
During the period 10/82 through 12/84, Cammack did not find 
any statistically significant results for Model II. This is 
consistent with the estimation results in this study, and 
the time frame difference is only seven months. 
Hypothesis Five 
The fifth hypothesis examines whether the weekly 
average Treasury bill auction rate (AM,Th) is an unbiased 
expectation of Thursday's Treasury bill spot rate (RTh). In 
examining the auction price and the price on a bill in 
Monday's secondary market, a slight downward biasing of the 
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auction prices was noted. 12 Since the auction price is 
downward biased, the testing of hypothesis five is relevant. 
The Model V joint null hypothesis (B0 = o and B1 = 1) 
was rejected at a 95 percent confidence level. The 
statistical significance of the intercept term and slope 
term indicate jointly they are different from zero and one, 
respectively. Since the average auction rate and Thursday's 
asked rate differ by something other than white noise, the 
average auction rate is a biased estimate of Thursday's 
asked rate. The auction rate, therefore, does not contain 
all information relevant to predicting Thursday's secondary 
market asked rate prevailing when the bills are issued. 
The estimated parameters for the slope and intercept 
are also tested individually. These tests indicate the 
slope term by itself is not significantly different from 
one, but the statistical significance of the intercept term 
suggests it is different from zero. This confirms the 
auction rate is a biaied estimate of Thursday's secondary 
market asked rate, and it is the intercept term driving this 
conclusion. 
The estimated intercept term has a negative coefficient 
in Model V which suggests the average auction rate (AM,Th) is 
greater than Thursday's secondary market asked rate (RTh). 
This indicates the auction price is lower than Thursday's 
12Monday's secondary market rate is adjusted to a 91 day rate which 
makes it similar to the bills issued on Thursday. 
secondary market asked price. This supports the downward 
biasing of the auction price seen in the comparison with 
Monday's and Tuesday's secondary market prices. 
Hypothesis Six 
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The auction information variables and the change in the 
Federal funds rate are examined as determinants of the 
change in the bid-asked spread in the secondary market. 
This is accomplished using the Model VI linear regression 
with the dependent variable being the change in the bid-
asked spread (CHSPR). 
The coefficient for the percent competitive (PCOMP) was 
statistically significant at the 95 percent level in 
explaining the change in the bid-asked spread from Monday to 
Tuesday and from Tuesday to Wednesday. The F-test, however, 
does not lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the set of independent variables is a determinant of the 
bid-asked spread for any of the combinations of days of the 
week. 
The coefficient for the percent competitive is positive 
for the Monday to Tuesday change in the bid-asked spread. As 
the number of competitive bidders winning bills in the 
auction increases compared to the number of noncompetitive 
participants, the percent competitive increases. Dealers 
may feel there is more uncertainty concerning the potential 
to incur adverse information costs in the secondary market 
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from subsequent trades with the informed competitive 
bidders. Feeling this, dealers may be increasing their bid-
asked spreads to reduce the potential losses from trades 
with more informed traders. The positive sign and 
significance of the percent competitive variable is 
consistent with results found by Roll (1970), Bagehot 
(1971), Copeland and Galai (1983}, Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), and Stoll (1989). This result is also consistent 
with the expectation that dealers alter their bid-asked 
spread once the results of the auction are known as 
evidenced by the significant number of changes in spreads 
from Monday to Tuesday (see Table II}. 
Other Conclusions 
The visual inspection of the data indicates a 
significant number of decreases in the bid-asked spread 
occurring from Monday to Tuesday in the secondary market. 
This is consistent with Roll's (1970} findings of sharp 
decreases in bid-asked spreads on 13 week Treasury bills 
immediately following the auction and Cammack's similar 
finding (1991). 
The decrease in the bid-asked spread is consistent with 
Monday's auction results announcement at the end of the day 
reducing uncertainty and hence dealers' risk. The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (Winter 1977-78} specifically notes 
the Treasury bill secondary market spreads should narrow 
when uncertainty is lessened. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
suggest dealers' spreads are larger on Mondays due to 
uncertainty concerning Monday's auction results. The 
announcement of the results allows the dealers to reduce 
their spreads on Tuesday. 
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One alternative explanation stems from Stoll's (1989) 
discussion of bid-asked spread determinants. If it is 
inventory holding costs for which the dealer is compensated 
through the bid-asked spread, the dealers will alter their 
bid-asked spreads in order to encourage transactions to 
bring inventory levels to their optimum levels. The dealers 
will know to what levels their inventories of 91-day bills 
will be increasing once the auction results are announced. 
These newly auctioned bills have maturities similar to bills 
already available in the secondary market. Given dealers' 
inventories will be increasing significantly due to the 
purchase of bills in Monday's auction, dealers may reduce 
their bid-asked spreads on Tuesday. By reducing the costs 
of secondary market transactions to buyers, dealers will 
reduce inventories of bills similar to the new bills to be 
received. In this manner, dealers ensure their inventories 
will be near the optimum levels when they receive the new 
bills. 
Another alternative explanation would be a Treasury 
bill secondary market anomaly in the form of a day-of-the-
week effect. studies have shown strong evidence for a 
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"weekend effect" in the stock markets in which the Friday-
to-Monday return is negative (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 
1993). A similar type of anomaly appears to be occurring in 
the Treasury bill secondary market with dealers frequently 
reducing their bid-asked spreads from Monday to Tuesday. 
Summary and Financial Implications 
Using the auction results variables, various 
conclusions are drawn. First, the Treasury bill secondary 
market is not semi-strong efficient with respect to the 
auction results variables (percent overbid, percent 
competitive, and tail spread) and the change in the Federal 
funds rate. 
Second, downward biased auction prices are observed. 
Based on this the Monday bidding adjustme.nt is examined but 
is not found to be determined by any of the expected 
components of the auction results (low tail, fraction of 
noncompetitive bidders, and fraction of competitive bids not 
accepted). The Tuesday return, however, is determined by 
the unexpected component of the fraction of noncompetitive 
bidders. This result is negated when a price level 
comparison variable is included in a model with the 
unexpected components of the auction results. This suggests 
Tuesday's return is just determined by the auction price 
level. 
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Next, the average auction rate is found to be a biased 
estimate of Thursday's secondary market rate. The auction 
price is less than Thursday's asked price. This supports 
the downward biasing observed in the comparison of the 
auction price with Monday and Tuesday's secondary market 
prices. Last, the bid-asked spread was not found to be 
determined by the set of auction variables (percent overbid, 
percent competitive, and tail spread) and the change in the 
Federal funds rate. 
The results of this study also provide implications for 
the field of finance. The secondary market is found to be 
semi-strong inefficient with. respect to the auction results 
variables and the change in the Federal funds rate. 
Although semi-strong inefficiency is found, the explanatory 
power of the models is very low. Due to this, the models 
cannot be used by market participants to earn any excess 
returns. 
Future Work with Treasury Issues 
One area of interest which has developed during the 
course of this study is with Treasury notes. With the 
Salomon Brothers illegal activities in the Treasury note 
auctions, the efficiency of the Treasury note auction could 
be examined. A study set up in a manner similar to the 
present study could be used. It would be interesting to 
determine if the market was less efficient during the time 
frame of Salomon Brothers' bogus bidding in the Treasury 
note auction. 
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An extension of the current study using data from the 
past two years is another possibility. The Treasury bill 
rate has experienced drastic changes during this time period 
with the changes in the economy. It would be interesting to 
note whether there was more or less uncertainty in the 
market.with the volatility in Treasury bill rates or if the 
market can better cope with volatility. Th.is would provide 
a better comparison with Cammack's work. 
Third, alternative explanatory variables could be 
considered. One possible relevant variable might be related 
to foreign purchases of Treasury bills. These purchases 
have become much more significant in recent years. 
Last if intra-day data was available, market efficiency 
and primary dealers could be studied in more detail. There 
are specific times during the day, especially on Mondays, 
when events are occurring. It could be questioned whether 
primary dealers as "insiders" are able to gain excess 
profits. 
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APPENDIX A 
TAIL SPREAD DATA 
DATE OF 
MONDAY'S 
AUCTION 
07/30/90 
07/23/90 
07/16/90 
07/09/90 
07/02/90 
06/25/90 
06/18/90 
06/11/90 
06/04/90 
05/28/90 
05/21/90 
05/14/90 
05/07 /90 
04/30/90 
04/23/90 
04/16/90 
04/09/90 
04/02/90 
03/26/90 
03/19/90 
03/12/90 
03/05/90 
02/26/90 
02/19/90 
02/12/90 
02/05/90 
01/29/90 
01/22/90 
01/15/90 
01/08/90 
01/01/90 
12/25/89 
12/18/89 
12/11/89 
12/04/89 
11/27/89 
11/20/89 
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TAIL 
SPREAD 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
0.05 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
0.06 
0.07 
0.04 
0.02 
0.14 
0.07 
0.08 
0.10 
0.09 
0.06 
DATE OF 
MONDAY'S 
AUCTION 
11/13/89 
11/06/89 
10/30/89 
10/23/89 
10/16/89 
10/09/89 
10/02/89 
09/25/89 
09/18/89 
09/11/89 
09/04/89 
08/28/89 
08/21/89 
08/14/89 
08/07/89 
07/31/89 
07/24/89 
07/17/89 
07/10/89 
07/03/89 
06/26/89 
06/19/89 
06/12/89 
06/05/89 
05/29/89 
05/22/89 
05/15/89 
05/08/89 
05/01/89 
04/24/89 
04/17/89 
04/10/89 
04/03/89 
03/27/89 
03/20/89 
03/13/89 
03/06/89 
02/27/89 
02/20/89 
02/13/89 
02/06/89 
01/30/89 
01/23/89 
01/16/89 
01/09/89 
01/02/89 
12/26/88 
12/19/88 
TAIL 
SPREAD 
0.03 
0.04 
0.00 
0.07 
0.12 
0.06 
0.02 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
0.95 
0.02 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.03 
0.07 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
0.05 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.02 
0.09 
0.06 
0.03 
0.05 
0.01 
0.06 
0.03 
0.02 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.11 
0.05 
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DATE OF 
MONDAY'S 
AUCTION 
12/12/88 
12/05/88 
11/28/88 
11/21/88 
11/14/88 
11/07/88 
10/31/88 
10/24/88 
10/17/88 
10/10/88 
10/03/88 
09/26/88 
09/19/88 
09/12/88 
09/05/88 
08/29/88 
08/22/88 
08/15/88 
08/08/88 
08/01/88 
07/25/88 
07/18/88 
07/11/88 
07/04/88 
06/27/88 
06/20/88 
06/13/88 
06/06/88 
05/30/88 
05/23/88 
05/16/88 
05/09/88 
05/02/88 
04/25/88 
04/18/88 
04/11/88 
04/04/88 
03/28/88 
03/21/88 
03/14/88 
03/07/88 
02/29/88 
02/22/88 
02/15/88 
02/08/88 
02/01/88 
01/25/88 
01/18/88 
TAIL 
SPREAD 
0.04 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.10 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.03 
0~06 
0.01 
0.06 
0.02 
0.02 
0.06 
0.07 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.07 
0.02 
0.04 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.05 
0.05 
0.04 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.06 
0.04 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.06 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
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DATE OF 
MONDAY'S 
AUCTION 
01/11/88 
01/04/88 
12/28/87 
12/21/87 
12/14/87 
12/07/87 
11/30/87 
11/23/87 
11/16/87 
11/09/87 
11/02/87 
10/26/87 
10/19/87 
10/12/87 
10/05/87 
09/28/87 
09/21/87 
09/14/87 
09/07/87 
08/31/87 
08/24/87 
08/17/87 
08/10/87 
08/03/87 
07/27/87 
07/20/87 
07/13/87 
07/06/87 
06/29/87 
06/22/87 
06/15/87 
06/08/87 
·06/01/87 
05/25/87 
05/18/87 
05/11/87 
05/04/87 
04/27/87 
04/20/87 
04/13/87 
04/06/87 
03/30/87 · 
03/23/87 
03/16/87 
03/09/87 
03/02/87 
02/23/87 
02/16/87 
02/09/87 
TAIL 
SPREAD 
0.03 
0.07 
0.07 
0.06 
0.04 
0.15 
0.12 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.13 
0.15 
0.18 
0.12 
0.11 
0.06 
0.00 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.00 
0.08 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.06 
0.08 
0.10 
0.08 
0.11 
0.07 
0.02 
0.07 
0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
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167 
DATE OF TAIL 
MONDAY'S SPREAD 
AUCTION 
02/02/87 0.01 
01/26/87 0.03 
01/19/87 0.01 
01/12/87 0.03 
01/05/87 0.03 
12/29/86 0.05 
12/22/86 0.06 
12/15/86 0.03 
12/08/86 0.07 
12/01/86 0.04 
11/24/86 0.04 
11/17/86 0.03 
11/10/86 0.04 
11/03/86 0.06 
10/27/86 0.02 
10/20/86 0.02 
10/13/86 0.05 
10/06/86 0.06 
09/29/86 0.02 
09/22/86 0.04 
09/15/86 0.02 
09/08/86 0.04 
09/01/86 0.01 
08/25/86 0.03 
08/18/86 0.04 
08/11/86 0.06 
08/04/86 0.01 
07/28/86 0.06 
07/21/86 0.02 
07/14/86 0.04 
07/07/86 0.02 
06/30/86 0.04 
06/23/86 0.03 
06/16/86 0.05 
06/09/86 0.06 
06/02/86 0.04 
05/26/86 0.04 
05/19/86 0.06 
05/12/86 0.02 
05/05/86 0.02 
04/28/86 0.04 
04/21/86 0.03 
04/14/86 0.02 
04/07/86 0.04 
03/31/86 0.04 
03/24/86 0.05 
03/17/86 0.04 
03/10/86 0.01 
03/03/86 o.oo 
DATE OF 
MONDAY'S 
AUCTION 
02/24/86 
02/17/86 
02/10/86 
02/03/86 
01/27/86 
01/20/86 
01/13/86 
01/06/86 
12/30/85 
12/23/85 
12/16/85 
12/09/85 
12/02/85 
11/25/85 
11/18/85 
11/11/85 
11/04/85 
10/28/85 
10/21/85 
10/14/85 
10/07/85 
09/30/85 
09/23/85 
09/16/85 
09/09/85 
09/02/85 
08/26/85 
08/19/85 
08/12/85 
08/05/85 
07/29/85 
TAIL 
SPREAD 
0.10 
0.03 
0.01 
0.05 
0.02 
0.04 
0.05 
0.04 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
0.02 
o .• 04 
0.05 
0.01 
0.04 
0.07 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.14 
0.04 
0.05 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
168 
APPENDIX .B 
BID RATE.S , ASK RATES , AND 
BID-ASK SPREADS DATA 
Appendix B-1: Bid Rates from 
the Secondary Market 
DATE OF TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
AUCTION MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
BID BID BID BID BID 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE. 
07/30/90 7.49 7.49 7.42 7.43 NA 
07/23/90 7.49 7.53 7.56 7.58 7.52 
07/16/90 7.62 7.61 7.55 7.54 7.54 
07/09/90 7.81 7.80 7.78 7.68 7.60 
07/02/90 7.73 7.70 NA 7.66 7.75 
06/25/90 7.76 7.81 7.79 7.75 7.75 
06/18/90 7.71 7.75 7.77 7.78 7.79 
06/11/90 7.74 7.74 7.68 7.68 7.70 
06/04/90 7.71 7.71 7.70 7.72 7.72 
05/28/90 7.75 7.79 7.77 7.77 7.70 
05/21/90 7.77 7.74 . 7. 66 7.70 7.72 
05/14/90 7.68 7.66 7.67 7.68 7.75 
05/07/90 7.79 7.80 7.75 7.72 7.63 
04/30/90 7.88 7.93 7.90 7.87 7.77 
04/23/90 7.77 7.77 7.80 7.87 7.80 
04/16/90 7.71 7.78 7.81 7.78 7.70 
04/09/90 7.79 7.78 7.77 7.76 NA 
04/02/90 7.85 7.83 7.76 7.77 7.77 
03/26/90 7.84 7.97 7.85 7.89 NA 
03/19/90 7.97 7.97 7.91 7.92 7.89 
03/12/90 7.97 7.99 7.95 7.95 7.92 
03/05/90 7.89 7.90 7.91 7.93 7.98 
02/26/90 7.72 7.73 7.78 7.81 7.76 
02/19/90 NA 7.79 7.79 7.73 7.68 
02/12/90 7.70 7.59 7.62 7.71 7.70 
02/05/90 7.83 7.81 7.82 7.82 7.81 
01/29/90 7.77 7.76 7.76 7.77 7.81 
01/22/90 7.67 7.68 7.68 7.70 7.70 
01/15/90 7.59 7.72 7.70 7.80 7.75 
01/08/90 7.54 7.56 7.52 7.58 7.50 
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170 
DATE OF TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
AUCTION MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
BID BID BID BID BID 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
01/01/90 NA 7.63 7.64 7.60 7.56 
12/25/89 NA 7.53 7.74 7.70 7.56 
12/18/89 7.64 7.67 7.57 7.57 7.60 
12/11/89 7.63 7.69 7.63 7.65 7.63 
12/04/89 7.50 7.58 7.67 7.71 7.62 
11/27/89 7.61 7.66 7.66 7.61 7.54 
11/20/89 7.62 7.66 7.59 NA 7.54 
11/13/89 7.69 7.70 7.63 7.58 7.69 
11/06/89 7.81 7.76 7.68 7.74 7.72 
10/30/89 7.77 7.79 7.73 7.69 7.84 
10/23/89 7.53 7.50 7.54 7.56 7.71 
10/16/89 7.42 7.43 7.45 7.52 7.56 
10/09/89 7.66 7.65 7.81 7.71 7.07 
10/02/89 7.85 7.79 7.82 7.79 7.58 
09/25/89 7.72 7.78 7.84 7.86 7.93 
09/18/89 7.57 7.68 7.80 7.74 7.78 
09/11/89 7.66 7.62 7.58 7.59 7.55 
09/04/89 7.84 7.86 7.82 7.78 7.77 
08/28/89 7.88 7.91 7.83 7.85 NA 
08/21/89 7.98 8.07 8.01 7.90 7.97 
08/14/89 8.08 8.03 7.94 7.95 7.88 
08/07/89 7.95 7.93 7.91 7.85 7.96 
07/31/89 7.69 7.69 7.55 7.61 7.88 
07/24/89 8.10 8.02 7.92 7.80 7.87 
07/17/89 7.92 7.94 7.98 8.00 8.13 
07/10/89 7.77 7.75 7.74 7.75 7.85 
07/03/89 NA 7.94 7.77 7.75 7.74 
06/26/89 8.14 NA 8.03 7.94 7.99 
06/19/89 8.21 8.17 8.24 8.23 8.07 
06/12/89 8.16 8.13 8.13 8.16 8.15 
06/05/89 8.16 8.19 8.11 8.09 8.21 
05/29/89 NA 8.54 8.56 8.52 8.37 
05/22/89 8.34 8.29 8.37 8.52 8.53 
05/15/89 8.18 8.24 8.28 8.40 8.38 
05/08/89 8.43 8.54 8.54 8.36 8.23 
05/01/89 8.65 8.58 8.44 8.47 8.46 
04/24/89 8.65 8.64 8.52 8.42 8.44 
04/17/89 8.57 8.45 8.42 8.63 8.66 
04/10/89 8.67 8.68 8.69 8.74 8.61 
04/03/89 8.86 8.78 8.83 8.76 8.81 
03/27/89 9.07 9.08 8.97 8.95 8.88 
03/20/89 9.08 9.10 9.01 9.05 NA 
03/13/89 8.68 8.72 8.69 8.71 8.86 
03/06/89 8.65 8.64 8.63 8.69 8.76 
02/27/89 8.70 8.72 8.66 8.67 8.65 
02/20/89 NA 8.49 8.54 8.63 8.66 
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DATE OF TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
AUCTION MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
BID BID BID BID BID 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
02/13/89 8.53 8.56 8.50 8.50 8.51 
02/06/89 8.57 8.55 8.54 8.49 8.56 
01/30/89 8.29 8.39 8.35 8.39 8.49 
01/23/89 8.24 8.23 8.30 8.35 8.34 
01/16/89 8.27 8.30 8.27 8.24 8.25 
01/09/89 8.34 8.31 8.26 8.28 8.21 
01/02/89 NA 8.23 8.25 8.29 8.30 
12/26/88 NA 8.13 8.24 8.12 8.11 
12/19/88 8.11 8.18 8.08 8.05 8.05 
12/12/88 8.01 8.12 8.11 8.20 8.17 
12/05/88 8.02 7.95 8.00 7.97 7.90 
11/28/88 8.06 7.99 7.83 7.86 8.07 
11/21/88 7.98 8.03 8.02 NA 8.05 
11/14/88 7.83 7.96 7.94 7.93 7.96 
11/07/88 7. 51 . 7.60 7.59 7.66 7.66 
10/31/88 7.38 7.36 7.38 7.43 7.48 
10/24/88 7.51 7.46 7.42 7.40 7.40 
10/17/88 7.35 7.39 7.43 7.46 7.46 
10/10/88 7.28 7.28 7.29 7. 34. 7.34 
10/03/88 7.24 7.25 7.24 7.32 7.30 
09/26/88 7.31 7.33 7.32 7.31 7.29 
09/19/88 7.22 7.21 7.19 7.22 7.24 
09/12/88 7.21 7.18 7.17 7.19 7.16 
09/05/88 NA 7.27 7.35 7.33 7.30 
08/29/88 7.26 7.31 7.29 7.30 7.23 
08/22/88 7.19 7.18 7.20 7.28 7.35 
08/15/88 7.01 7.07 7.04 7.01 7.07 
08/08/88 6.95 7.07 6.99 7.02 7.03 
08/01/88 6.86 6.91 6.91 6.85 6.93 
07/25/88 6.87 6.92 7.01 7.00 6.95 
07/18/88 6.73 6.69 6.72 6.78 6.76 
07/11/88 6.68 6.76 6.74 6.74 6.73 
07/04/88 NA 6.55 6.54 6.56 6.67 
06/27/88 6.55 6.62 6.60 6.56 6.56 
06/20/88 6.47 6.58 6.53 6.53 6.51 
06/13/88 6.47 6.36 6.35 6.30 6.39 
06/06/88 6.48 6.44 6.41 6.45 6.46 
05/30/88 NA 6.55 6.47 6.46 6.47 
05/23/88 6.34 6.30 6.33 6.44 6.45 
05/16/88 6.26 6.31 6.23 6.16 6.28 
05/09/88 6.32 6.36 6.27 6.22 6.20 
05/02/88 6.12 6.13 6.16 6.20 6.31 
04/25/88 5.90 5.91 5.87 5.99 6.00 
04/18/88 5.84 5.81 5.84 5.84 5.84 
04/11/88 6.01 5.94 5.86 5.70 5.90 
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DATE OF TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
AUCTION MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
BID BID BID BID BID 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
04/04/88 5.92 6.01 6.05 6.05 6.02 
03/28/88 5.76 5.76 5.74 5.71 NA 
03/21/88 5.79 5.79 5.84 5.82 5.69 
03/14/88 5.64 5.62 5.64 5.61 5.72 
03/07/88 5.78 5.75 5.75 5.74 5.75 
02/29/88 NA 5.63 5.61 5.61 5.71 
02/22/88 5.65 5.64 5.64 5.65 5.60 
02/15/88 NA 5.73 5.75 5.70 5.67 
02/08/88 5.67 5.61 5.61 5.65 5.76 
02/01/88 5.69 5.71 5.69 5.66 5.66 
01/25/88 5.83 5.81 5.75 5.68 5.65 
01/18/88 5.90 5.98 5.82 5.84 5.81 
01/11/88 5.88 5.82 5.80 5.84 5.88 
01/04/88 5.89 5.94 5.85 5.79 5.81 
12/28/87 5.58 5.83 NA NA NA 
12/21/87 5.92 8.91 5.78 5.75 NA 
12/14/87 5.97 5.95 5.95 5.95 5.89 
12/07/87 5.86 5.88 5.86 5.92 5.90 
11/30/87 5.40 5.59 5.46 5.37 5.48 
11/23/87 5.78 5.74 5.70 NA 5.66 
11/16/87 5.98 5.89 5.81 5.67 5.72 
11/09/87 5.70 5.69 5.64 5.82 5.93 
11/02/87 5.72 5.65 5.58 5.62 5.76 
10/26/87 5.17 5.25 5.04 5.05 5.30 
10/19/87 6.65 5.91 5.59 5.31 5.31 
10/12/87 6.96 6.96 7.19 7.08 6.91 
10/05/87 6.50 6.56 6.56 6.69 6.72 
09/28/87 6.61 6.69 6.62 6.64 6.69 
09/21/87 6.51 6.58 6.59 6.63 6.64 
09/14/87 6.37 6.32 6.33 6.38 6.44 
09/07/87 NA 6.41 6.44 6.34 6.36 
08/31/87 6.20 6.13 6.09 6.20 6.39 
08/24/87 6.18 6.21 6.26 6.28 6.24 
08/17/87 5.99 6.02 6.08 6.11 6.10 
08/10/87 5.93 5.93 5.95 5.96 5.96 
08/03/87 5.95 5.85 5.86 5.74 5.85 
07/27/87 5.93 6.03 6.06 6.08 6.07 
07/20/87 5.51 5 .. 64 5.66 5.62 5.93 
07/13/87 5.60 5.55 5.58 5.58 5.56 
07/06/87 5.60 5.60 5.57 5.61 5.61 
06/29/87 5.78 5.65 5.73 5.66 NA 
06/22/87 5.65 5.72 5.83 5.84 5.78 
06/15/87 5.67 5.63 5.65 5.65 5.65 
06/08/87 5.58 5.51 5.48 5.54 5.58 
06/01/87 5.83 5.76 5.69 5.66 5.59 
173 
DATE OF TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
AUCTION MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
BID BID BID BID BID 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
05/25/87 NA 5.70 5.76 5.85 5.81 
05/18/87 5.92 5.78 5.69 5.53 5.62 
05/11/87 5.59 5.60 5.53 5.72 6.01 
05/04/87 5.78 5.81 5.50 5.53 5.48 
04/27/87 5.78 5.82 5.71 5.53 5.67 
04/20/87 5.68 5.50 5.42 5.49 5.76 
04/13/87 5.99 5.92 5.68 5.56 NA 
04/06/87 5.53 5.51 5.50 5.75 5.85 
03/30/87 5.71 5.61 5.54 5.51 5.56 
03/23/87 5.58 5.61 5.57 5.57 5.68 
03/16/87 5.59 5.57 · 5.52 5.50 5.50 
03/09/87 5.66 5.68 5.69 5.67 5.62 
03/02/87 5.48 5.54 5.51 5.52 5.64 
02/23/87 5.43 5.44 5.45 5.45 5.45 
02/16/87 NA 5.68 5.60 5.45 5.43 
02/09/87 5.74 5.82 5.86 5.72 5.65 
02/02/87 5.60 5.59 5.63 5.59 5.66 
01/26/87 5.46 5.49 5.47 5.48 5.60 
01/19/87 NA 5.25 5.31 5.38 5.40 
01/12/87 5.39 5.36 5.35 5.36 5.33 
01/05/87 5.54 5.34 5.48 5.43 5.38 
12/29/86 5.65 5.69 5.67 NA 5.49 
12/22/86 5.49 5.55 5.57 NA 5.57 
12/15/86 5.56 5.58 5.64 5.60 5.51 
12/08/86 5.49 5.48 5.49 5.49 5.49 
12/01/86 5.40 5.41 5.41 5.40 5.44 
11/24/86 5.35 5.39 5.39 NA 5.39 
11/17/86 5.40 5.35 5.33 5.38 5.36 
11/10/86 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 
11/03/86 5.22 5.25 5.26 5.26 5.32 
10/27/86 5.18 5.20 5.20 5.18 5.20 
10/20/86 5.30 5.31 5.30 5.26 5.27 
10/13/86 NA 5.13 5.18 5.20 5.27 
10/06/86 5.12 5.06 5.04 5.06 5.06 
09/29/86 5.19 5.20 5.19 5.19 5.09 
09/22/86 5.24 5.25 5.24 5.23 5.24 
09/15/86 5.17 5.13 5.12 5.23 5.25 
09/08/86 5.24 5.20 5.16 5.21 5.17 
09/01/86 NA 5.14 5.24 5.19 5.23 
08/25/86 5.35 5.29 5.32 5.29 5.17 
08/18/86 5.62 5.57 5.50 5.37 5.36 
08/11/86 5.64 5.61 5.57 5.59 5.56 
08/04/86 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.70 
07/28/86 5.87 5.86 5.85 5.79 5.77 
07/21/86 5.70 5.73 5.81 5.81 5.81 
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DATE OF TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
AUCTION MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
BID BID BID BID BID 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
07/14/86 5.78 5.77 5.77 5.75 5.71 
07/07/86 5.85 5.94 5.88 5.85 5.75 
06/30/86 5.99 5.99 6.00 5.91 NA 
06/23/86 6.07 6.08 6.08 6.08 6.02 
06/16/86 6.11 6.09 6.09 6.11 6.10 
06/09/86 6.33 6.28 6.34 6.28 6.17 
06/02/86 6.36 6.41 6.52 6.51 6.32 
05/26/86 NA 6.16 6.19 6.30 6.30 
05/19/86 6.22 6.22 6.20 6.20 6.18 
05/12/86 6.09 6.09 6.09 6.17 6.21 
05/05/86 6.06 6.05 6.04 6.04 6.05 
04/28/86 6.07 6.09 6.10 6.11 6.15 
04/21/86 5.86 5.95 6.09 6.11 6.14 
04/14/86 5.86 5.81 5.77 5.84 5.87 
04/07/86 6.20 6.13 6.01 6.02 5.96 
03/31/86 6.35 6.34 6.34 6.33 6.23 
03/24/86 6.36 6.38 6.41 6.34 NA 
03/17/86 6.54 6.54 6.49 6.44 6.41 
03/10/86 6.57 6.57 6.62 NA 6.54 
03/03/86 6.92 6.84 5.85 6.69 6.61 
02/24/86 6.99 7.05 7.07 7.03 7.02 
02/17/86 NA 6.98 7.08 7.11 6.98 
02/10/86 7.18 7.11 7.11 7.10 7.02 
02/03/86 6.99 6.98 7.01 7.10 7.21 
01/27/86 6.92 6.92 7.03 7.04 6.97 
01/20/86 NA 7.00 7.00 6.97 6. 9.7 
01/13/86 7.24 7.24 7.19 7.08 7.11 
01/06/86 7.06 7.03 7.17 7.18 7.21 
12/30/85 7.03 7.05 NA 7.10 7.03 
12/23/85 7.04 7.05 NA 7.01 6.96 
12/16/85 7.00 7.06 7.13 7.10 7.05 
12/09/85 7.20 7.19 7.04 7.08 6.98 
12/02/85 7.23 7.23 7.22 7.26 7.26 
11/25/85 7.17 7.20 7.18 NA 7.16 
11/18/85 NA 7.21 7.25 7.23 7.23 
11/11/85 NA 7.22 7.27 7.32 7.35 
11/04/85 7.23 7.24 7.25 7.25 7.23 
10/28/85 7.24 7.24 7.19 7.19 7.21 
10/21/85 7.21 7.16 7.22 7.29 7.24 
10/14/85 NA 7.23 7.21 7.19 7.20 
10/07/85 7.14 7.16 7.19 7.22 7.19 
09/30/85 7.04 7.03 7.02 6.98 6.99 
09/23/85 6.80 6.84 6.87 6.94 NA 
09/16/85 7.19 7.20 7.11 7.09 7.01 
09/09/85 7.24 7.23 7.24 7.24 7.21 
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DATE OF TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
AUCTION MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
BID BID BID BID BID 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
09/02/85 NA 7.11 7.05 7.13 7.26 
08/26/85 7.08 7.05 . 7. 06 7.04 7.14 
08/19/85 7.13 7.12 7.04 7.03 7.04 
08/12/85 7.14 7.14 7.09 7.19 7.11 
08/05/85 7.29 7.26 7.18 7.17 7.16 
07/29/85 7.27 7.31 
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Appendix B-2: Ask Rates from 
the Secondary Market 
DATE TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
OF MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
AUCTION ASK ASK ASK ASK ASK 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
07/30/90 7.47 7.47 7.40 7.41 NA 
07/23/90 7.47 7.51 7.54 7.56 7.50 
07/16/90 7.60 7.59 7.53 7.52 7.52 
07/09/90 7.79 7.78 7.76 7.66 7.58 
07/02/90 7.71 7.68 NA 7.64 7.73 
06/25/90 7.72 7.78 7.75 7.72 7.72 
06/18/90 7.69 7.72 7.75 7.75 7.75 
06/11/90 7.69 7.72 7.66 7.66 7.66 
06/04/90 7.69 7.69 7.66 7.69 7.69 
05/28/90 7.72 7.75 7.75 7.75 7.66 
05/21/90 7.75 7.72 7.63 7.66 7.69 
05/14/90 7.66 7.63 7.63 7.66 7.72 
05/07/90 7.75 7.78 7.72 7.69 7.58 
04/30/90 7.84 7.91 7.88 7.84 7.75 
04/23/90 7.75 7.75 7.78 7.81 7.78 
04/16/90 7.69 7.75 7.78 7.75 7.66 
04/09/90 7.75 7.75 7.75 7.72 NA 
04/02/90 7.81 7.81 7.72 7.75 7.75 
03/26/90 7.81 7.94 7.81 7.84 NA 
03/19/90 7.94 7.94 7.88 7.88 7.88 
03/12/90 7.94 7.97 7.91 7.91 7.88 
03/05/90 7.88 7.88 7.88 7.91 7.94 
02/26/90 7.69 7.69 7.75 7.78 7.72 
02/19/90 NA 7.75 7.75 7.69 7.66 
02/12/90 7.66 7.56 7.59 7.69 7.66 
02/05/90 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 
01/29/90 7.72 7.72 7.72 7.75 7.78 
01/22/90 7.63 7.63 7.63 7.66 7.66 
01/15/90 7.58 7.69 7.66 7.75 7.72 
01/08/90 7.50 7.53 7.47 7.53 7.47 
01/01/90 NA 7.59 7.59 7.56 7.53 
12/25/89 NA 7.50 7.69 7.66 7.53 
12/18/89 7.56 7.63 7.53 7.53 7.56 
12/11/89 7.59 7.66 7.59 7.63 7.59 
12/04/89 7.44 7.53 7.63 7.69 7.59 
11/27/89 7.53 7.63 7.63 7.56 7.50 
11/20/89 7.59 7.63 7.56 NA 7.50 
11/13/89 7.63 7.63 7.59 7.53 7.66 
11/06/89 7.75 7.69 7.63 7.69 7.69 
10/30/89 7.72 7.75 7.66 7.63 7.81 
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DATE TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
OF MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
AUCTION ASK ASK ASK ASK ASK 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
10/23/89 7.49 7.47 7.50 7.53 7.66 
10/16/89 7.35 7.39 7.41 7.48 7.52 
10/09/89 7.61 7.61 7.74 7.64 7.03 
10/02/89 7.77 7.75 7.75 7.72 7.54 
09/25/89 7.67 7.73 7.80 7.78 7.89 
09/18/89 7.50 7.65 7.77 7.69 7.75 
09/11/89 7.59 7.58 7.54 7.52 7.51 
09/04/89 7.77 7.79 7.78 7.72 7.74 
08/28/89 7.82 7.88 7.76 7.78 NA 
08/21/89 7.92 8.08 7.97 7.84 7.93 
08/14/89 8.02 7.99 7.88 7.89 7.8 
08/07/89 7.89 7.89 7.83 7.79 7.92 
07/31/89 7.65 7.65 7.49 7.55 7.84 
07/24/89 8.06 7.98 7.86 7.74 7.83 
07/17/89 7.86 7.90 7.94 7.96 8.09 
07/10/89 7.73 7.71 7.70 7.69 7.81 
07/03/89 NA 7.88 7.73 7.71 7.70 
06/26/89 8.08 NA 7.97 7.88 7.95 
06/19/89 8.17 8.13 8.18 8.17 8.03 
06/12/89 8.12 8.09 8.09 8 .12 8.11 
06/05/89 8.12 8.15 8.07 8.05 8.17 
05/29/89 NA 8.50 8.52 8.48 8.33 
05/22/89 8.30 8.25 8.33 8.48 8.49 
05/15/89 8.14 8.20 8.24 8.36 8.34 
05/08/89 8.36 8.50 8.50 8.32 8.20 
05/01/89 8.61 8.54 8.37 8.40 8.42 
04/24/89 8.61 8.60 8.48 8.38 8.40 
04/17/89 8.53 8.41 8.38 8.56 8.63 
04/10/89 8.63 8.64 8.65 8.70 8.57 
04/03/89 8.82 8.74 8.79 8.72 8.77 
03/27/89 9.03 9.05 8.94 8.92 8.85 
03/20/89 9.04 9.06 8.98 9.02 NA 
03/13/89 8.64 8.69 8.66 8.68 8.83 
03/06/89 8.61 8.60 8.59 8.65 8.72 
02/27/89 8.66 8.68 8.62 8.63 8.61 
02/20/89 NA 8.45 8.50 8.59 8.62 
02/13/89 8.49 8.52 8.46 8.46 8.47 
02/06/89 8.53 8.51 8.51 8.45 8.52 
01/30/89 8.25 8.35 8.31 8.35 8.45 
01/23/89 8.20 8.19 8.26 8.31 8.30 
01/16/89 8.23 8.26 8.23 8.20 8.21 
01/09/89 8.30 8.27 8.22 8.24 8.17 
01/02/89 NA 8.19 8.21 8.25 8.26 
12/26/88 NA 8.09 8.20 8.08 8.07 
12/19/88 8.07 8.14 8.04 8.01 8.01 
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DATE TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
OF MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
AUCTION ASK ASK ASK ASK ASK 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
12/12/88 7.97 8.08 8.07 8.16 8.13 
12/05/88 7.98 7.91 7.96 7.93 7.86 
11/28/88 8.00 . 7. 95 7.80 7.82 8.03 
11/21/88 7.92 7.99 7.98 NA 8.01 
11/14/88 7.79 7.92 7.90 7.89 7.92 
11/07/88 7.47 7.56 7.55 7.62 7.62 
10/31/88 7.32 7.32 7.34 7.39 7.44 
10/24/88 7.47 7.42 7.38 7.36 7.36 
10/17/88 7.31 7.35 7.39 7.42 7.42 
10/10/88 7.22 7.22 7.25 7.30 7.30 
10/03/88 7.20 7.21 7.20 7.28 7.26 
09/26/88 7.25 7.29 7.28 7.27 7.23 
09/19/88 7.15 7.17 7.15 7.18 7.20 
09/12/88 7.15 7.14 7.13 7.15 7.12 
09/05/88 NA 7.21 7.31 7.29 7.26 
08/29/88 7.20 7.27 7.25 7.26 7.19 
08/22/88 7.15 7.14 7.16 7.24 7.31 
08/15/88 6.97 7.03 7.00 6.97 7.03 
08/08/88 6.89 7.03 6.95 6.98 6.99 
08/01/88 6.80 6.87 6.87 6.81 6.89 
07/25/88 6.81 6.88 6.97 6.96 6.91 
07/18/88 6.66 6.65 6.68 6.74 6.72 
07/11/88 6.61 6.72 6.70 6.70 6.69 
07/04/88 NA 6.48 6.50 6.52 6.63 
06/27/88 6.48 6.58 6.56 6.52 6.52 
06/20/88 6.40 6.54 6.49 6.49 6.47 
06/13/88 6.40 6.32 6.31 6.26 6.35 
06/06/88 6.41 6.40 6.37 6.41 6.42 
05/30/88 NA 6.48 6.43 6.42 6.43 
05/23/88 6.27 6.26 6.29 6.40 6.41 
05/16/88 6.19 6.27 6.19 6.12 6.24 
05/09/88 6.25 6.32 6.23 6.18 6.16 
05/02/88 6.05 6.09 6.12 6.16 6.27 
04/25/88 5.83 5.87 5.83 5.95 5.96 
04/18/88 5.77 5.77 5.80 5.80 5.80 
04/11/88 5.94 5.90 5.82 5.66 5.86 
04/04/88 5.85 5.97 6.01 6.01 5.98 
03/28/88 5.72 5.72 5.70 5.69 NA 
03/21/88 5.72 5.75 5.80 5.78 5.65 
03/14/88 5.57 5.58 5.60 5.57 5.68 
03/07/88 5.71 5.71 5.71 5.70 5.71 
02/29/88 NA 5.59 5.57 5.57 5.69 
02/22/88 5.58 5.60 5.60 5.61 5.56 
02/15/88 NA 5.66 5.71 5.66 5.63 
02/08/88 5.60 5.57 5.57 5.61 5.72 
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DATE TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
OF MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
AUCTION ASK ASK ASK ASK ASK 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
02/01/88 5.62 5.67 5.65 5.62 5.62 
01/25/88 5.79 5.77 5.71 5.64 5.61 
01/18/88 5.83 5.91 5.78 5.80 5.77 
01/11/88 5.81 5.78 5.76 5.80 5.84 
01/04/88 5.82 5.90 5.81 5.75 5.77 
12/28/87 5.46 5.79 NA NA NA 
12/21/87 5.85 5.87 5.74 5.71 NA 
12/14/87 5.90 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.85 
12/07/87 5.74 5.84 5.82 5.90 5.86 
11/30/87 5.33 5.52 5.39 5.33 5.44 
11/23/87 5.71 5.70 5.66 NA 5.62 
11/16/87 5.91 5.82 5.74 5.60 5.65 
11/09/87 5.63 5.62 5.57 5.75 5.86 
11/02/87 5.65 5.58 5.51 5.55 5.69 
10/26/87 5.10 5.18 4.97 4.98 5.23 
10/19/87 6.58 5.84 5.52 5.24 5.24 
10/12/87 6.84 6.92 7.15 7.04 6.87 
10/05/87 6.38 6.52 6.52 6~65 6.68 
09/28/87 6.49 6.65 6.58 6.60 6.65 
09/21/87 6.47 6.51 6.52 6.59 6.60 
09/14/87 6.12 6.22 6.29 6.34 6.40 
09/07/87 NA 6.16 6.34 6.24 6.26 
08/31/87 5.95 6.03 5.99 6.10 6.29 
08/24/87 5.93 6.11 6.16 6.18 5.99 
08/17/87 5.74 5.92 5.98 6.01 6.00 
08/10/87 5.68 5.83 5.85 5.86 5.86 
08/03/87 5.70 5.75 5.76 5.64 5.75 
07/27/87 5.88 5.98 6.01 5.83 5.97 
07/20/87 5.46 5.59 5.61 5.57 5.88 
07/13/87 5.56 5.53 5.56 5.56 5.54 
07/06/87 5.56 5.58 5.55 5.59 5.57 
06/29/87 5.74 5.61 5.71 5.64 NA 
06/22/87 5.63 5.70 5.81 5.82 5.76 
06/15/87 5.63 5.61 5.63 5.63 5.63 
06/08/87 5.54 5.49 5.46 5.52 5.53 
06/01/87 5.81 5.74 5.67 5.64 5.55 
05/25/87 NA 5.66 5.74 5.81 5.77 
05/18/87 5.85 5.76 5.67 5.51 5.56 
05/11/87 5.55 5.58 5.49 5.71 5.99 
05/04/87 5.74 5.79 5.46 5.51 5.44 
04/27/87 5.76 5.80 5.69 5.49 5.63 
04/20/87 5.64 5.48 5.40 5.47 5.74 
04/13/87 5.95 5.90 5.66 5.54 NA 
04/06/87 5.49 5.49 5.48 5.73 5.83 
03/30/87 5.67 5.59 5.52 5.49 5.52 
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DATE TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
OF MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
AUCTION ASK ASK ASK ASK ASK 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
03/23/87 5.56 5.59 5.55 5.55 5.64 
03/16/87 5.57 5.55 5.50 5.46 5.48 
03/09/87 5.64 5.66 5.67 5.65 5.60 
03/02/87 5.46 5.52 5.49 5.50 5.62 
02/23/87 5.41 5.42 5.43 5.43 5.43 
02/16/87 NA 5.66 5.58 5.43 5.41 
02/09/87 5.72 5.80 5.84 5.70 5.63 
02/02/87 5.58 5.57 5.61 5.57 5.64 
01/26/87 5.44 5.47 5.45 5.46 5.58 
01/19/87 NA 5.23 5.29 5.36 5.38 
01/12/87 5.35 5.34 5.31 5.34 5.31 
01/05/87 5.52 5.30 5.41 5.41 5.36 
12/29/86 5.63 5.67 5.65 5.53 NA 
12/22/86 6.47 5.53 5.55 NA 5.55 
12/15/86 5.54 5.56 5.62 5.58 5.49 
12/08/86 5.45 5.46 5.47 5.47 5.47 
12/01/86 5.36 5.39 5.39 5.38 5.42 
11/24/86 5. 31 5.37 5.37 NA 5.37 
11/17/86 5.36 5.33 5.31 5.36 5.34 
11/10/86 5.38 5.36 5.38 5.36 5.38 
11/03/86 5.18 5.23 5.24 5.24 5.30 
10/27/86 5.16 5.18 5.18 5.16 5.18 
10/20/86 5.28 5.29 5.28 5.24 5.25 
10/13/86 NA 5.09 5.16 5.18 5.25 
10/06/86 5.10 5.04 5.02 5.04 5.04 
09/29/86 5.15 5.18 5.17 5.17 5.07 
09/22/86 5.20 5.23 5.22 5.21 5.22 
09/15/86 5.13 5.09 5.10 5.21 5.23 
09/08/86 5.22 5.18 5.14 5.19 5.15 
09/01/86 NA 5.10 5.22 5.17 5.21 
08/25/86 5.33 5.22 5.30 5.27 5.13 
08/18/86 5.60 5.53 5.46 5.35 5.34 
08/11/86 5.60 5.59 5.55 5.57 5.54 
08/04/86 5.68 5.68 5.70 5.70 5.66 
07/28/86 5.83 5.81 5.83 5.77 5.75 
07/21/86 5.68 5.71 5.79 5.79 5.79 
07/14/86 5.76 5.73 5.75 5.71 5.69 
07/07/86 5.81 5.92 5.86 5.83 5.73 
06/30/86 5.95 5.97 5.98 5.89 NA 
06/23/86 6.05 6.06 6.06 6.06 6.00 
06/16/86 6.07 6.07 6.05 6.09 6.08 
06/09/86 6.30 6.24 6.32 6.24 6.15 
06/02/86 6.34 6.39 6.50 6.47 6.30 
05/26/86 NA 6.12 6.17 6.28 6.28 
05/19/86 6.20 6.20 6.18 6.18 6.16 
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DATE TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL TBILL 
OF MON TUES WED THURS FRI 
AUCTION ASK ASK ASK ASK ASK 
RATE RATE RATE RATE RATE 
05/12/86 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.15 6.19 
05/05/86 6.02 6.03 ·, 6. 02 6.00 6.03 
04/28/86 6.03 6.07 6.08 6.09 6.11 
04/21/86 5.84 5. 93 . 6.07 6.09 6.12 
04/14/86 5.82 5.79 5.75 5.82 5.85 
04/07/86 6.18 6'.11 5.99 5.98 5.94 
03/31/86 6.31 6.32 6.29 6.31 6.19 
03/24/86 6.32 6.36 6.39 6.32 NA 
03/17/86 6.52 6.52 6.45 6.42 6.39 
03/10/86 6.53 6.55 6.60 NA 6.50 
03/03/86 6.90 6.82 6.83 6.65 6.59 
02/24/86 6.95 7.03 7.05 7.01 7.00 
02/17/86 NA 6.94 7.06 7.09 6.94 
02/10/86 7.14 7.09 7.09 7.08 6.98 
02/03/86 6.97 6.96 6.99 7.08 7.19 
01/27/86 6.88 6.90 7.01 7.02 6.95 
01/20/86 NA 6.96 6.98 6.95 6.95 
01/13/86 7.22 7.22 7.17 7.06 7.09 
01/06/86 7.04 7.01 7.15 7.16 7.19 
12/30/85 6.99 7.03 NA 7.08 7.00 
12/23/85 7.00 7.03 NA 6.99 6.94 
12/16/85 6.98 7.02 7.11 7.08 7.03 
12/09/85 7.16 7.15 7.00 7.06 6.94 
12/02/85 7.19 7.21 7.20 7.24 7.24 
11/25/85 7.13 7.38 7.14 NA 7.14 
11/18/85 NA 7.19 7.23 7.21 7.21 
11/11/85 NA 7.20 7.23 7.30 7.33 
11/04/85 7.19 7.22 7.23 7.23 7.19 
10/28/85 7.20 7.19 7.17 7.17 7.17 
10/21/85 7.17 7.14 7.20 7.23 7.22 
10/14/85 NA 7.19 7.19 7.17 7.18 
10/07/85 7.12 7.14 7.17 7.20 7.17 
09/30/85 7.02 7.01 7.00 6.94 6.97 
09/23/85 6.76 6.82 6.85 6.92 NA 
09/16/85 7.15 7.18 7.07 7.07 6.99 
09/09/85 7.20 7.21 7.22 7.22 7.17 
09/02/85 NA 7.07 7.01 7.11 7.24 
08/26/85 7.04 7.03 7.04 7.00 7.12 
08/19/85 7.09 7.10 7.02 6.99 7.02 
08/12/85 7.10 7.12 7.07 7.17 7.09 
08/05/85 7.25 7.24 7.14 7.15 7.14 
07/29/85 7.23 7.29 
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Appendix B-3: Bid-Ask Spreads in 
Secondary Market 
DATE OF BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK 
MONDAY'S SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
AUCTION ON MON ON TUE ON WED ON THU ON FRI 
07/30/90 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
07/23/90 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
07/16/90 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
07/09/90 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
07/02/90 0.02 0.02 o.oo 0.02 0.02 
06/25/90 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
06/18/90 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 
06/11/90 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
06/04/90 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 
05/28/90 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 
05/21/90 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 
05/14/90 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 
05/07/90 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 
04/30/90 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
04/03/90 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 
04/16/90 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
04/09/90 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 
04/02/90 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
03/26/90 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 
03/19/90 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 
03/12/90 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 
03/05/90 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
02/26/90 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
02/19/90 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 
02/12/90 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 
02/05/90 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 
01/09/90 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 
01/22/90 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
01/15/90 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 
01/08/90 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 
01/01/90 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 
12/25/89 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 
12/18/89 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
12/11/89 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 
12/04/89 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 
11/27/89 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 
11/20/89 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04 
11/13/89 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 
11/06/89 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 
10/30/89 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.03 
10/23/89 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 
10/16/89 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
10/09/89 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 
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DATE OF BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK 
MONDAY'S SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
AUCTION ON MON ON TUE ON WED ON THU ON FRI 
10/02/89 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 
09/25/89 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 
09/18/89 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 
09/11/89 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 
09/04/89 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 
08/28/89 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.00 
08/21/89 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.04 
08/14/89 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 
08/07/89 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04 
07/31/89 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 
07/24/89 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 
07/17/89 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
07/10/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 
07/03/89 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 
06/26/89 0.06 o.oo 0.06 0.06 0.04 
06/19/89 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 
06/12/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
06/05/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/29/89 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/22/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/15/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/08/89 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
05/01/89 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 
04/24/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
04/17/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03 
04/10/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
04/03/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
03/27/89 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
03/20/89 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 
03/13/89 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
03/06/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/27/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/20/89 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/13/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/06/89 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
01/30/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
01/23/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
01/16/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
01/09/89 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
01/02/89 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
12/26/88 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
12/19/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
12/12/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
12/05/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
11/28/88 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
11/21/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 
11/14/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
11/07/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
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DATE OF BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK 
MONDAY'S SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
AUCTION ON MON ON TUE ON WED ON THU ON FRI 
10/31/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
10/24/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
10/17/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
10/10/88 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 
10/03/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
09/26/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 
09/19/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
09/12/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
09/05/88 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 
08/29/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
08/02/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
08/15/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
08/08/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
08/01/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
07/25/88 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
07/18/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
07/11/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
07/04/88 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 
06/27/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
06/20/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
06/13/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
06/06/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/30/88 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/23/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/16/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/09/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
05/02/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
04/25/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
04/18/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
04/11/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
04/04/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
03/28/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 
03/21/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
03/14/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
03/07/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/29/88 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 
02/22/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/15/88 o.oo 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/08/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
02/01/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
01/25/88 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
01/18/88 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 
01/04/88 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
12/28/87 0.12 0.04 o.oo o.oo 0.00 
12/21/87 0.07 3.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 
12/14/87 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
12/07/87 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 
11/30/87 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 
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DATE OF BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK 
MONDAY'S SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
AUCTION ON MON ON TUE ON WED ON THU ON FRI 
01/11/88 · 0. 07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
11/23/87 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 
11/16/87 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
11/09/87 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
11/02/87 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
10/26/87 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
10/19/87 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
10/12/87 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
10/05/87 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
09/28/87 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
09/21/87 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 
09/14/87 0.25 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.04 
09/07/87 0.00 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 
08/31/87 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
08/24/87 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.25 
08/17/87 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
08/10/87 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
08/03/87 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
07/27/87 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.10 
07/20/87 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
07/13/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
07/06/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
06/29/87 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 
06/22/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
06/15/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
06/08/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 
06/01/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
05/25/87 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 
05/18/87 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 
05/11/87 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
05/04/87 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
04/27/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 
04/20/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
04/13/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
04/06/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
03/30/87 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
03/23/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
03/16/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
03/09/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
03/02/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
02/23/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
02/16/87 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
02/09/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
02/02/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
01/26/87 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
01/19/87 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
01/12/87 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
186 
DATE OF BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK 
MONDAY'S SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
AUCTION ON MON ON TUE ON WED ON THU ON FRI 
01/05/87 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 
12/29/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 NA 
12/22/86 NA 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 
12/15/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
12/08/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
12/01/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
11/24/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 NA 0.02 
11/17/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
11/10/86 0.02 0.04 0.02 NA 0.02 
11/03/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 NA 0.02 
10/27/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.02 
10/20/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 NA 0.02 
10/13/86 0.00 0.04 0.02 NA 0.02 
10/06/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.02 
09/29/86 0~04 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 
09/22/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
09/15/86 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 
09/08/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 
09/01/86 o.oo 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.02 
08/25/86 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.04 
08/18/86 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
08/11/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
08/04/86 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 
07/28/86 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 
07/21/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
07/14/86 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 
07/07/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
06/30/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
06/23/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
06/16/86 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
06/09/86 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 
06/02/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
05/26/86 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
05/19/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
05/12/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
05/05/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
04/28/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
04/21/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
04/14/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
04/07/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
03/31/86 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 
03/24/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
03/17/86 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
03/10/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 
03/03/86 0.02 0.02 na 0.04 0.02 
02/24/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
02/17/86 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 
02/10/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
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DATE OF BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK BIDASK 
MONDAY'S SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
AUCTION ON MON ON TUE ON WED ON THU ON FRI 
02/03/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
01/27/86 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
01/20/86 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
01/13/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
01/06/86 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
12/30/85 0.04 0.02 0.00 0 .,02 0.03 
12/23/85 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 
12/16/85 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
12/09/85 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 
12/02/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
11/25/85 0.04 NA 0.04 0.00 0.02 
11/18/85 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
11/11/85 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
11/04/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
10/28/85 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 
10/21/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 
10/14/85 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
10/07/85 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
09/30/85 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
09/23/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
09/16/85 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
09/09/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 
09/02/85 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
08/26/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
08/19/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 
08/12/85 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
08/05/85 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 
07/29/85 0.00 0.04 0.02 
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Appendix B-4: Calculated Changes 
in the Ask Rates 
DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
07/30/90 0.00 -0.07 0.01 NA NA 
07/23/90 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 
07/16/90 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 o.oo 0.08 
07/09/90 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 0.21 
07/02/90 -0.03 o.oo o.oo 0.09 -0.02 
06/25/90 0.06 -0.03 -.03 o.oo 0.00 
06/18/90 0.03 0.03 000 o.oo -0.06 
06/11/90 0.03 -0.06 o.oo 0.00 0.03 
06/04/90 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
05/28/90 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.06 
05/21/90 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.03 0.06 
05/14/90 -0.03 o.oo 0.03 0.06 -0.06 
05/07/90 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 0.17 
04/30/90 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.09 
04/23/90 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
04/16/90 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 
04/09/90 o.oo o.oo -0.03 NA NA 
04/02/90 0.00 -0.09 0.03 o.oo 0.06 
03/26/90 0.13 -0.13 0.03 NA NA 
03/19/90 0.00 -0.06 o.oo o.oo 0.06 
03/12/90 0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.06 
03/05/90 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.06 
02/26/90 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 
02/19/90 o.oo 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
02/12/90 -0.10 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.00 
02/05/90 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
01/29/90 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.06 
01/22/90 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03 
01/15/90 0.11 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 -0.14 
01/08/90 0.03 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.03 
01/01/90 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 
12/25/89 0.00 0.19 -0.03 -0.13 o.oo 
12/18/89 0.07 -0.10 0.00 0.03 0.00 
12/11/89 0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.00 
12/04/89 0.09 0.10 0.06 -0.10 -0.15 
11/27/89 0.10 o.oo -0.07 -0.06 0.03 
11/20/89 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09 
11/13/89 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 0.13 -0.03 
11/06/89 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 
10/30/89 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 0.18 -0.09 
10/23/89 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.13 -0.17 
10/16/89 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.17 
10/09/89 o.oo 0.13 -0.10 -0.61 0.58 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
10/02/89 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.18 0.23 
09/25/89 0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.11 -0.22 
09/18/89 0.15 0.12 -0.08 0.06 -0.25 
09/11/89 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 
09/04/89 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.03 
08/28/89 0.06 -0.12 0.02 NA NA 
08/21/89 0.16 -0.11 -0.13 0.09 -0.01 
08/14/89 -0.03 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 0.18 
08/07/89 o.oo -0.06 -0.04 0.13 -0.03 
07/31/89 0.00 -0.16 0.06 0.29 -0.19 
07/24/89 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 0.09 0.23 
07/17/89 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.13 -0.23 
07/10/89 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 -0.08 
07/03/89 NA -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 NA 
06/26/89 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.07 0.13 
06/19/89 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.14 0.14 
06/12/89 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
06/05/89 0.03 -0.08· 
-0.02 0.12 -0.05 
05/29/89 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.15 0.00 
05/22/89 -0.05 0.08 0.15 0.01 -0.19 
05/15/89 0.06 0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.20 
05/08/89 0.14 0.00 -0.18 -0.12 0.16 
05/01/89 -0.07 -0.17 0.03 0.02 0.19 
04/24/89 -0.01 -0.12 -0.10 0.02 0.21 
04/17/89 -0.12 -0.03 0.18 0.07 -0.10 
04/10/89 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.13 0.06 
04/03/89 -0.08 0.05 -0.07 0.05 0.05 
03/27/89 0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.07 0.18 
03/20/89 0.02 -0.08 0.04 NA NA 
03/13/89 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.15 -0.19 
03/06/89 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.11 
02/27/89 0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.05 
02/20/89 o.oo 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.00 
02/13/89 0.03 -0.06 o.oo 0.01 0.02 
02/06/89 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.07 0.01 
01/30/89 0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.10 -0.20 
01/23/89 -0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 
01/16/89 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 
01/09/89 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.13 
01/02/89 o.oo 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 
12/26/88 8.09 0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -8.07 
12/19/88 0.07 -0.10 -0.03 o.oo 0.06 
12/12/88 0.11 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.16 
12/05/88 -0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.12 
11/28/88 -0.05 -0.15 0.02 0.21 -0.03 
11/21/88 0.07 -0.01 o.oo 0.00 -0.09 
11/14/88 0.13 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.13 
11/07/88 0.09 -0.01 0.07 o.oo -0.15 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
10/31/88 o.oo 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.12 
10/24/88 -0.05 -0.04 ~0.02 0.00 0.11 
10/17/88 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.11 
10/10/88 o.oo 0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.08 
10/03/88 0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.06 
09/26/88 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 
09/19/88 0.02 -o .. 02 0.03 0.02 -0.05 
09/12/88 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
09/05/88 0.00 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
08/29/88 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.01 
08/22/88 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07 -0.16 
08/15/88 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 
08/08/88 0.14 -0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.10 
08/01/88 0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.08 -0.09 
07/25/88 0.07 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 
07/18/88 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
07/11/88 0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 
07/04/88 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.00 
06/27/88 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 
06/20/88 0.14 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 
06/13/88 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 0.09 0.05 
06/06/88 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.01 
05/30/88 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
05/23/88 -0.01 0.03 0.11 0.01 -0.14 
05/16/88 0.08 ~0.08 -0.07 0.12 -0.05 
05/09/88 0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 
05/02/88 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.22 
04/25/88 0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.01 -0.13 
04/18/88 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
04/11/88 -0.04 -0.08 -0.16 0.20 0.08 
04/04/88 0.12 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 
03/28/88 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 NA NA 
03/21/88 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.13 0.07 
03/14/88 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.11 -0.11 
03/07/88 o.oo 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
02/29/88 NA -0.02 0.00 0.12 NA 
02/22/88 0.02 o.oo 0.01 -0.05 0.02 
02/15/88 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 
02/08/88 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.11 -0.12 
02/01/88 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
01/25/88 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.18 
01/18/88 0.08 -0.13 0.02 -0.03 0.06 
01/11/88 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.03 
01/04/88 0.08 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.05 
12/28/87 0.33 0.00 o.oo o.oo NA 
12/21/87 0.02 -0.13 -0.03 NA NA 
12/14/87 0.01 o.oo 0.00 -0.06 0.05 
12/07/87 0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.12 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
11/30/87 0.19 -0.13 -0.06 0.11 -0.11 
11/23/87 -0. 01. -0.04 NA NA 0.09 
11/16/87 -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 0.05 0.26 
11/09/87 -0.01 -0.05 0.18 0.11 -0.23 
11/02/87 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.14 -0.04 
10/26/87 0.08 -0.21 0.01 0.25 -0.13 
10/19/87 -0.74 -0.32 -0.28 0.00 1. 34 
10/12/87 0.08 0.23 -0.11 -0 .. 17 -0.03 
10/05/87 0.14 o.oo 0.13 0.03 -0.30 
09/28/87 0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.16 
09/21/87 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.13 
09/14/87 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.28 
09/07/87 NA 0.18 -0.10 0.02 NA 
08/31/87 0.08 -0.04 0.11 0.19 -0.34 
08/24/87 0.18 0.05 0.02 -0.19 -0.06 
08/17/87 0.18 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.26 
08/10/87 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.18 
08/03/87 0.05 0.01 -0.12 0.11 -0.05 
07/27/87 0.10 0.03 -0.18 0.14 -0.09 
07/20/87 0.13 0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.42 
07/13/87 -0.03 0.03 o.oo -0.02 0.02 
07/06/87 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
06/29/87 -0.13 0.10 -0.07 NA NA 
06/22/87 0.07 0.11 0.01 -0.06 -0.13 
06/15/87 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
06/08/87 -0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 
06/01/87 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.26 
05/25/87 NA 0.08 0.07 -0.04 NA 
05/18/87 -0.09 -0.09 -0.16 0.05 0.29 
05/11/87 0.03 -0.09 0.22 0.28 -0.44 
05/04/87 0.05 -0.33 0.05 -0.07 0.30 
04/27/87 0.04 -0.11 -0.20 0.14 0.13 
04/20/87 -0.16 -0.08 0.07 0.27 -0.10 
04/13/87 -0.05 -0.24 -0.12 NA NA 
04/06/87 0.00 -0.01 0.25 0.10 -0.34 
03/30/87 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.15 
03/23/87 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.08 
03/16/87 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.09 
03/09/87 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 
03/02/87 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.12 -0.16 
02/23/87 0.01 0.01 o. 00 · o.oo -0.02 
02/16/87 NA -0.08 -0.15 -0.02 NA 
02/09/87 0.08 0.04 -0.14 -0.07 0.09 
02/02/87 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 
01/26/87 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.12 -0.14 
01/19/87 NA 0.06 0.07 0.02 NA 
01/12/87 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.04 
01/05/87 -0.22 0.11 o.oo -0.05 0.16 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
12/29/86 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 NA NA 
12/22/86 -0.94 0.02 NA NA 0.92 
12/15/86 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.09 0.05 
12/08/86 0.01 0.01 0.00 o.oo -0.02 
12/01/86 0.03 o.oo -0.01 0.04 -0.06 
11/24/86 0.06 o.oo NA NA -0.06 
11/17/86 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.02 
11/10/86 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 o.oo 
11/03/86 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.12 
10/27/86 0.02 o.oo -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
10/20/86 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.03 
10/13/86 NA 0.07 0.02 0.07 NA 
10/06/86 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06 
09/29/86 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.08 
09/22/86 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
09/15/86 -0.04 .01 .11 0.02 -0.10 
09/08/86 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.07 
09/01/86 NA 0.12 -0.05 0.04 NA 
08/25/86 -0.11 0.08 -0.03 -0.14 0.20 
08/18/86 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 0.26 
08/11/86 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.06 
08/04/86 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.02 
07/28/86 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 
07/21/86 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.11 
07/14/86 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 
07/07/86 0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.10 0.08 
06/30/86 0.02 0.01 -0.09 NA NA 
06/23/86 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.05 
06/16/86 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
06/09/86 -0.06 0.08 -0.08 -0.09 0.15 
06/02/86 0.05 0.11 -0.03 -0.17 0.04 
05/26/86 NA 0.05 0.11 0.00 NA 
05/19/86 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.04 
05/12/86 0.00 o.oo 0.08 0.04 -0.12 
05/05/86 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 
04/28/86 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.08 
04/21/86 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.03 -0.28 
04/14/86 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.03 
04/07/86 -0.07 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 0.24 
03/31/86 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.12 0.12 
03/24/86 0.04 0.03 -0.07 NA NA 
03/17/86 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 
03/10/86 0.02 0.05 NA NA 0.03 
03/03/86 -0.08 0.01 -0.18 -0.06 0.31 
02/24/86 0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 
02/17/86 NA 0.12 0.03 -0.15 NA 
02/10/86 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 0.16 
02/03/86 -0.1 0.03 0.09 0.11 -0.22 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK IN ASK 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
01/27/86 0.0 0.11 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 
01/20/86 NA 0.02 -0.03 0.00 NA 
01/13/86 o.oo -0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.13 
01/06/86 -0.03 0.14 0.01 0.03 -0.15 
12/30/85 0.04 NA NA -0.08 -0.01 
12/23/85 0.03 NA NA -0.05 0.06 
12/16/85 0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
12/09/85 -0.01 -0.15 0.06 -0.12 0.22 
12/02/85 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.05 
11/25/85 0.25 -0.24 NA NA -0.01 
11/18/85 NA 0.04 -0.02 0.00 NA 
11/11/85 NA 0.03 0.07 0.03 NA 
11/04/85 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
10/28/85 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 
10/21/85 -0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 
10/14/85 NA 0.00 -0.02 0.01 NA 
10/07/85 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 
09/30/85 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.05 
09/23/85 0.06 0.03 0.07 NA NA 
09/16/85 0.03 -0.11 0.00 -0.08 0.16 
09/09/85 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.03 
09/02/85 NA -0.06 0.10 0.13 NA 
08/26/85 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.12 -0.08 
08/19/85 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.07 
08/12/85 0.02 -0.05 0.10 -0.08 0.01 
08/05/85 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.11 
07/29/85 0.00 0.00 NA 0.06 NA 
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Appendix B-5: Changes in the 
Bid-Ask Spreads 
DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
AUCTION IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD 
M TO TU TU TOW . W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
07/30/90 o.oo o.oo 0.00 -0.02 0.02 
07/23/90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
07/16/90 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
07/09/90 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.00 
07/02/90 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
06/25/90 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 o.oo 0.01 
06/18/90 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 
06/11/90 -0.03 o.oo o.oo 0.02 0.01 
06/04/90 o.oo 0.02 -0.01 o.oo -0.01 
05/28/90 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
05/21/90 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
05/14/90 0.01 0.01 -0~02 0.01 -0.01 
05/07/90 -0.02 0.01 o.oo 0.02 -0.01 
04/30/90 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
04/23/90 0.00 o.oo 0.04 -0.04 0.00 
04/16/90 0.01 o.oo 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
04/09/90 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 o.oo 
04/02/90 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
03/26/90 o.oo 0.01 0.01 0.00 o.oo 
03/19/90 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
03/12/90 -0.01 0.02 0.00 o.oo -0.01 
03/05/90 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
02/26/90 0.01 -0.01 o.oo 0.01 -0.01 
02/19/90 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 o.oo 
02/12/90 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 o.oo 
02/05/90 -0.02 0.01 o.oo -0.01 0.02 
01/29/90 -0.01 o.oo -0.02 0.01 0.02 
01/22/90 0.01 · o. 00 -0.01 0.00 o.oo 
01/15/90 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
01/08/90 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
01/01/90 o.oo 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 o.oo 
12/25/89 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
12/18/89 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
12/11/89 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 o.oo 
12/04/89 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 
11/27/89 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.04 
11/20/89 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
11/13/89 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
11/06/89 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 
10/30/89 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 
10/23/89 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
10/16/89 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
10/09/89 -0.01 0.03 o.oo -0.03 0.01 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
10/02/89 -0.04 0.03 o.oo -0.03 0.04 
09/25/89 o.oo -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.01 
09/18/89 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.04 
09/11/89 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
09/04/89 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.04 
08/28/89 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
08/21/89 -0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
08/14/89 -0.02 0.02 o.oo -0.02 0.02 
08/07/89 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 
07/31/89 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
07/24/89 o.oo 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
07/17/89 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
07/10/89 0.00 o.oo 0.02 -0.02 o.oo 
07/03/89 o.oo -0.02 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
06/26/89 0.00 0.00 o.oo -0.02 0.02 
06/19/89 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
06/12/89 o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.00 
06/05/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
05/29/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
05/22/89 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
05/15/89 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 
05/08/89 -0.03 o.oo 0.00 -0.01 0.04 
05/01/89 0.00 0.03 o.oo -0.03 o.oo 
04/24/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
04/17/89 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.01 
04/10/89 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
04/03/89 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
03/27/89 -0.01 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.01 
03/20/89 0.00 -0.01 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
03/13/89 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
03/06/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
02/27/89 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 
02/20/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
02/13/89 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
02/06/89 · 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
01/30/89 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/23/89 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
01/16/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/09/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
01/02/89 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
12/26/88 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/19/88 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
12/12/88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
12/05/88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11/28/88 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 o.oo 0.02 
11/21/88 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
11/14/88 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
11/07/88 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
10/31/88 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.02 
10/24/88 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/17/88 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
10/10/88 o.oo -0.02 o.oo o.oo 0.02 
10/03/88 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
09/26/88 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 0.02 o.oo 
09/19/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
09/12/88 -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.02 
09/05/88 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
08/29/88 -0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.02 
08/22/88 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
08/15/88 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
08/08/88 -0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.02 
08/01/88 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
07/25/88 -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.02 
07/18/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
07/11/88 -0.03 o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.03 
07/04/88 o.oo -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
06/27/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00· 0.03 
06/20/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.03 
06/13/88 -0.03 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.03 
06/06/88 -0.03 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.03 
05/30/88 0.00 -0.03 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
05/23/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
05/16/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.03 
05/09/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
05/02/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
04/25/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
04/18/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
04/11/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.03 
04/04/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
03/28/88 0.00 o.oo -0.02 o.oo 0.00 
03/21/88 -0.03 o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.03 
03/14/88 -0.03 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.03 
03/07/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
02/29/88 0.04 o.oo o.oo -0.02 -0.02 
02/22/88 -0.03 o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.03 
02/15/88 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
02/08/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
02/01/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
01/25/88 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
01/18/88 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 
01/11/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
01/04/88 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
12/28/87 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 
12/21/87• 2.97 -3.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
12/14/87 -0.03 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.03 
12/07/87 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.08 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
11/30/87 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
11/23/87 -0.03 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.03 
11/16/87 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
11/09/87 o.oo 0.00 o.oo o.oo o.oo 
11/02/87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
10/26/87 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
10/19/87 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
10/12/87 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
10/05/87 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
09/28/87 -0.08 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.08 
09/21/87 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 o.oo 
09/14/87 -0.15 -0.06 o.oo o.oo 0.21 
09/07/87 0.00 -0.15 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
08/31/87 -0.15 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.15 
08/24/87 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.15 o.oo 
08/17/87 -0.15 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.15 
08/10/87 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 
08/03/87 -0.15 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.15 
07/27/87 o.oo 0.00 0.20 -0.15 -0.05 
07/20/87 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
07/13/87 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.02 
07/06/87 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 0.02 0.00 
06/29/87 o.oo -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
06/22/87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
06/15/87 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
06/08/87 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
06/01/87 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.02 -0.02 
05/25/87 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.00 o.oo 
05/18/87 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 
05/11/87 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 
05/04/87 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 
04/27/87 o.oo 0.00 0.02 o.oo -0.02 
04/20/87 -0.02 o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.02 
04/13/87 -0.02 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
04/06/87 -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.02 
03/30/87 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
03/23/87 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.02 -0.02 
03/16/87 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 
03/09/87 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
03/02/87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
02/23/87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
02/16/87 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
02/09/87 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
02/02/87 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
01/26/87 o.oo 0.00 o.oo o.oo o.oo 
01/19/87 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
01/12/87 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
01/05/87 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.00 o.oo 
198 
DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
12/29/86 o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00 -5.47 
12/22/86 1. 00 0.00 0.00 o.oo -1.00 
12/15/86 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/08/86 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
12/01/86 -0.02 o. 00 · o.oo 0.00 0.02 
11/24/86 -0.02 0.00 5.36 -5.36 0.02 
11/17/86 -0.02 o.oo 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
11/10/86 0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.12 o.oo 
11/03/86 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.08 0.02 
10/27/86 o.oo 0.00 0.08 -0.08 o.oo 
10/20/86 o.oo o.oo -0.06 0.06 o.oo 
10/13/86 o.oo -0.02 -0.14 0.14 o.oo 
10/06/86 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.13 0.00 
09/29/86 -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.02 
09/22/86 -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.02 
09/15/86 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
09/08/86 o.oo 0.00 -0.02 0.02 o.oo 
09/01/86 o.oo -0.02 0.10 -0.10 o.oo 
08/25/86 0.05 -0.05 o.oo 0.00 -0.02 
08/18/86 0.02 0.00 -0.02 o.oo o.oo 
08/11/86 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
08/04/86 o.oo -0.02 o.oo 0.02 o.oo 
07/28/86 0.01 -0.03 o.oo 0.00 0.02 
07/21/86 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
07/14/86 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 o.oo 
07/07/86 -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.02 
06/30/86 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
06/23/86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
06/16/86 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
06/09/86 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 
06/02/86 0.00 o.oo 0.02 -0.02 o.oo 
05/26/86 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
05/19/86 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
05/12/86 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
05/05/86 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
04/28/86 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 o.oo 
04/21/86 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
04/14/86 -0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.02 
04/07/86 o.oo 0.00 0.02 -0.02 o.oo 
03/31/86 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 
03/24/86 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 
03/17/86 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 
03/10/86 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
03/03/86 0.00 -1.00 1.02 -0.02 0.00 
02/24/86 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
02/17/86 o.oo -0.02 o.oo 0.02 o.oo 
02/10/86 -0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.02 o.oo 
02/03/86 o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
199 
DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD IN SPREAD 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
01/27/86 -0.02 o.oo o.oo 0.00 0.02 
01/20/86 o.oo -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
01/13/86 0.00 o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.00 
01/06/86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/30/85 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
12/23/85 -0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.02 
12/16/85 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/09/85 o.oo o.oo -0.02 0.02 0.00 
12/02/85 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
11/25/85 -0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.02 
11/18/85 0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
11/11/85 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
11/04/85 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
10/28/85 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 o.oo 
10/21/85 -0.02 o.oo 0.04 -0.04 0.02 
10/14/85 o.oo -0.02 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
10/07/85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
09/30/85 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 o.oo 
09/23/85 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
09/16/85 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 o.oo 0.02 
09/09/85 -0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.02 0.00 
09/02/85 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 o.oo 
08/26/85 -0.02 o.oo 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
08/19/85 -0.02 o.oo 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
08/12/85 -0.02 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.02 
08/05/85 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 o.oo 0.02 
07/29/85 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
APPENDIX C 
PERCENT COMPETITIVE BIDS ACCEPTED 
AND PERCENT OVERBID 
DATE OF %CO:t-1P % OVER 
MONDAY'S ACCEPTED SUBSCRIBED 
AUCTION 
07/30/90 88.66 68.84 
07/23/90 83.70 68.84 
07 /16/90 83.81 65.27 
07/09/90 82.95 61.19 
07/02/90 82.55 74.78 
06/25/90 81. 69 66.28 
06/18/90 85.75 74.16 
06/11/90 82.37 66.21 
06/04/90 83.31 73.28 
05/28/90 84.16 70.46 
05/21/90 83.14 71. 63 
05/14/90 79.34 74.10 
05/07/90 81.39 65.77 
04/30/90 88.25 70.19 
04/23/90 81.56 64.87 
04/16/90 82.60 69.03 
04/09/90 79.76 71. 75 
04/02/90 81.42 70.05 
03/26/90 80.63 63.53 
03/19/90 84.54 71. 00 
03/12/90 80.00 71.11 
03/05/90 82.26 69.76 
02/26/90 83.38 96.18 
02/19/90 81.30 67.59 
02/12/90 87.59 66.44 
02/05/90 80.59 75.73 
01/29/90 87.37 82.31 
01/22/90 81.13 64.91 
01/15/90 82.45 69.86 
01/08/90 80.94 68.53 
01/01/90 82.88 71.41 
12/25/89 85.50 62.76 
12/18/89 87.27 68.94 
12/11/89 83.81 66.04 
12/04/89 84.44 62.65 
200 
201 
DATE OF· %COMP % OVER 
MONDAY'S ACCEPTED SUBSCRIBED 
AUCTION 
11/27/89 85.01 59.65 
11/20/89 83.10 68.82 
11/13/89 81.54 67.74 
11/06/89 84.70 71. 05 
10/30/89 93.96 79.08 
10/23/89 83.47 67.62 
10/16/89 85.27 66.71 
10/09/89 81. 91 67.56 
10/02/89 82.85 73.26 
09/25/89 84.69 68.98 
09/18/89 87.92 71. 26 
09/11/89 72.63 69.71 
09/04/89 83.29 72.11 
08/28/89 83.14 67.49 
08/21/89 83.69 66.75 
08/14/89 81.49 74.43 
08/07/89 81.54 71. 34 
07/31/89 76.71 77.02 
07/24/89 78.29 69.36 
07/17/89 81.17 73.43 
07/10/89 79.88 69.23 
07/03/89 80.28 74.07 
06/26/89 81.96 74.07 
06/19/89 84.81 73.10 
06/12/89 80.23 79.10 
06/05/89 80.19 79.21 
05/29/89 81.92 71.26 
05/22/89 82.03 69.77 
05/15/89 76.02 73.16 
05/08/89 80.72 72.23 
05/01/89 81.85 70.54 
04/24/89 82.00 65.64 
04/17/89 82.00 68.98 
04/10/89 78.85 72.84 
04/03/89 79.14 68.86 
03/27/89 82.58 71. 03 
03/20/89 85.60 73.55 
03/13/89 79.73 68.06 
03/06/89 79.63 79.73 
02/27/89 80.69 72.53 
02/20/89 80.39 72.07 
02/13/89 92.06 74.87 
02/06/89 81. 07 69.74 
01/30/89 80.52 70.12 
01/23/89 81.32 69.22 
01/16/89 81.49 70.78 
01/09/89 77.11 74.86 
01/02/89 81.58 75.05 
202 
DATE OF %COMP % OVER 
MONDAY'S ACCEPTED SUBSCRIBED 
AUCTION 
12/26/88 84.77 69.81 
12/19/88 87.29 71.95 
12/12/88 82.74 74.68 
12/05/88 82.18 74.81 
11/28/88 84.27 74.42 
11/21/88 82.46 76.48 
11/14/88 84.50 67.82 
11/07/88 83.91 70.27 
10/31/88 83.42 73.86 
10/24/88 84.37 71.18 
10/17/88 86.83 75.59 
10/10/88. 82.51 70.08 
10/03/88 84.00 74.58 
09/26/88 87.16 68.58 
09/19/88 90.12 75.90 
09/12/88 84.69 76.15 
09/05/88 85.53 69.62 
08/29/88 85.20 69.81 
08/22/88 85.59 71.50 
08/15/88 34.49 93.03 
08/08/88 83.20 72.44 
08/01/88 82.60 70.78 
07/25/88 84.75 68.46 
07/18/88 86.29 79.67 
07/11/88 82.61 73.70 
07/04/88 83.58 82.07 
06/27/88 86.27 73.46 
06/20/88 90.51 72.52 
06/13/88 83.37 75.09 
06/06/88 84.83 75.29 
05/30/88 84.57 76.20 
05/23/88 85.06 76.81 
05/16/88 83.39 77.44 
05/09/88 83.00 73.09 
05/02/88 83.72 75.08 
04/25/88 84.46 71. 05 
04/18/88 86.20 76.46 
04/11/88 81.32 75.73 
04/04/88 84.31 76.88 
03/28/88 86.67 74.01 
03/21/88 91.22 72.90 
03/14/88 82.27 77.64 
03/07/88 83.94 78.70 
02/29/88 84.03 76.92 
02/22/88 86.24 74.27 
02/15/88 80.70 68.91 
02/08/88 81. 33 77.21 
02/01/88 82.37 74.28 
01/25/88 81.95 77.58 
203 
DATE OF %COMP % OVER 
MONDAY'S ACCEPTED SUBSCRIBED 
AUCTION 
01/18/88 74.56 71. 68 
01/11/88 79.59 77.98 
01/04/88 82.74 70.50 
12/28/87 89.36 72.26 
12/21/87 91.08 71. 77 
12/14/87 85.03 71.56 
12/07/87 85.89 68.23 
11/30/87 85.71 69.81 
11/23/87 85.01 69.60 
11/16/87 84.84 77.92 
11/09/87 84.15 74.52 
11/02/87 81. 62 68.24 
10/26/87 82.05 68.36 
10/19/87 88.45 67.50 
10/12/87 81.85 65.93 
10/05/87 81.82 69.83 
09/28/87 84.48 71. 65 
09/21/87 0.00 0.00 
09/14/87 84.66 73.39 
09/07/87 85.72 71.82 
08/31/87 84.33 77.32 
08/24/87 86.01 74.59 
08/17/87 85.37 73.68 
08/10/87 85 .. 08 74.07 
08/03/87 83.09 79.22 
07/27/87 91.14 73.50 
07/20/87 0.00 o.oo 
07/13/87 84.01 72.91 
07/06/87 83.72 75.11 
06/29/87 86.53 81. 89 
06/22/87 85.86 75.00 
06/15/87 84.58 76.96 
06/08/87 84.10 74.54 
06/01/87 84.06 75.00 
05/25/87 83.40 71. 69 
05/18/87 83.44 70.15 
05/11/87 82.72 68.36 
05/04/87 82.54 70.78 
04/27/87 83.21 69.79 
04/20/87 82.68 77.35 
04/13/87 81.54 74.44 
04/06/87 80.98 79.90 
03/30/87 83.84 73.98 
03/23/87 84.32 76.59 
03/16/87 82.72 73.32 
03/09/87 83.94 78.40 
03/02/87 82.73 77.41 
02/23/87 84.89 77.74 
02/16/87 83.07 78.11 
204 
DATE OF %COMP % OVER 
MONDAY'S ACCEPTED SUBSCRIBED 
AUCTION 
02/09/87 85.46 80.01 
02/02/87 83.77 84.22 
01/26/87 85.42 75.40 
01/19/87 84.58 81.22 
01/12/87 83.54 80.14 
01/05/87 8.37 -132.56 
12/29/86 86.97 71. 71 
12/22/86 87.76 67.16 
12/15/86 87.70 71.40 
12/08/86 87.70 68.05 
12/01/86 88.02 71. 66 
11/24/86 88. 2.8 72.17 
11/17/86 87.63 77.69 
11/10/86 87.20 69.82 
11/03/86 87.39 70.57 
10/27/86 86.93 73.74 
10/20/86 86.69 72.96 
10/13/86 84.18 69.31 
10/06/86 83.36 72.36 
09/29/86 83.62 76.55 
09/22/86 88.64 70.79 
09/15/86 87.78 68.03 
09/08/86 88.06 72.78 
09/01/86 87.17 70.46 
08/25/86 88.15 73.33 
08/18/86 87.10 72.55 
08/11/86 80.67 77.29 
08/04/86 86.23 80.15 
07/28/86 87.42 69.78 
07/21/86 86.95 70.41 
07/14/86 85. 46 · 68.60 
07/07/86 99.04 76.17 
06/30/86 85.81 67.96 
06/23/86 86.96 72.29 
06/16/86 85.31 70.43 
06/09/86 83.95 67.70 
06/02/86 84.10 69.18 
05/26/86 85.49 66.13 
05/19/86 83.67 68.19 
05/12/86 83.09 74.02 
05/05/86 84.42 76.48 
04/28/86 84.77 69.98 
04/21/86 84.83 72.78 
04/14/86 82.91 74.76 
04/07/86 82.51 72.42 
03/31/86 84.99 73.62 
03/24/86 85.43 68.78 
03/17/86 84.41 71. 07 
03/10/86 84.28 73.32 
205 
DATE OF %COMP % OVER 
MONDAY'S ACCEPTED SUBSCRIBED 
AUCTION 
03/03/86 82.97 78.35 
02/24/86 85.33 64.45 
02/17/86 82.88 68.76 
02/10/86 83.39 72.56 
02/03/86 82.88 70.85 
01/27/86 83.63 67.20 
01/20/86 81.98 64.39 
01/13/86 82.77 65.08 
01/06/86 82.37 72.26 
12/30/85 85.28 61.45 
12/23/85 86.65 60.72 
12/16/85 . 86. 06 60.99 
12/09/85 86.80 62.92 
12/02/85 84.98 59.15 
11/25/85 86.07 64.65 
11/18/85 84.98 72.34 
11/11/85 82.62 66.36 
11/04/85 82.85 64.86 
10/28/85 82.92 65.53 
10/21/85 81.16 76.52 
10/14/85 81.25 65.05 
10/07/85 80.49 64.01 
09/30/85 82.17 67.80 
09/23/85 76.96 76.44 
09/16/85 83.64 69.26 
09/09/85 83.61 66.11 
09/02/85 84.08 59.43 
08/26/85 85.07 62.00 
08/19/85 83.83 60.99 
08/12/85 82.82 60.19 
08/05/85 82.85 77.61 
07/29/85 83.41 63.26 
APPENDIX D 
DAILY CHANGE IN THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE 
DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW w TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
07/30/90 NA 0.00 o.oo 0.00 NA 
07/23/90 -0.19 2.06 -2.00 0.00 0.13 
07/16/90 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
07/09/90 0.06 -1. 38 1. 31 -0.19 0.19 
07/02/90 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.13 
06/25/90 -0.13 -0.25 0.38 -0.88 0.88 
06/18/90 0.06 -0.06 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
06/11/90 -0.06 3.81 -3.63 -0.06 -0.06 
06/04/90 0.00 -0.06 0.13 0.00 -0.06 
05/28/90 0.00 -1. 00 1. 06 0.00 0.00 
05/21/90 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 
05/14/90 0.13 -1. 38 1. 25 0.00 0.00 
05/07/90 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.06 
04/30/90 -1. 25 0.00 1. 31 -0.06 0.00 
04/23/90 -0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.13 0.13 
04/16/90 -0.19 0.25 -0.25 -0.06 0.25 
04/09/90 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.50 0.44 
04/02/90 -0.25 0.25 -0.25 -0.06 0.31 
03/26/90 o.oo 0.00 0.06 -0.25 0.19 
03/19/90 -0.06 0.31 -0.25 -0.06 0.06 
03/12/90 0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.00 
03/05/90 0.00 0.63 -0.44 0.00 -0.19 
02/26/90 -0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.19 0.13 
02/19/90 0.00 0.19 -0.19 0.00 0.00 
02/12/90 0.00 0.06 0.25 -0.31 0.00 
02/05/90 -0.06 -0.13 0.19 0.06 -0.06 
01/29/90 -0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.13 0.13 
01/22/90 0.00 0.31 -0.25 0.00 -0.06 
01/15/90 0.00 -0.13 -0.06 0.00 0.00 
01/08/90 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 o.oo 0.06 
01/01/90 0.00 -0.25 -0.13 0.00 0.00 
12/25/89 0.00 0.50 0.38 -3.13 o.oo 
12/18/89 -0.19 0.00 -0.19 -0.13 0.50 
12/11/89 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.19 
12/04/89 0.00 -0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.13 
11/27/89 -0.75 0.13 -0.19 -0.19 1. 00 
11/20/89 -0.06 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.25 
11/13/89 0.13 0.25 -0.19 -0.13 -0.06 
206 
207 
DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW w TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
11/06/89 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
10/30/89 0.19 0.06 -0.25 0.00 o.oo 
10/23/89 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 
10/16/89 -0.06 0.19 -0.19 0.06 0.00 
10/09/89 0.00 -0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.00 
10/02/89 -0.38 0.13 -0.13 -0.13 0.50 
09/25/89 -0.19 0.06 0.50 -1.13 0.75 
09/18/89 -0.13 1.00 -0.88 0.00 0.00 
09/11/89 -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.06 
09/04/89 -0.06 -0.63 0.75 -0.06 0.00 
08/28/89 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 o.oo 
08/21/89 0.06 1.50 -1. 50 -0.13 0.06 
08/14/89 0.06 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 0.13 
08/07/89 0.00 0.69 -0.56 -0.06 -0.06 
07/31/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.06 
07/24/89 0.00 -3.13 3.00 0.13 0.00 
07/17/89 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.13 
07/10/89 -0.13 0.50 -0.38 -0.19 0.19 
07/03/89 0.00 0.25 -0.31 -0.19 0.00 
06/26/89 -0.13 -0.13 0.25 -0.25 0.25 
06/19/89 0.00 0.19 0.13 -0.38 0.06 
06/12/89 -0.13 -2.25 2.88 -0.44 -0.06 
06/05/89 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.25 
05/29/89 0.00 1.13 -1.13 -0.19 0.00 
05/22/89 -0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.13 0.13 
05/15/89 -0.44 0.75 -0.50 0.00 0.19 
05/08/89 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.06 
05/01/89 -0.06 0.44 -0.25 -0.19 0.06 
04/24/89 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.06 
04/17/89 -0.44 4.50 -4.06 -0.13 0.13 
04/10/89 -0.13 0.06 0.00 0.06 o.oo 
04/03/89 -3.38 -0.50 3.81 0.00 0.06 
03/27/89 -0.06 0.00 0.06 o.oo 0.00 
03/20/89 -0. 06, 0.75 -0.56 -0.06 -0.06 
03/13/89 0.00 0.13 -0.13 0.19 -0.19 
03/06/89 -0.13 5.38 -5.19 0.00 -0.06 
02/27/89 0.00 -0.06 o.oo -0.88 0.94 
02/20/89 0.00 4.69 -4.31 0.06 0.00 
02/13/89 0.13 0.13 -0.06 -0.19 0.00 
02/06/89 0.50 1. 25 -1.06 0.06 -0.75 
01/30/89 0.00 -0.19 0.06 -0.06 0.19 
01/23/89 -0.06 0.94 -0.81 0.00 -0.06 
01/16/89 0.00 -0.31 0.13 -0.06 0.00 
01/09/89 0.13 -0.25 0.19 -0.06 0.00 
01/02/89 0.00 -1. 00 -0.69 0.81 0.00 
12/26/88 0.00 0.69 0.00 -3.13 0.00 
12/19/88 -0.13 o.oo 0.00 -0.88 1. 00 
12/12/88 -0.44 1. 38 -0.25 -0.25 -0.44 
208 
DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW w TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
12/05/88 -0.13 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.13 
11/28/88 -0.56 na na -0.06 -0.19 
11/21/88 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.13 
11/14/88 0.25 -2.63 2.38 0.00 0.00 
11/07/88 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/31/88 0.00 0.19 -0.25 0.00 0.06 
10/24/88 0.06 -0.19 0.06 0.06 0.00 
10/17/88 -0.13 0.19 -0.19 -0.06 0.19 
10/10/88 0.00 -0.13 0.06 0.31 0.00 
10/03/88 -0.69 12.25 -11.69 -0.13 0.25 
09/26/88 -0.06 o.oo 0.31 0.00 -0.25 
09/19/88 0.06 1. 88 -1. 75 -0.06 -0.13 
09/12/88 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.25 0.13 
09/05/88 0.00 -0.13 0.63 0.00 0.00 
08/29/88 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.13 0.00 
08/22/88 -0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.13 -0.13 
08/15/88 -0.25 0.06 0.00 -0.13 0.31 
08/08/88 -0.13 0.38 0.13 0.00 -0.38 
08/01/88 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
07/25/88 -0.19 -0.25 0.38 -0.06 0.13 
07/18/88 -0.13 0.00 0.13 -0.13 0.13 
07/11/88 -0.13 0.81 -0.50 0.06 -0.25 
07/04/88 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.13 0.00 
06/27/88 -0.06 0.38 0.25 -0.50 -0.06 
06/20/88 -0.19 0.13 0.06 -0.06 0.06 
06/13/88 -0.13 2.75 -2.44 -0.13 -0.06 
06/06/88 -0.13 -0.06 0.06 o.oo 0.13 
05/30/88 0.00 -0.13 -0.13 -0.06 0.00 
05/23/88 -0.06 0.44 0.25 -0.50 -0.13 
05/16/88 -0.69 -0.63 1.25 0.13 -0.06 
05/09/88 0.00 -0.19 0.13 0.06 0.00 
05/02/88 -0.38 0.13 0.38 0.06 -0.19 
04/25/88 -0.13 0.50 -0.13 -0.25 0.00 
04/18/88 0.25 1.25 -1. 38 0.00 -0.13 
04/11/88 -0.06 -0.13 0.06 0.25 -0.13 
04/04/88 0.31 0.69 -0.63 -0.13 -0.25 
03/28/88 -0.06 0.13 1. 38 -1. 25 -0.19 
03/21/88 0.00 1. 88 -1.63 0.00 -0.25 
03/14/88 -0.13 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.19 
03/07/88 0.06 2.56 -2.38 0.00 -0.25 
02/29/88 na -0.13 -0.06 0.06 na 
02/22/88 -0.13 0.25 -0.31 -0.06 0.25 
02/15/88 0.00 -0.25 -0.13 0.06 0.00 
02/08/88 -2.25 2.25 0.25 0.25 -0.50 
02/01/88 0.00 -0.06 -0.25 0.00 0.31 
01/25/88 -0.19 0.00 0.06 0.19 -0.06 
01/18/88 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.13 0.00 
01/11/88 -0.25 0.25 0.00 0.13 -0.13 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW w TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
01/04/88 -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 0.00 0.44 
12/28/87 0 0.00 o.oo o.oo 7.13 
12/21/87 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 o.oo 
12/14/87 0.00 -L69 1. 75 0.13 -0.19 
12/07/87 -0.06 0.13 o.oo -0.06 0.00 
11/30/87 -0.25 -LOO 0.88 -0.06 0.44 
11/23/87 -0.13 0.00 o.oo o.oo 0.19 
11/16/87 -0.63 2.50 -2.19 -0.06 0.38 
11/09/87 0.06 0.00 o.oo .:.o. 06 -0.13 
11/02/87 -1.88 -2.00 3.63 0.13 0.13 
10/26/87 -0.63 -0.13 0.50 -0.38 0.63 
10/19/87 -0.50 -0.25 0.75 -0.50 0.50 
10/12/87 0.00 -0.19 0.25 -0.50 0.00 
10/05/87 -0.13 0.19 0.25 -0.25 -0.06 
09/28/87 0.00 0.50 0.25 -0.88 0.13 
09/21/87 0.00 0.31 -0.50 0.00 0.00 
09/14/87 0.13 -0.13 -0.13 0.06 0.06 
09/07/87 0.00 -2.25 2.13 o.oo 0.00 
08/31/87 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 
08/24/87 0.13 0.81 -0.88 -0.06 0.00 
08/17/87 -0.25 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.19 
08/10/87 -0.19 0.50 -0.25 0.25 -0.31 
08/03/87 -0.06 -0.06 o.oo -0.13 0.25 
07/27/87 -0.06 0.31 -0.13 0.00 -0.13 
07/20/87 -0.13 0.00 0.13 0.06 -0.06 
07/13/87 -0.75 0.88 -0.19 0 .1"9 -0.13 
07/06/87 0.00 -0.06 0.19 -0.19 0.06 
06/29/87 0.00 -1.50 1. 69 0.00 0.00 
06/22/87 -0.19 0.06 0.06 -0.31 0.38 
06/15/87 -0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.13 
06/08/87 -0.13 0.13 0.00 0.06 -0.06 
06/01/87 0.31 0.00 -0.25 -0.06 o.oo 
05/25/87 o.oo -0.25 -0.13 o.oo 0.00 
05/18/87 -0.13 0.50 -0.38 0.13 -0.13 
05/11/87 -0.06 -0.06 0.13 -0.13 0.13 
05/04/87 -0.06 0.13 -0.25 o.oo 0.19 
04/27/87 -0.25 1.25 -0.25 o.oo -0.75 
04/20/87 -0.13 0.69 -0.50 o.oo -0.06 
04/13/87 -0.06 0.00 -0.31 0.13 0.25 
04/06/87 0.13 0.38 -0.38 0.13 -0.25 
03/30/87 -0.13 0.25 -0.19 -0.13 0.19 
03/23/87 0.00 0.31 -0.25 -0.06 0.00 
03/16/87 -0.13 -0.06 0.25 0.06 -0.13 
03/09/87 -0.13 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 
03/02/87 -0.13 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.13 
02/23/87 o.oo o.oo o.oo 0.13 -0.13 
02/16/87 0.00 -0.63 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 
02/09/87 -0.06 -4.25 4.13 a.op 0.19 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW W TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
02/02/87 -0.31 -0.19 0.13 0.25 0.13 
01/26/87 0.00 0.69 -0.44 0.13 -0.38 
01/19/87 0.00 -0.13 0.13 -0.19 0.00 
01/12/87 0.00 -3.19 3.00 0.00 0.19 
01/05/87 -0.56 -0.25 o.oo 0.00 0.81 
12/29/86 6.75 -15.50 o.oo 0.00 2.75 
12/22/86 -0.13 -0.13 o.oo o.oo -0.13 
12/15/86 -0.13 1. 06 -1.19 -0.06 0.31 
12/08/86 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.13 -0.06 
12/01/86 -2.00 1.00 -1. 00 -0.13 2.13 
11/24/86 0.00 0.00 o.oo o.oo -0.25 
11/17/86 -0.13 3.94 -3.81 -0.31 0.31 
11/10/86 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
11/03/86 -0.19 2.69 -2.50 -0.19 0.19 
10/27/86 -0.25 0.06 0.31 -0.25 0.13 
10/20/86 0.00 1.44 -1.13 -0.38 0.06 
10/13/86 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/06/86 -0.63 1.00 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
09/29/86 0.13 0.13 -0.19 -0.44 0.38 
09/22/86 -0.25 0.63 -0.38 0.06 -0.06 
09/15/86 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.25 
09/08/86 0.13 0.88 -0.88 -0.06 -0.06 
09/01/86 0.00 -0.13 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
08/25/86 -0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.13 
08/18/86 0.06 -0.19 -0.19 -0.25 0.56 
08/11/86 -0.06 -0.44 0.69 0.56 -0.75 
08/04/86 0.00 0.06 o.oo 0.06 -0.13 
07/28/86 -0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.06 
07/21/86 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 
07/14/86 0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.25 0.13 
07/07/86 -0.06 -0.13 0.06 -0.56 0.69 
06/30/86 -0.38 0.25 -0.56 0.00 o.oo 
06/23/86 -0.06 -0.69 0.81 -0.19 0.13 
06/16/86 -0.19 0.19 o.oo -0.06 0.06 
06/09/86 -0.19 0.06 o.oo 0.00 0.13 
06/02/86 -0.13 0.50 -0.44 -0.06 0.13 
05/26/86 0.00 -0.31 o.oo 0.06 0.00 
05/19/86 0.00 0.06 0.13 -0.13 -0.06 
05/12/86 -0.06 -0.06 0.38 -0.19 -0.06 
05/05/86 -0.06 -0.19 0.38 -0.06 -0.06 
04/28/86 0.13 0.56 -0.50 -0.31 0.13 
04/21/86 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 -0.13 0.31 
04/14/86 0.00 0.00 -0.25 0.13 0.13 
04/07/86 o.oo o.oo 0.06 -0.13· 0.06 
03/31/86 0.06 -0.56 0.31 -0.56 0.75 
03/24/86 0.00 -0.13 0.25 -1.00 0.88 
03/17/86 0.00 -0.25 0.13 -0.19 0.31 
03/10/86 0.13 0.31 -0.38 -0.25 0.19 
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DATE OF CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE CHANGE 
MONDAY'S IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF IN FF 
AUCTION M TO TU TU TOW w TO TH TH TO F FR TOM 
03/03/86 -0.13 0.13 -0.13 -0.38 0.50 
02/24/86 -0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
02/17/86 o.oo -0.50 0.13 -0.19 0.00 
02/10/86 0.94 -1.00 -0.06 -0.31 0.44 
02/03/86 -0.44 0.31 -0.06 0.06 0.13 
01/27/86 -0.25 o.oo 0.38 0.00 -0.13 
01/20/86 0.00 --o. 38 0.13 _;0.13 0.00 
01/13/86 o.oo -2.00 1 •. 88 0.00 0.13 
01/06/86 0.00 -0.06 0.19 -0.13 0.00 
12/30/85 -4.50 0.00 o.oo -1. 63 na 
12/23/85 -0.25 0.00 o.oo -1. 00 1.25 
12/16/85 -0.56 2.06 -1. 63 o.oo 0.00 
12/09/85 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.13 
12/02/85 -0.75 0.13 -0.38 -0.25 1. 25 
11/25/85 -0.13 1. 25 o.oo o.oo -1. 63 
11/18/85 -1. 38 4.00 -1.88 -1. 63 0.88 
11/11/85 0.00 -0.25 0.38 0.13 0.00 
11/04/85 0.00 0.25 -0.25 -0.25 0.25 
10/28/85 -0.13 0.50 0.06 -0.19 -0.25 
10/21/85 0.00 0.38 -0.38 -0.38 0.38 
10/14/85 0.00 -0.50 0.13 0.13 0.00 
10/07/85 0.00 0.38 o.oo 0.13 -0.50 
09/30/85 -1.50 -1.13 0.13 -0.38 2.88 
09/23/85 -0.19 0.69 -0.63 -0.63 0.75 
09/16/85 -0.13 0.06 0.63 -0.50 -0.06 
09/09/85 0.19 0.19 -0.13 o.oo -0.25 
09/02/85 0.00 -0.75 0.25 -0.13 0.00 
08/26/85 0.13 -1. 00 0.88 0.25 -0.25 
08/19/85 -0.38 0.13 0.25 -0.25 0.25 
08/12/85 0.19 0.63 0.00 -0.56 -0.25 
08/05/85 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.19 0.25 
07/29/85 0.00 0.00 8.38 -0.75 NA 
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Figure 2. Time Series of the Change ·in the Asked Rate N 
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Figure 3. Time Series of the Change in the Bid-Ask Spread 
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